77 Hawai'i 222, State v. French

Decision Date31 October 1994
Docket NumberNo. 16317,16317
Citation883 P.2d 644
CourtHawaii Court of Appeals
Parties77 Hawai'i 222 STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dale E. FRENCH, Defendant-Appellant.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under the United States Constitution, Defendant has the constitutional right to conduct his own defense.

2. A defendant cannot complain about the quality of his own defense once he chooses to represent himself.

3. The appellate court must determine from the record whether there was an unequivocal waiver of Defendant's right to counsel.

4. Presently, there is no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the [Hawaiian] Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state's sovereign nature.

5. The first part of clause 2, section 2, of article III, of the United States Constitution confers original jurisdiction in the United States Supreme Court over all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.

6. Article III, section 2, clause 2 of the United States Constitution does not grant original jurisdiction to the United States Supreme Court in a case, as here, between a state and one of its own citizens.

7. Original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court under article III, section 2, clause 2 of the United States Constitution, in cases where the State is a party is confined to civil suits where damage has been inflicted or is threatened, not to the enforcement of penal statutes of a state.

8. Traffic statutes, HRS §§ 431:10C-104(b), 291-11.6, 286-25, and 286-102 are penal in nature.

9. Although a violation does not constitute a crime, it constitutes a penal offense, and the legislature intended its penalties for violations to be criminal penalties.

10. None of the provisions in HRS §§ 431:10C-104(b), 291-11.6, 286-25, and 286-102 limit their application to vehicles used for state or business purposes only. The statutes apply to persons and a "person" is defined, "in general usage, as a human being (i.e. natural person)." And "whoever" means "whatever person."

11. As part of the exercise of its police power, a state may, in the absence of national legislation, rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles,--those moving in interstate commerce as well as others. And to this end it may require the registration of such vehicles and the licensing of their drivers.

12. The right to travel has been recognized as a fundamental constitutional right under the United States Constitution. This fundamental right is founded on the principle that citizens of the United States, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States. Consequently, the right to travel recognized by the supreme court in this context is the right to interstate travel.

13. The Supreme Court of Hawai'i has recognized a right to freedom of movement under article I, section 2 of the Constitution of the State of Hawai'i. This right includes the right of men and women to move from place to place, to walk in the fields in the country or on the streets of a city, and to stand under open sky. Yet, this right, too, is subject to the State's police power to regulate an individual's conduct for the protection of society.

14. Pursuant to its police power, the State may regulate the operation of motor vehicles for the safety and order of the general public. Thus, statutes similar to the ones here are commonly held to be constitutional because the requirements imposed on the operation of motor vehicles are rationally related to the purpose of the statutes.

15. The State's requirements that all persons who operate motor vehicles on state highways possess a valid driver's license and safety inspection tags are valid exercises of the state's police power and are rationally related to the state's purpose in safeguarding the health and safety of its citizens, and the means employed by the state are rationally related to the purpose of the statutes.

16. It is a well-established doctrine that in regulating the use of public highways, the state has always been afforded exceptionally broad discretion.

Dale E. French, defendant-appellant pro se, on the brief.

Gerald A. Garcia, Deputy Prosecuting Atty., County of Hawai'i, on the brief, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before BURNS C.J., and HEEN and ACOBA, JJ.

ACOBA, Judge.

Defendant-Appellant Dale E. French (Defendant), appearing pro se, appeals from traffic violation convictions in the district court. Defendant argues, in effect, that his right to a fair trial was violated. He also claims that the district court lacked jurisdiction in his case because the United States Supreme Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to article III, section 2, of the United States Constitution and alternatively, because he is a member of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Finally, he contends that the traffic statutes involved violated his right to travel.

We affirm.

On January 9, 1991, Defendant was arraigned on various traffic offenses in the district court. He filed a written statement and "plea of innocence," and the matter was transferred to the circuit court. On January 17, 1991, the State filed a complaint charging Defendant with the violation of several traffic offenses. The complaint charged that on December 12, 1990, Defendant operated a motor vehicle "without [it] being insured under a no-fault policy" in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 431:10C-104(b) (Special Pamphlet 1987) (Count I), "without being restrained by a seat assembly" in violation of HRS § 291-11.6 (1985) (Count II), "without a current official certificate of inspection" in violation of HRS § 286-25 (1985) (Count III), and "without first being ... licensed as a qualified driver[,]" in violation of HRS § 286-102 (1985) (Count IV). On February 12, 1991, Defendant filed an answer.

Pursuant to a recommendation filed on October 4, 1991, Defendant was assigned counsel from the Office of the Public Defender. On November 6, 1991, the deputy public defender assigned to Defendant filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. In the affidavit in support of the motion, the deputy disclosed that, "Defendant requested [counsel] to advance a claim of a constitutional right to free and unregulated travel ... [and] to raise a claim of Hawaiian sovereignty[.]" According to the affidavit, counsel explained to Defendant that the constitutional claim "appears unwarranted under existing law" and the sovereignty claim "has no factual basis." The affidavit further advised that, "Defendant ... wanted [counsel] to file a motion to withdraw as counsel." The motion to withdraw was granted on November 6, 1991. 1

On December 10, 1991, Defendant, acting pro se, voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial and the case was remanded to district court for a judge trial. 2 On March 9, 1992, Defendant filed a "statement of innocence" and a motion to dismiss, alleging that the district court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction. He was again arraigned on March 11, 1992, and the court treated Defendant's written statements as a plea of not guilty.

Defendant's jurisdictional challenge was argued at a hearing on April 8, 1992, where Defendant appeared with an "interpreter." The court issued an Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on May 22, 1992. It ruled simply that "upon consideration of the arguments presented, [and] the files and records herein[,] ... Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied as the Court had [sic] jurisdiction."

The "interpreter," Joseph Wilkinson, (Wilkinson) was apparently present to aid Defendant who claimed to have problems hearing. The district court minutes indicate that Defendant was "hard of hearing" and Wilkinson, a friend of Defendant, had also been present to act as an "interpreter" at Defendant's arraignment on March 11, 1992, and was at his pre-trial motions hearing on May 13, 1992. The record does not indicate whether Wilkinson was present at Defendant's trial or not.

Defendant filed a pre-trial motion on May 1, 1992, where he made a number of requests. The requests were for (a) a hearing, (b) answers on questions about the law and the courts, (c) the court to "use fair procedure[,]" by conducting all matters connected to his case in writing, because his "hearing ha[d] been 'shot down' by too many years in the construction trade[,]" (d) the court to appoint him counsel of his choice, (e) his rights to be restored, and (f) full disclosure under Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 16 pertaining to discovery.

Request (a), Defendant's request for a hearing on his pre-trial motions, was granted, and a hearing held on May 13, 1992. According to the court's minutes, the "court answered [Defendant's] questions of law" in satisfaction of item (b).

In connection with item (c), the court apparently granted Defendant's request relating to proceedings being in writing, but to what extent this was required is not clear.

Defendant's request for counsel of his choice, item (d), was also granted by the court on the condition that counsel be licensed by the State. In his brief, Defendant states that he did not want appointed counsel from the public defender's office or any counsel licensed by the State because he "[could not] afford to have an enemy in [his] camp as counsel."

Item (e) apparently amounts to a demand that the case against him be dismissed. Finally, the minutes indicate that the "State handed ... copies of tickets & information regarding license [sic] to [Defendant]" in compliance with item (d), his HRPP Rule 16 disclosure request. 3

Defendant was tried on July 8, 1992, and found guilty. The district court imposed fines for the convictions. 4 On July 17, 1992, Defendant appealed. 5

Defendant appears pro se on his appeal. Neither party requested that a transcript of...

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