State v. Seigler

• Decision Date: 21 March 1913
• Citation: 77 S.E. 731,94 S.C. 117
• Parties: STATE v. SEIGLER.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

77 S.E. 731

94 S.C. 117

STATE v. SEIGLER.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 21, 1913

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Aiken County; Hayne F Rice, Judge.

James Seigler was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals. Affirmed.

The exceptions were as follows:

"(1) The presiding judge erred in standing aside juror J. M Rosier, after he had been examined on his voir dire, for the reason that the said examination did not show that the said juror was not a fair, competent and impartial juror, and it was therefore an abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge to stand him aside, and was prejudicial and harmful to the rights of the defendant.

"(2) The presiding judge erred in admitting in evidence over defendant's objections, the ordinance purporting to be the code of laws of the city of Aiken, for the reason that the said ordinance or code of laws was null and void on its face, as the city council of the city of Aiken had no authority under its charter or under the Constitution of this state, or under the general municipal laws of South Carolina, to pass a single ordinance embodying all offenses made unlawful and prohibited by it, and covering all the subjects, rules, resolutions, and ordinances regulating the various departments of its city government, and, as the said ordinance appears on its face to be null and void, it was error and harmful to the defendant to admit the same in evidence.

"(3) The presiding judge erred in charging the jury on the subject of what provocation would reduce a killing from murder to manslaughter as follows: 'Now, Mr. Foreman and gentlemen of the jury, what is a legal provocation? *** It must be of such nature, Mr. Foreman and gentlemen, that it will arouse in an ordinary man an intense degree of heat and passion in his mind against the party who commits the deed.' For the reason that the said charge instructed the jury that it would take a higher degree of heat and passion, to wit, 'an intense degree,' to reduce a killing from murder to manslaughter than required by the law, as it is respectfully submitted, the law only requires that the heat and passion shall only be of such a degree as to dethrone reason, and render the defendant incapable of cool and deliberate reflection, and therefore the defendant was prejudiced by the said charge.

"(4) The presiding judge erred in charging the jury on the subject of manslaughter as follows: 'Now, Mr. Foreman and gentlemen of the jury, in manslaughter, as I have told you, done in sudden heat and passion, in order for the killing to be reduced from murder to manslaughter, in addition to what I have already charged, I charge you this: That a man must be without fault in bringing about the difficulty. A man cannot go and pick a row or fuss with another man and cause him to insult him in the manner in which I have described, then suddenly fly into a rage and passion and kill him, and claim that it was only manslaughter. He must be without fault in bringing about the killing.' The error being that the presiding judge confused the law of manslaughter with the law of self-defense, and it is respectfully submitted that under the law a man may even provoke a difficulty and kill his adversary, and still the killing may be manslaughter, and the said charge was therefore misleading to the jury and harmful and prejudicial to the defendant.

"(5) The presiding judge erred in refusing to charge as a whole defendant's tenth request, and in his modifications of the same, for the reason the said request contained sound propositions of law which the defendant was entitled to have charged to the jury as submitted, and it was harmful and prejudicial to the rights of the defendant not to charge it as submitted. Especially was it harmful to refuse to charge that part of said request which stated: 'And this is the case even where the man who does the killing is in fault in bringing about the difficulty.' As it is respectfully submitted that under the law, even where the accused was at fault in bringing on the difficulty, he may be guilty of manslaughter and not murder, and it was prejudicial error not to so charge as requested. It was also especially harmful for the presiding judge to refuse to charge that portion of said tenth request, which stated: 'And legal provocation is anything calculated to throw into a passion a man of ordinary firmness, and I charge you that an illegal arrest would be a sufficient legal provocation to reduce the killing from murder to manslaughter.' The error being that said portion of the request contained a sound proposition of law which defendant was entitled to have charged to the jury, and it was harmful and prejudicial to the rights of defendant not to charge the same as requested.

"(6) The presiding judge erred while commenting on defendant's tenth request in charging the jury as follows: 'If an officer of the law, with his uniform on, his badge which indicates to every one that he is an officer of the law, in what he supposes is the discharge of his duty, attempts to arrest, Mr. Foreman and gentlemen of the jury, an arrest on account of what he supposes is a violation of a city ordinance, and he uses no more force than is necessary, then if he uses no more force than is necessary to make the arrest, if that force is not such an amount of force as would cause a man of ordinary firmness to fly into a passion, then, Mr. Foreman and gentlemen of the jury, the party whom he is arresting would not be justified in shooting him down. To make it plainer, I will illustrate to you--suppose an officer of the law goes up to a man and says, "I arrest you for a violation of the ordinances of the city," and the man submits quietly to arrest, he is not angry or provoked, but says, "You have no right to arrest me," cool, calm, and collected at the time, then if in that condition he draws a pistol and shoots the man down, Mr. Foreman and gentlemen, I charge you that that would be murder.' The error being that said charge instructed the jury in effect that a person would have no right to resist an officer when making an illegal arrest, under what he merely

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