77 Hawai'i 51, State v. Bowe

• Decision Date: 06 October 1994
• Docket Number: No. 16222,16222
• Citation: 77 Hawaii 51,881 P.2d 538
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court
• Parties: 77 Hawai'i 51, 63 USLW 2264, 94 Ed. Law Rep. 575, 48 A.L.R.5th 907 STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Troy BOWE, Defendant-Appellee, and Vincent Smalls, Defendant.

Page 538

881 P.2d 538

77 Hawai'i 51, 63 USLW 2264, 94 Ed.

Law Rep. 575,

48 A.L.R.5th 907

STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Troy BOWE, Defendant-Appellee and Vincent Smalls, Defendant.

No. 16222.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Oct. 6, 1994.

James H.S. Choi, Deputy Pros. Atty., City and County of Honolulu, on the briefs, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellant.

David C. Schutter, Mitchell S. Wong and Paul D. Hicks of Schutter & Glickstein, on the briefs, Honolulu, for defendant-appellee.

Before KLEIN, Acting C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA and RAMIL, JJ., and SOONG, Circuit Court Judge, In Place of MOON, C.J., recused.

RAMIL, Justice.

The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the coercive conduct of a private person is sufficient to render a confession inadmissible.

On September 17, 1991, Defendant-Appellee Troy Bowe (Defendant) was charged with Assault in the Second Degree in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-711 (Supp.1992). Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence arguing that his statement to the police was involuntary because it was the result of undue influence by Coach Riley Wallace (Wallace). In granting Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, the circuit court concluded that the coercive conduct of Wallace was sufficient to render Defendant's confession inadmissible under HRS § 621-26 (1985) . We agree and affirm.

I. FACTS

On January 21, 1990, a brawl involving a number of individuals occurred at one of the dormitory buildings on the University of Hawai'i-Manoa (UH) campus. During the fight, Steven Oshiro (Victim) was beaten and sustained physical injuries.

On February 9, 1990, Sergeant John Pinero (Sergeant Pinero) of the Honolulu Police Department (HPD) contacted Wallace, head coach of the UH Men's Basketball Team, and requested his assistance in making arrangements for the police to interview certain members of the basketball team suspected of being involved in the January 21, 1990 fight. Sergeant Pinero provided Wallace with a list of suspects that included Defendant.

Wallace later told Defendant that he needed to go to the police station and that Wallace would go with Defendant if he required assistance. On February 12, 1990, Defendant went to the police station accompanied by Wallace. Defendant was given Miranda warnings and subsequently signed an HPD Form 81, waiving his constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent. After waiving his constitutional rights, an interrogation commenced in which Defendant admitted assaulting Victim.

On September 17, 1991, an Oahu Grand Jury indicted Defendant and Vincent Smalls for Assault in the Second Degree, in violation of HRS § 707-711(1)(a).

On November 21, 1991, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence on the grounds that his February 12, 1990 statement to the police was involuntary because it was obtained through the use of official state coercion in violation of Defendant's constitutional right to due process. On May 8, 1992, the circuit court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. This timely appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

The Prosecution contends that the circuit court erred by granting Defendant's motion to suppress his February 12, 1990 confession to police because coercive police action is required for a confession to be found involuntary. Thus, the Prosecution maintains that the circuit court erred in concluding that Defendant's confession was involuntary as a result of Wallace's coercive influence. ¹

We review the circuit court's conclusions of law (COLs) under the right/wrong standard. State v. Furutani, 76 Hawai'i 172, 180, 873 P.2d 51, 59 (Sup.1994) (citation omitted). A COL is not binding upon the appellate court and is freely reviewable for its correctness. Id. Moreover, a COL that is supported by the trial court's findings of fact and that reflects an application of the correct rule of law will not be overturned. Id.

In granting Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, the circuit court entered the following COLs:

3. Defendant TROY BOWE'S statement to Sergeant Pinero on February 12, 1990, was coerced and the result of undue influence brought to bear upon him by Wallace.

4. Defendant TROY BOWE's statement to Sergeant Pinero was not the product of his rational intellect and free will because Defendant TROY BOWE feared that if he did not follow Wallace's direction, he would be suspended from the Basketball Team, and therefore said statement was not voluntary.

5. Said statement being involuntary, it is barred from being received in evidence under [HRS] § 621-26.

6. This Court makes no ruling on Defendant TROY BOWE's argument that Wallace was exercising State police power when he instructed Defendant TROY BOWE to go to the Honolulu Police Department.

By declining to rule on whether Wallace was exercising "State police power," the circuit court implicitly concluded that coercive conduct of a private person, namely Wallace, was sufficient to render a confession inadmissible under HRS § 621-26. ²

Whether the coercive conduct of a private person is sufficient to render a confession involuntary is a case of first impression in this jurisdiction. Thus, the Prosecution relies on Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), for support. In Connelly, the United States Supreme Court held that coercive police conduct is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not voluntary under the due process clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 167, 107 S.Ct. at 522. Therefore, the Prosecution maintains that absent a finding that the police engaged in some coercive activity, Bowe's confession must be deemed voluntary. Thus, we begin our analysis with Connelly.

A. Colorado v. Connelly

In Connelly, Connelly approached a police officer in downtown Denver and, without any prompting, confessed to a murder. Id. at 160, 107 S.Ct. at 518. The officer immediately advised him of his Miranda rights. Id. Connelly replied that he understood his rights but still wanted to talk about the murder. Id. at 160, 107 S.Ct. at 518. Connelly also stated to the police officer that he had been a patient in several mental hospitals. Id. After another police officer arrived, Connelly was again advised of his rights and was asked "what he had on his mind." Id. Connelly answered that he had come all the way from Boston to confess to the murder of a young girl who had been killed in Denver in late 1982. Id. After being held overnight, Connelly became visibly disoriented the next morning and stated for the first time that "voices" had told him to come to Denver and confess. Id. at 161, 107 S.Ct. at 518. Connelly was then sent to a state hospital and evaluated by a psychiatrist. Id.

At a preliminary hearing before a Colorado trial court, Connelly moved to suppress his statements to the police. Id. at 161, 107 S.Ct. at 519. The psychiatrist who evaluated Connelly testified that Connelly was experiencing "command hallucinations" and that this psychotic condition had motivated his confession but had not impaired his ability to understand his Miranda rights. Id. The Colorado trial court ruled that the initial statements and the custodial confession must be suppressed because they were involuntary, although the police had done nothing coercive in securing them. Id. at 162, 107 S.Ct. at 519.

The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed, holding that the admission of the evidence would violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, and that Connelly's mental condition had precluded his ability to make a valid waiver of his Miranda rights. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court further stated that the issue of voluntariness must be resolved by evaluating the totality of circumstances and that the absence of police coercion or duress did not foreclose a finding of involuntariness. Id. The court stated that the ultimate test of voluntariness is whether the statement was the product of a rational intellect and free will, and declared that free will may be overborne as much by certain forms of severe mental illness as by external pressure. Id. The court also concluded that admitting Connelly's confession constituted "state action" in violation of the fourteenth amendment, stating that "[s]tate action enters the picture ... when a trial court permits the prosecution ... to utilize [an involuntary confession] as evidence of guilt." Id. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Writing for six members of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that "coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." ³ Id. at 167, 107 S.Ct. at 522. Therefore, because Connelly had not been coerced by the police into making his incriminating statements, the Court concluded that the admission of his confession into evidence would not constitute a constitutional violation. Id.

The Supreme Court noted that precedent demonstrated that police overreaching has been a "crucial element" in its confession cases for fifty years. Id. at 163, 107 S.Ct. at 520. The Court also rejected the Colorado Supreme Court's conclusion that admitting Connelly's confession would constitute state action, noting that the Colorado Supreme Court had failed to recognize the essential link between coercive activity of the State and a resulting confession. Id. at 165, 107 S.Ct. at 521. The Court further stated that courts should exclude illegally obtained evidence only to deter future constitutional violations, and that excluding Connelly's confession would "serve absolutely no purpose in enforcing constitutional guarantees." Id. at 166, 107 S.Ct. at 521.

Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justice Marshall, argued that admitting the involuntary confession of a mentally ill person is ...