Greenspring Racquet Club v. Baltimore County, Md.

• Decision Date: 30 November 1999
• Docket Number: Civil No. AMD99-469.
• Citation: 77 F.Supp.2d 699
• Parties: GREENSPRING RACQUET CLUB, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

77 F.Supp.2d 699

GREENSPRING RACQUET CLUB, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND, Defendant.

Civil No. AMD99-469.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

November 30, 1999.

H. Russell Smouse, Julius W. Lichter, Towson, MD, Robert H. Freilich, Freilich, Leitner & Carisle, Kansas City, MO, for plaintiff.

Virginia W. Barnhart, John E. Beverungen, Jeffrey Grant Cook, Towson, MD, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

DAVIS, District Judge.

On September 27, 1999, I dismissed with prejudice the seven count complaint brought by plaintiff Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc.¹ Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 70 F.Supp.2d 598 (D.Md.1999). Now pending is defendant Baltimore County's motion for attorney's fees pursuant to The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). On the basis of the findings and conclusions set forth herein, I am persuaded that all of Greenspring's claims were "frivolous, unreasonable, [and] without foundation." Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, 124 F.3d 597, 606 (4th Cir.1997). Accordingly, I shall award attorney's fees to the County in the amount of $33,522.50.

(i)

Greenspring brought suit on January 29, 1999, in a disorganized eight count complaint naming ten defendants. At a hearing on April 21, 1999, I dismissed the complaint with leave to amend and with instructions to plaintiff's counsel to properly allege separate counts identifying their basis in law. On May 14, 1999, Greenspring filed a "Second Amended Complaint" alleging seven counts against the County challenging the County's enforcement of County Council Bill No. 111-98 ("the Ordinance") to prevent it from replacing its racquet club with one or more office towers more than three stories high.²

To summarize briefly, and reading Greenspring's complaint liberally as was required in respect to a motion to dismiss, see Conley v. Gibson 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), I found that Greenspring had alleged the County applied the Ordinance to effectuate an unconstitutional "taking" of their property without just compensation, and to violate constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. Greenspring sought relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law. I dismissed with prejudice all of plaintiff's claims.

The takings claims alleged a property interest sufficient to invoke a Fifth Amendment analysis,³ however, they failed because Greenspring did not allege facts supporting its assertion that it had been deprived of "substantially all of the economic value of its property as a consequence of its failure to obtain the desired exemption." See Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc., 70 F.Supp.2d at 602. This well-established element of a takings claim was reiterated by the Supreme Court as recently as 1996 in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384-85, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994).

The equal protection claims failed because Greenspring alleged neither that a fundamental right had been compromised nor an invidious motive, either of which would have triggered heightened scrutiny.⁴ Instead, rational basis review was appropriate, and the County's actions in enacting and enforcing the Ordinance were clearly justified by legitimate concerns about traffic congestion, protection of rural zones and other land use purposes. See Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 828-29 (4th Cir.1995).

The procedural due process claim failed because the projected delay of two years to pursue administrative and judicial appeals does not constitute an unconstitutional burden. See Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc., 70 F.Supp.2d at 604. Substantive due process was not violated because a post deprivation procedure exists which can rectify any wrongful deprivation, and indeed Greenspring is pursuing that process. Id. at 605. In any event, I found that denial of the Section 2 exemption fell "far short of the type of state action which is `so arbitrary or irrational, so unjustified by any circumstance or governmental interest' that the `residual protections' of the equal protection clause are invoked." Id. (citing Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48 F.3d at 827).

(ii)

As a preliminary matter, Greenspring asserts that the County's motion for attorney's fees should not be considered because it was filed three days late. However, because the County has demonstrated good cause that the short, nonprejudicial delay in filing its application was the result of excusable neglect, I exercise my discretion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(2) to accept the fees motion.

Rule 6(b)(2) provides that: "[T]he court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion ... permit [a motion to be filed after the time period specified in the rules] when ... the failure to [timely file] ... was the result of excusable neglect." "Excusable neglect" is "inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness," In re SPR Corp., 45 F.3d 70, 72 (4th Cir.1995) (interpreting "excusable neglect" provision of Bankruptcy Code), which is excusable, "`taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission.'" Id. (quoting Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (interpreting "excusable neglect" provision of Bankruptcy Code)). In particular, courts are to exercise an equitable discretion to alter time limits after considering four factors: "(1) the danger of prejudice to the ... nonmovant, (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith." Id. (internal quotations omitted).

I have considered each of these factors and I find that they militate heavily in favor of acceptance of the County's motion for attorney's fees. Greenspring does not allege that it has been prejudiced by the County's three-day delay in filing its fees motion. The delay was a brief one and had no impact on these proceedings. The judgment of dismissal is now on appeal to the Fourth Circuit and the minor delay has not impeded the prompt resolution of the motion. Any appeal of the instant decision on the County's motion for attorney's fees might be easily joined with the appeal on the merits of Greenspring's claims.

Moreover, as affirmed in the affidavit of the lead attorney for the County, the reason for the delay was a personal family emergency utterly beyond his control to predict or anticipate; it was perfectly understandable that he would temporarily be distracted from some of his professional obligations such as the fees motion deadline in this case. Thus, for these reasons, and because, in fact, the attorney for the County did not rely upon his personal circumstances as an excuse to seek a long delay, I find that the County attorney acted in good faith. Accordingly, I deem the County's motion for attorney's fees timely filed.⁵

(iii)

As amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides in pertinent part, "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section ... 1983 the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." Because the County's motion to dismiss was granted on all counts, the County was clearly the prevailing party here.

Section 1988(b) is part of the Congressional scheme to promote enforcement of constitutional and civil rights law by private parties. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980); see also Christiansburg Garment Company v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978) (setting standard for attorney's fees awards to defendants in actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).⁶ Thus, a different standard applies to determine whether fees will be awarded when a defendant prevails. As the Supreme Court explained, "[t]o take the further step of assessing attorney's fees against plaintiffs simply because they do not finally prevail would substantially add to the risks inhering in most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote vigorous enforcement ..." Id. at 422, 98 S.Ct. 694. Congress specifically intended the attorney's fees provision to "make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit." Id. at 420, 98 S.Ct. 694. A second factor cited by the Supreme Court as discouraging fee awards to defendants in civil rights suits is the fact that an attorney's fee award to a prevailing plaintiff is an award "against a violator of federal law." Id. at 418, 98 S.Ct. 694.

The absence of these factors when a defendant prevails in such cases dictates that an award of attorney's fees to a defendant must be based on the "quite different equitable considerations," id. at 419, 98 S.Ct. 694, of discouraging groundless lawsuits. Id. at 420, 98 S.Ct. 694. Hence, "a plaintiff should not be assessed his opponent's attorney's fees unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Id. at 421, 98 S.Ct. 694. See also DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499, 510 (4th Cir.1999); Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at 606. "In applying these criteria," the Supreme Court cautioned, "it is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation." Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22, 98 S.Ct. 694.

Applying the Christiansburg criteria to the present case dictates a grant of attorney's fees to the County. In particular, Greenspring's takings claims were without legal foundation. Greenspring asserted numerous theories of a property interest which were unjustly infringed by the County's actions. Only one of these...