Pratt v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.

• Decision Date: 24 January 1899
• Parties: R. C. PRATT, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF W. H. STONE, Deceased, v. THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

77 N.W. 1064

107 Iowa 287

R. C. PRATT, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF W. H. STONE, Deceased, v. THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

January 24, 1899

Appeal from Cass District Court.--HON. WALTER I. SMITH, Judge.

THE petition and amendments thereto are too lengthy to be even fully summarized. It is sufficient to say that it charges that on the tenth day of March, 1894, deceased, W. H. Stone came to his death, without fault on his part, by being struck by one of defendant's passenger trains at a street crossing in Anita, while in his wagon, passing over defendant's track at said crossing; that his death was caused by reason of the negligence of the defendant's servants in failing to give the required and proper signals and warnings of the approach of said train to said crossing by running said train at a high, unusual, and reckless rate of speed, and by sharply sounding the whistle when near the crossing; also, that defendant was negligent in not providing a flagman at said crossing. Plaintiff asks judgment for fifty thousand dollars. The defendant answered, admitting its corporate capacity, and that it was operating a railway through the town of Anita, and, in effect, denying the other allegations of the petition. Verdict and judgment were rendered in favor of the plaintiff for five thousand and twenty dollars. Defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

J. B Rockafellow, Robert Mather, and Carroll Wright for appellant.

Swan & Bruce for appellee.

OPINION

GIVEN, J.

I.

Except in a few particulars, that will be mentioned, there is no conflict in the evidence. The following is a sufficient statement of the facts for the purposes of this appeal: Defendant's railway runs east and west through the town of Anita; the depot building being on the north side of the track, and east of the crossing of a north and south street, called "Chestnut." Part of the town is situated south, and part north, of the railway; and said crossing, being the principal one, is much used. The track east from the crossing is straight for a long distance, and slightly down grade to the west. Some distance south of the track, and east of Chestnut street, was a steam mill, with a driveway around it and between it and a large corncrib standing north, between the mill and the track, and running lengthwise east and west. The mill and crib obscured a view of trains coming from the east by persons going north on the street until the northwest corner of the crib was passed, and from there the view was quite extended. There is some conflict as to the distance from the track to the crib, from the northwest corner of the crib to the crossing, and the extent of the view of the track to the east. The exact distances are not very material, as it is manifest that, taking the shortest distances claimed, deceased had ample opportunity to have seen the train in time to have avoided the collision, if nothing had occurred to prevent him from doing so. In the forenoon of March 10, 1894, deceased, accompanied by his wife, drove his two-horse team and wagon into the north part of the town; and, after leaving Mrs. Stone at a store he drove south, over the crossing, to the south side of the mill, and from there, around the mill, out onto Chestnut street, and thence north onto the crossing, where the fast passenger train going west struck the wagon and killed Mr. Stone. Plaintiff alleges in his petition that the team became frightened by steam escaping from the mill, and that by the time the street was reached it "became unmanageable, or very difficult to control and manage." It is also alleged that by reason of the conduct of the team the attention of Mr. Stone was necessarily given entirely to its management, and that, therefore, he could not and did not observe the approach of the train. While there is much diversity in the testimony as to the conduct of the team, there can be no doubt that the horses were greatly frightened, and that although Mr. Stone, as all agree, made strenuous efforts to control them, he did not succeed in doing so. Some question is made in argument whether the horses were entirely or only partially beyond the control of Mr. Stone. The jury found specially that they were only partially unmanageable and beyond his control. It is evident, however, that they were so much beyond his control that he was unable to stop them before reaching the crossing. Mr. Stone was familiar with that crossing, and knew that this fast train was due to pass about that time; and we may presume that he would not have gone upon the crossing when and as he did, if he could have controlled the team, and observed the approach of the train. As we view it, it is not material whether the team was entirely or only partially beyond his control. There is some conflict in the evidence as to what signals were given, and the speed of the train. These conflicts we will notice further on.

II. Defendant's counsel say in argument "that if the team of the deceased rushed on the track at the crossing because they were frightened and unmanageable, and beyond the control of the driver, and that such condition of the team was due to the fright, for which defendant was in no manner responsible, then the fright was the proximate cause of the accident, or at least a concurring cause, and there can be no recovery." Appellee's counsel say "that when two causes combine to produce an injury, both of which are proximate in their character,--the one being the result of culpable negligence, and the other an occurrence as to which neither party is at fault,--the negligent party is liable, provided the injury would not have been sustained but for such negligence." Appellant cites a number of cases,--among them, the following Iowa cases,--in support of its contention: Knapp v. Railway Co., 65 Iowa 91; Handelun v. Railway Co., 72 Iowa 709; Moss v. City of Burlington, 60 Iowa 438, 15 N.W. 267; Gould v. Railway Co., 66 Iowa 590; DeCamp v. Sioux City, 74 Iowa 392, 37 N.W. 971. While much is said in these cases which seems to support appellant's contention, the question under consideration was not directly passed upon in either of them. In the recent case of Gould v. Schermer, 101 Iowa 582, 70 N.W. 697,--an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff by reason of the alleged negligence of defendant road supervisor in constructing a bridge, by erecting a cattle pass under the same without authority,--the court instructed as follows: "That, if there were other causes than that of the cattle way or defective bridge concurring to produce the injury, plaintiff could not recover, unless these causes were also the wrongful act of the defendant." This court said: "Such instructions were erroneous, for the rule of law is well settled that the mere fact that some other cause operates with the negligence of the defendant to produce the injury does not absolve defendant from liability. His original wrong, concurring with some other cause, and both operating...