New York State Medical Transporters Ass'n, Inc. v. Perales

• Decision Date: 20 December 1990
• Citation: 564 N.Y.S.2d 1007,566 N.E.2d 134,77 N.Y.2d 126
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 566 N.E.2d 134, Medicare & Medicaid Guide P 39,090 In the Matter of NEW YORK STATE MEDICAL TRANSPORTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Appellants, v. Cesar A. PERALES, as Commissioner of the Department of Social Services of the State of New York, Respondent.

Page 1007

564 N.Y.S.2d 1007

77 N.Y.2d 126, 566 N.E.2d 134,

Medicare & Medicaid Guide P 39,090

In the Matter of NEW YORK STATE MEDICAL TRANSPORTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Appellants, v. Cesar A. PERALES, as Commissioner of the Department of Social Services of the State of New York, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 20, 1990.

Daniel J. Roberts and Jeffrey M. Roberts, for appellants.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. (Michele M. Woodard, O. Peter Sherwood, Lawrence S. Kahn, Harvey M. Berman and Elizabeth Bradford, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

KAYE, Judge.

Petitioners, providers of nonemergency transportation services to Medicaid recipients, by this proceeding seek to compel respondent, Commissioner of the Department of Social Services (DSS), to process their claims for transportation services rendered to Medicaid recipients without the agency's prior approval. Petitioners acknowledge that prior agency approval is a statutory prerequisite but contend they are nonetheless entitled to have their claims processed because of an informal practice permitting them to obtain "retroactive prior approval" after the services were rendered, which respondent should either be estopped from contesting, or found to have ratified. In that there is no basis here for the application of estoppel or ratification, we affirm the order of the Appellate Division dismissing the petition. 160 A.D.2d 710, 553 N.Y.S.2d 790.

By statute, DSS must provide Medicaid recipients with "transportation when essential to obtain care and services" (Social Services Law § 365-a[2][j]. The statute requires that such transportation be "upon prior approval, except in cases of emergency," and the implementing regulation states that "[p]rior authorization by the local social services official shall be required for * * * transportation when essential to obtain medical care and services except emergency care" (18 NYCRR 505.10[b].

Petitioner New York State Medical Transporters Association, Inc. is an association of companies that provide nonemergency invalid coach services to Medicaid recipients. Petitioner Medicab Inc. of New York was such a company during times relevant to this lawsuit, but was disqualified from further participation in the Medicaid program because its president pleaded guilty to grand larceny in connection with fraudulent Medicaid claims. Although a stipulation would have permitted Medicab's subsidiaries to resume services if certain conditions were met, Medicab's present status is unclear.

It is undisputed that under the applicable New York City plan, medical transporters were not themselves permitted to obtain the requisite approval. Instead, the medical care provider was to request approval from DSS's fiscal agent, a separate entity operating under contract with DSS. After approving a request, the fiscal agent would assign a prior approval number to the claim, which the medical care provider would then communicate to the transporter and the transporter would include on its claim form. A prior approval number did not guarantee that a claim would be paid, only that it would be processed.

Monthly calls for prior approval reached 60,000 in 1986. Because the fiscal agent was unable to respond to that volume of calls, it adopted a practice of giving "retroactive prior approvals" after services had been rendered. The record does not establish when the fiscal agent adopted that practice, or how long it was maintained, or how many patients were transported, or when--prior to May 15, 1987--respondent learned of the practice. ¹

On May 15, 1987, respondent sent petitioner Association a draft letter restating the requirement that prior approval be obtained before transportation services were rendered in all nonemergency cases, and one month later sent the final version of the letter to all transportation providers in New York City. The letter reiterated that "[i]t is the policy of the New York State Medicaid Program that all requests for non-emergency ambulance and ambulette transportation be made via the telephone Prior Approval system at Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) prior to or on the same date as the medical service." The letter further stated that the requirement of prior approval would be relaxed only when "extreme difficulty had been experienced by an ordering provider in getting through on the telephone to obtain a Prior Approval," and that such "retroactive prior approval" requests could in no event be made more than 30 days after the patient had been transported.

By this proceeding, petitioners then sought to compel respondent to reinstitute the prior practice, and also to process claims for transportation that had been provided without prior approval. They do not indicate how many claims are involved, only that respondent denied one request made August 14, 1987 for "prior approval" of transportation provided to a patient in February 1986, and another request made June 27, 1987 for "prior approval" of transportation provided to eight patients in February 1985. While denying that portion of the petition seeking reinstitution of the practice, Supreme Court granted the petition to the extent it sought to compel processing of claims, on the ground that the DSS had "ratified the irregular procedure by its failure to end it within a reasonable time, and by its retention of the benefits resulting from petitioner's services." The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the petition, concluding that there was no basis for the application of estoppel or ratification. We agree.

We have repeatedly made clear that estoppel cannot be invoked against a governmental agency to prevent it from discharging its statutory duties (Matter of Wedinger v. Goldberger, 71 N.Y.2d 428, 441, 527 N.Y.S.2d 180, 522 N.E.2d 25, cert. denied 488 U.S. 850, 109 S.Ct. 132, 102 L.Ed.2d 105; Matter of E.F.S. Ventures Corp. v. Foster, 71 N.Y.2d 359, 369-370, 526 N.Y.S.2d 56, 520 N.E.2d 1345; Matter of Parkview Assocs. v. City of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 274, 282, 525 N.Y.S.2d 176, 519 N.E.2d 1372, cert. denied 488 U.S. 801, 109 S.Ct. 30, 102 L.Ed.2d 9; Scruggs-Leftwich v. Rivercross Tenants' Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 849, 852, 523 N.Y.S.2d 451, 517 N.E.2d 1337). Among other reasons, to permit estoppel against the government "could easily result in large scale public fraud." (Matter of E.F.S. Ventures Corp. v. Foster, supra, 71 N.Y.2d at 370, 526 N.Y.S.2d 56, 520 N.E.2d 1345.) While we have not absolutely precluded the possibility of estoppel against a governmental agency, our decisions have made clear that it is foreclosed "in all but the rarest cases." (Matter of Parkview Assocs. v. City of New York, supra, 71 N.Y.2d at 282, 525 N.Y.S.2d 176, 519 N.E.2d 1372.)

We reject petitioners' contention that this is such a case. First, nothing in this record suggests that the Appellate Division erred when it found that petitioners were well aware that the law required prior approval; thus, petitioners here are in an even weaker position than the petitioner in Parkview Assocs., which could have discovered the law by reasonable diligence (71 N.Y.2d, at 282, 525 N.Y.S.2d 176, 519 N.E.2d 1372, supra ). Second, we are not persuaded that the potential for public fraud is eliminated, as petitioners contend, because they seek only processing, not payment, of their claims. The possibility that collusive behavior will result if the government can be prevented from enforcing a law on the grounds that its agents excused compliance is the same, regardless of the immediacy of the expected benefit.

Finally, petitioners' claim that "manifest injustice" will result if respondent is not compelled to process their claims has no foundation in this record, which does not even reveal how many claims are involved. Furthermore, the law is clear that those who deal with the government are expected to know the law, and cannot rely on the conduct of government agents contrary to law as a basis for "manifest injustice" claims (Parsa v. State of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 143, 147, 485 N.Y.S.2d 27, 474 N.E.2d 235; Heckler v. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 63, 104 S.Ct. 2218, 2225, 81 L.Ed.2d 42). "Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government" (Rock Is., Ark. & La. R.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143, 41 S.Ct. 55, 56, 65 L.Ed. 188). Thus, the Appellate Division correctly concluded that the doctrine of estoppel is not available to allow petitioners--who have only themselves to blame--to avoid the consequences of their own knowing failure to follow the law.

No doubt recognizing the difficulty of their estoppel claim, petitioners advance the closely related doctrine of ratification, contending that respondent knew of its agent's practice, accepted the benefits, and is therefore bound (see generally, 57 N.Y.Jur.2d, Estoppel, Ratification, and Waiver, § 76). For much the same reason, that contention also must fail.

At the outset, ratification of an agent's acts requires knowledge of material facts concerning the allegedly binding transaction (see, e.g., Stauss v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 284 N.Y. 41, 45-47, 29 N.E.2d 462; Pollitz v. Wabash R.R. Co., 207 N.Y. 113, 129-130, 100 N.E. 721; Reuschlein and Gregory, Agency and Partnership § 30, at 74; Restatement [Second] of Agency § 91 [1958]. Here, as the Appellate Division noted, there has been no showing that respondent knew of and intentionally condoned its agent's practice before its letters repudiating that practice. Nor does the record demonstrate that respondent retained benefits provided by petitioners. There was no evidence that the persons to whom transportation services were provided were Medicaid recipients or that that transportation was "essential to obtain care and services." ²

But petitioners' arguments suffer from an even more fundamental flaw. Illegal contracts are not generally enforceable (Weir Metro Ambu-Service v. Turner, 57 N.Y.2d 911, 912, 456 N.Y.S.2d 757, 442 N.E.2d...