770 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1985), 83-1608, Alexander Grant and Co. v. Tiffany Industries, Inc.

Docket Nº:83-1608.
Citation:770 F.2d 717
Party Name:ALEXANDER GRANT AND COMPANY, Appellant, v. TIFFANY INDUSTRIES, INC., Farrell Kahn and Gail Martin, Appellees.
Case Date:August 07, 1985
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Page 717

770 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1985)



TIFFANY INDUSTRIES, INC., Farrell Kahn and Gail Martin, Appellees.

No. 83-1608.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

August 7, 1985

Submitted Aug. 5, 1985.

Before ROSS, JOHN R. GIBSON and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

By order of the Supreme Court, the appeal of Alexander Grant and Company is before us again for further consideration in light of the recent decisions in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985), and American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 3291, 87 L.Ed.2d 437 (1985). See Tiffany Industries v. Alexander Grant & Co., --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (granting certiorari and vacating the judgment below); Kahn v. Alexander Grant & Co., --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 3551, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (same). We earlier held that Grant has standing and has asserted a sufficient racketeering enterprise injury to state a claim in its action against Tiffany Industries, Inc., company president Farrell Kahn, and secretary Gail Martin under the civil damage provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1964(c) (1982). Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Industries, 742 F.2d 408 (8th Cir.1984). We readopt

Page 718

those portions of our earlier opinion that we believe are not in conflict with Sedima and again remand so that Grant may proceed on its claims.

Grant, a public accounting firm, alleges that it was injured as the result of a pervasive scheme of mail and wire fraud designed by Tiffany to obtain a favorable audit for the fiscal year 1977. In Sedima the Supreme Court considered whether any such injuries, to be actionable, had to arise from an activity of a nature which RICO was designed to deter rather than merely from certain of the individual predicate acts which comprised the racketeering.

The Court made plain that no "racketeering injury" is required. --- U.S. at ----, 105 S.Ct. at 3284; American National, --- U.S. at ----, 105 S.Ct. at 3292. Observing that section 1964(c) authorizes suit by "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of Sec. 1962," the Court stated,

If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden by [Sec. 1962], and the...

To continue reading