McGuigan v. Gaines

• Decision Date: 14 November 1903
• Parties: MCGUIGAN v. GAINES
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

77 S.W. 52

71 Ark. 614

MCGUIGAN v. GAINES

Supreme Court of Arkansas

November 14, 1903

Appeal from Garland Chancery Court A. CURL, Special Chancellor.

Reversed.

STATEMENT OF THE COURT.

On the 9th day of February, 1891, W. H. Gaines and others executed and delivered to Wm. McGuigan a deed conveying to him certain land in Garland county, for which land McGuigan paid the sum of $ 4,600. The land conveyed is described in the deed as follows, to-wit: "That southwest quarter of the northwest quarter, the southwest fractional quarter, the south half of the southeast quarter, and the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter, all of section 18 in township three (3) south, range eighteen west, containing 317.41 acres, more or less, except, however, the right of way of the Hot Springs railroad and the following described parcel of land in the said northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of said section eighteen, used as a graveyard to-wit." Then follows a particular description of the graveyard tract, which it is unnecessary to set out here. The land, as described in the deed, was divided by Gulpha Creek. From eight to fourteen acres of the land lay west of the creek, while the remainder lay east of it. But this land west of the creek did not belong to the parties who conveyed it to McGuigan, for it had been sold to one Nickles some twenty or thirty years before the deed to McGuigan was executed.

In 1894 McGuigan brought this action in the circuit court to recover damages for breach of the covenants contained in his deed on account of the fact that plaintiffs did not own the land described in the deed which lay west of Gulpha Creek. To this complaint the defendants filed an answer and cross-complaint in which they alleged that they informed plaintiff at the time of the purchase and before the delivery of the deed that they did not own the land west of Gulpha Creek; that the same had been sold and conveyed to Nickels by their ancestor many years before, and that they did not intend to sell or convey that land, and that the plaintiff well knew that this was so and that it was included in the deed by mistake of the draughtsman who drew the deed. There does not appear to have been any reply filed to this cross-complaint, but the allegations thereof were treated as denied, and the case was transferred to the chancery court, and heard and decided on those issues.

The special chancellor who decided the case found that the land west of Gulpha Creek was included in the deed by mistake, and that the deed in this respect did not express the intention of the parties. He thereupon rendered a decree reforming the deed, from which decree plaintiff appealed.

Decree reversed and cause remanded.

Wood & Henderson, for appellant.

A court of equity is not authorized to find that a contract does not express the intention of the parties by reason of a mistake of the draughtsman, unless the evidence is clear. 14 Ark 482; 50 Ark. 179; 66 Ark. 155; 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 649; 98 U.S. 79, 85; 53 N.E. 797, 87; 28 S.E. 798; 48 S.W. 700; 44 S.W. 728. The mistake must be mutual. 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 628; 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Pl., 781; 50 Ark. 179; 26 Ark. 28. A contract written as intended by the parties will not be reformed, although it does not have the intended legal effect. 46 Ark. 167; 49 Ark. 425; 56 Ark. 320; 41 Ark. 495.

Greaves & Martin, for appellees.

The decision of the court comes within the rule laid down in 50 Ark. 179. The covenants of warranty were not part of the conveyance, but separate contracts. 44 Ark. 153. Married women are not held on such covenants. 33 Ark. 640.

OPINION

RIDDICK, J., (after stating the facts).

This action was brought by the plaintiffs to recover damages for breach of the covenants contained in his deed executed to him by the defendants. The defendants admit the execution of the deed, but allege that by the mistake of the attorney who drew the deed he failed to except from the conveyance certain land west of Gulpha Creek mentioned in the statement of facts, which defendants did not own, and for the loss of which plaintiff now asks damages. They allege that plaintiff well knew that defendants did not intend to convey this land west of the creek, and they therefore ask that the deed be reformed so as to conform to the intention of the parties thereto.

The question involved in the case is not so much one of law as it is one of fact. The party alleging the mistake has undertaken to prove it by parol evidence only. The law bearing on that point is well settled. There is no doubt that a court of equity may reform a written instrument where on account of mutual mistake the instrument does not reflect the intention of the parties thereto, and it may do so although the mistake be proved by parol evidence only. But in such cases, where the court is asked to reform a written contract against the will of one of the parties thereto, a court must, as a matter of common prudence, proceed with caution, and will decree a reformation only where the evidence shows clearly and conclusively that justice requires it. "In no case," says Mr. Bishop, "will a court decree an alteration in the terms of a duly executed written contract, unless the proofs are full, clear, and decisive. Mere preponderance of evidence is not enough. The mistake must appear beyond reasonable controversy." Bishop on Contracts, § 708.

These words of the author are well supported by the adjudged cases. But, though the mistake must be clearly proved, it does not follow that the courts must refuse relief in all cases where there is conflict in the testimony or evidence, for it often happens that, notwithstanding such conflict, the facts of a case may be clearly and decisively proved. A recent decision by the Court of Appeals of New York has gone even further, and holds that relief may be granted even though the facts be not established beyond a reasonable doubt. Southard v. Curley, 134 N.Y. 148, 31 N.E. 330. But this case seems to be opposed at least to the reasoning of many other cases, and there is room for doubt as to whether it is a sound exposition of the law outside of the state of New York. Take, for instance, the statement of Judge Story in United States v. Monroe, 5 Mason C.C. 572, 577. "In cases," he said, "of asserted mistakes in written instruments, it is not denied that a court of equity may reform the instrument, but such a court is very slow to exercise such an authority, and it requires the clearest and strongest evidence to establish the mistake. It is not sufficient that there be some reason to presume a mistake; the evidence must be clear, unequivocal, and decisive."

This statement of the law by Judge Story has been frequently quoted and approved by the courts. It has been twice approved by this court. Now, while Judge Story does not expressly state that the mistake must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, he uses language which carries the same idea. He says that a court of equity in such cases requires "the clearest and strongest evidence" to establish the mistake, that the evidence must be "clear, unequivocal, and decisive." But how can this be so if the evidence is such as to leave on the mind of the chancellor a reasonable doubt as to whether a mistake is proved or not?

But waiving that point, the decisions are quite unanimous in requiring that the mistake should be clearly...