Meyers v. Wal-Mart Stores, East, Inc.

Citation77 F.Supp.2d 826
Decision Date21 December 1999
Docket NumberNo. CIV. 97-40517.,CIV. 97-40517.
PartiesWilliam J. MEYERS, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES, EAST, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

Jeffrey T. Meyers, Linda M. Galante, Detroit, MI, John D. Nickola, Flint, MI, for Plaintiff.

Ronald E. Westen, Lupo & Koczkur, Detroit, MI, Jeffrey S. Sutton, Columbus, OH, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL; GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR REMITTITUR; AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

GADOLA, District Judge.

A jury trial was conducted in the above-captioned matter, the Honorable Paul V. Gadola, presiding. The trial commenced July 7, 1999, but was subsequently adjourned for a period of nine days due to a death in the family of plaintiff William Meyers. The trial then resumed with the consent of both parties on July 16, July 19, and July 20, 1999. On July 20, 1999, at the conclusion of the four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff.1

As discussed more fully below, the jury awarded plaintiff a total of $1,501,400 in economic and non-economic damages. The jury also found plaintiff five percent comparatively negligent, thus reducing the total award to $1,426,330. Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff on July 29, 1999.

On August 12, 1999, defendant Wal-Mart Stores, East, Inc., (hereinafter "Wal-Mart") timely filed three post-trial motions. The first is a motion for new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. In the alternative, defendant requests remittitur of the jury award. Finally, defendant renews its motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) on the issue of causation regarding plaintiff's allegation of aggravated arthritis. Defendant maintains that there is an absence of evidence showing a causal connection between plaintiff's fall and the alleged "flare-ups" of plaintiff's rheumatoid arthritis. Plaintiff responded to defendant's motions on August 27, 1999. Defendant filed its reply brief on September 21, 1999.

For the reasons set forth hereinbelow, the Court will deny defendant's motion for new trial, grant defendant's motion for remittitur, and deny defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The instant case arose out of an incident which occurred on January 8, 1997 in a Sam's Club warehouse store, owned by defendant Wal-Mart. Plaintiff William J. Meyers and his wife visited the store located in Southgate, Michigan. Plaintiff and his wife shopped for approximately 45 minutes to one hour. After filling two carts with groceries and other items, they proceeded to the checkout lines. While his wife waited in line, plaintiff went to get a cup of frozen custard. Upon his return, his wife asked plaintiff to go to the box area in order to retrieve a box for their purchases since the store does not provide its customers with bags.

Plaintiff proceeded to the garage area located near the exit doors. The boxes in the back of this area were stacked four or five feet high. The boxes in the front were "scattered all over the place" and were in disarray, according to plaintiff. Just before entering the garage area, plaintiff put his custard down. He moved a few boxes with his feet and some with his hands in order to get the box he wanted. Plaintiff then turned around, grabbed his custard in one hand while holding a box in the other hand. At this point, plaintiff began to exit the garage area, whereupon his left foot allegedly tripped on a box and he fell. Plaintiff suffered a fractured hip.

On December 30, 1997, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant Wal-Mart, alleging that Wal-Mart had maintained the open box bin area of its premises in a negligent fashion with boxes lying upon the floor in a haphazard, disorganized, and dangerous condition. In the complaint, plaintiff alleged the following breaches of defendant's duty of care: (1) failure to maintain the open area in a condition so as to eliminate trip hazards from the area; (2) failure to provide customers with shopping bags so as to avoid the necessity of customers entering the open area where boxes are strewn about; and (3) failure to provide bins and/or other holding devices so that boxes might be safely accessed by customers. See Complaint ¶ 12.

On December 11, 1998, this Court issued a memorandum opinion and order denying defendant's motion for summary judgment. SeeMeyers v. Wal-Mart Stores, East, Inc., 29 F. Supp.2d 780 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (Gadola, J.). In that opinion, after a discussion of the current state of Michigan premises liability law and after reviewing the evidence presented at that point by both parties, this Court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an unreasonably dangerous situation existed on defendant's premises. See id. at 785-86.

Subsequent to the denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment, both parties expressed a willingness to enter into mediation. Mediation was scheduled with the approval of this Court. See January 15, 1999 Order of Reference to Mediation Tribunal Association. On March 2, 1999, the mediator issued a finding of liability on the part of defendant Wal-Mart in the amount of $500,000. Plaintiff accepted that amount as fair compensation. Defendant, however, rejected the mediator's assessment. See Mar. 2, 1999 Notification of Acceptance or Rejection of Mediation Evaluation. As a consequence, the case proceeded to trial.

As mentioned previously, trial in the above-entitled matter commenced July 7, 1999, but was subsequently adjourned for a period of nine days due to a death in the family of plaintiff William Meyers. The trial then resumed with the consent of both parties on July 16, July 19, and July 20, 1999. Upon resumption of the trial, the Court had excused two jurors for prepaid prolonged long-distance trips. Shortly thereafter, a third juror was also excused due to severe illness. On July 14, 1999, the parties filed a written stipulation to proceed with five jurors. See July 14, 1999 stipulation. On July 20, 1999, the parties filed a stipulation to proceed with four jurors, the number of jurors then remaining. See July 20, 1999 stipulation. On July 20, 1999, at the conclusion of the four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff.

The jury awarded plaintiff a total of $1,000,000 in non-economic damages sustained by plaintiff to the present time, $500,000 in non-economic damages reasonably certain to sustain in the future, and $1,400 in economic damages. The jury also found plaintiff 5 per cent comparatively negligent. The Court thus reduced the total award by 5 per cent to $1,426,330. A judgment was entered on July 29, 1999.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that

[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues ... in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States....

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 59(a). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has interpreted Rule 59 as allowing for a new trial "when a jury has reached a `seriously erroneous result' as evidenced by: (1) the verdict being against the weight of the evidence; (2) the damages being excessive; or (3) the trial being unfair to the moving party in some fashion, i.e., the proceedings being influenced by prejudice or bias." Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1045-46 (6th Cir. 1996)(citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251, 61 S.Ct. 189, 194, 85 L.Ed. 147 (1940); Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 835 (7th Cir.1989); and Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 717 F.2d 683, 691 (2d Cir. 1983)). Whether to grant or deny a motion for new trial is "committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." Norfin, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 81 F.R.D. 614, 616 (D.Colo. 1979).

Instead of granting a new trial, the court may alternatively grant a remittitur of the amount of damages awarded by the jury. A district court should grant such a motion only if "the award clearly exceeds `the amount which, under the evidence in the case was the maximum that a jury could reasonably find to be compensatory' for the plaintiff's loss." Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 96 F.3d 151, 156 (6th Cir. 1996)(citing In re Lewis, 845 F.2d 624, 635 (6th Cir.1988) and Manning v. Altec, Inc., 488 F.2d 127, 133 (6th Cir. 1973)). "`Unless the award is (1) beyond the range supportable by proof or (2) so excessive as to shock the conscience, ... or (3) the result of a mistake, we must let the award stand.'" Id. (citing Leila Hosp. & Health Ctr. v. Xonics Medical Sys., 948 F.2d 271, 278 (6th Cir.1991)). The district court's review of a motion for remittitur is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id.

Defendant has also brought a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50,

[i]f during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.

Motions for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before submission of the case to the jury. Such a motion shall specify the judgment sought and the law and the facts on which the moving party is entitled to the judgment.

* * * * * *

If, for any reason, the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all the...

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  • Kovacic v. Ponstingle
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Ohio
    • 22 Septiembre 2014
    ...testify regarding their symptoms (and when they began), but may not testify to causation. See, e.g., Meyers v. Wal-Mart Stores, E., Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 826, 835-36 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (plaintiff was competent, under similarMichigan law, to testify "relating to how he felt before and after hi......
  • Meyers v. Wal-mart Stores, East, Inc., 00-1046
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • 6 Junio 2001
    ...of the evidence in support of the award and the constitutionality of the four-person jury. See Meyers v. Wal-Mart Stores, East, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 826, 830-32, 835-37 (E.D. Mich. 1999). However, the court granted Wal-Mart's motion to remit the verdict based upon a range of allegedly compa......

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