State v. Campbell
| Decision Date | 23 March 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 55977-5,55977-5 |
| Citation | 112 Wn.2d 186,770 P.2d 620 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Charles Rodman CAMPBELL, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Charles R. Campbell, Walla Walla, Snohomish County Public, Defenders Office, Mr. Al J. Lyon, Everett, Nance, Iaria & Gombiner, Robert H. Gombiner, Seattle, for appellant Charles R. Campbell.
Kenneth Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., William L. Williams, Asst. Dept. of Corrections, Olympia, Seth Dawson, Snohomish County Prosecutor, S. Aaron Fine, Larry E. McKeeman, Deputys, Everett, for respondent State of Wash.
Charles Rodman Campbell appeals from an order of the Snohomish County Superior Court setting March 30, 1989 as the date for his execution on his conviction for three counts of aggravated first degree murder. We affirm the Superior Court's order.
On November 26, 1982, following a lengthy trial, a Snohomish County Superior Court jury convicted Campbell of three counts of aggravated first degree murder. In the subsequent special sentencing proceeding, the jury found insufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. Campbell was sentenced to death. This court upheld Campbell's conviction and sentence on direct review. State v. Campbell, 103 Wash.2d 1, 691 P.2d 929 (1984), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1094, 105 S.Ct. 2169, 85 L.Ed.2d 526 (1985).
On January 21, 1985, the Snohomish County Superior Court issued a death warrant scheduling Campbell's execution for March 29, 1985. This court stayed execution to permit Campbell to seek review of this court's decision by petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied Campbell's petition for certiorari on April 29, 1985.
On May 17, 1985, the Snohomish County Superior Court issued a second death warrant scheduling Campbell's execution for July 25, 1985. Campbell moved this court to stay On July 22, 1985, Campbell filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The district court granted a stay of execution pending disposition of Campbell's habeas corpus petition. During the habeas corpus proceeding, Campbell identified 61 different issues to be litigated. The district court determined that Campbell had not exhausted state remedies with respect to all but twenty-one of those issues. Campbell amended his federal complaint to delete the unexhausted claims and proceeded with the remaining twenty-one exhausted claims. The district court denied Campbell's habeas corpus petition on February 12, 1986.
the execution pending the filing and disposition of a personal restraint petition; in this motion he identified twenty-three issues which he alleged had not previously been litigated. On July 18, 1985, this court denied the motion for a stay, treating it and the supporting pleadings as a personal restraint petition which the court also denied on the merits.
On October 6, 1987, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The United States Supreme Court denied Campbell's petition for certiorari to review this decision on November 7, 1988, and denied his petition for rehearing on January 9, 1989. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the State's motion to dissolve Campbell's stay of execution on January 25, 1989.
In apparent anticipation of these actions by the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit, on August 21, 1988, Campbell moved this court to appoint counsel for the purpose of preparing a second personal restraint petition. This court denied Campbell's motion on December 6, 1988.
On February 15, 1989, the Snohomish County Superior Court issued a third death warrant scheduling Campbell's execution date for March 30, 1989, and appointed counsel in order to assist Campbell in taking a direct appeal of its order to this court. The court also found Campbell to be indigent and thus to qualify for the appointment of counsel Two matters involving Campbell are now before this court. First, on March 3, 1989, Campbell again moved this court to appoint counsel for the purpose of preparing a second personal restraint petition. He also sought a stay of execution pending this proposed new collateral attack on his conviction. By order dated March 8th, 1989, this court granted the motion to appoint counsel. The court did not grant the motion for a stay. Instead it afforded counsel the opportunity to further brief the matter in an attempt to show the existence of issues not previously litigated which have sufficient potential merit to require a stay to permit further consideration by this court. That matter was set for argument to the court on March 23, 1989.
to assist him in seeking review of the February 15 order in this court.
Meanwhile, on March 7, 1989, Campbell separately filed a notice of appeal from the February 15th order. In a second order dated March 8, 1989, this court set an accelerated briefing and hearing schedule for this appeal. The court ordered Campbell's counsel to perfect the record and submit opening briefs by March 16, 1989; ordered the State to submit responsive briefs by March 20, 1989; ordered Campbell's counsel to submit a reply brief, if any, by March 22, 1989; and ordered Campbell to submit his pro se supplemental brief, if he desired to file one, by March 22, 1989. The court heard oral argument in this appeal on March 23, 1989, immediately following oral argument on the separately filed motion for a stay.
Campbell seeks to appeal the order of the trial court setting his execution for March 30, 1989. Campbell asserts a right to appeal under RAP 2.2(a)(13), which provides that a party may appeal "[a]ny final order made after judgment which affects a substantial right." A death warrant is a final order made after judgment. However, we hold that it does not affect a substantial right within the meaning of this rule.
If appeal were to lie from a death warrant, a defendant could indefinitely postpone execution of the death sentence. The execution date can be set no later than ninety days from the date of the issuance of the death warrant. RCW 10.95.160. RAP 5.2(a) provides the defendant 30 days in which to file the notice of appeal. The notice of appeal would stay execution of the sentence. RCW 9.95.062. The record must then be perfected, briefs filed, and argument heard. RAP 9.2, 10.2, 11.1.
Absent extraordinary court intervention, the death warrant would almost certainly expire by the time the appeal were considered. This means the trial court would be required to issue another warrant from which the defendant could again appeal. RCW 10.95.200.
If such a practice were to be followed, it would result in an endless chain, which would involve an absurdity in the administration of the law that would justly bring it into disrepute and totally destroy its efficacy.
State v. Boyce, 25 Wash. 422, 425-26, 65 P. 763 (1901).
This court has previously reviewed and affirmed the judgment imposing the death sentence. State v. Campbell, 103 Wash.2d 1, 691 P.2d 929 (1984). A final order entered after judgment is appealable under RAP 2.2(a)(13) only if it affects a right other than those adjudicated by the earlier final judgment. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Marshall, 16 Wash.App. 503, 508, 557 P.2d 352 (1976). The trial court's order issuing the death warrant does not affect new substantial rights. State v. Seaton, 27 Wash. 120, 67 P. 572 (1902); State v. Boyce, supra; State v. Nordstrom, 21 Wash. 403, 58 P. 248 (1899) (). Campbell's appeal is therefore dismissed.
Pursuant to RAP 5.1(c), this court will treat Campbell's notice of appeal as a motion for discretionary review. In view of the posture of this case and in the interests of justice, we accept review and proceed to the merits.
First, Campbell claims that he must serve the remainder of his incarceration time on his various prior felony convictions before he can be executed on his 1982 convictions. He relies for this contention on RCW 9.92.080(1), which provides:
Whenever a person while under sentence of felony shall commit another felony and be sentenced to another term of imprisonment, such latter term shall not begin until the expiration of all prior terms.
(Italics ours). Campbell asserts that he is presently still serving out his sentences on his prior convictions. He also notes that even when a defendant is sentenced to death there will necessarily be a period of incarceration prior to...
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Personal Restraint of Benn, Matter of
...court and the Ninth Circuit have both rejected this contention. In re Lord, 123 Wash.2d at 325-26, 868 P.2d 835; State v. Campbell, 112 Wash.2d 186, 191, 770 P.2d 620 (1989); Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 683 (9th Cir.1994). Moreover, the Legislature recently amended the death penalty stat......
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Personal Restraint of Lord, Matter of
...(opinions of Rosellini, J., and Stafford, J.,); State v. Rupe, 101 Wash.2d 664, 701, 683 P.2d 571 (1984); and State v. Campbell, 112 Wash.2d 186, 192, 770 P.2d 620 (1989). Other state courts have also concluded that hanging does not involve the infliction of pain beyond that necessary for t......
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Campbell v. Blodgett
...829 F.2d at 1467; 488 U.S. at 948, 109 S.Ct. at 380. Campbell sought further state relief in 1989, which was denied. State v. Campbell, 112 Wash.2d 186, 770 P.2d 620 (1989). He then petitioned the federal court a second time for habeas corpus relief. The second petition was also denied, and......
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Campbell v. Wood
...Campbell appealed from the order scheduling his execution. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed on March 23, 1989. State v. Campbell, 112 Wash.2d 186, 770 P.2d 620 (1989). Campbell filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court. The district court held an evident......
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§ 4.3 Superior Court Decisions that May Be Appealed
...an execution date is not appealable because execution was already ordered in the previous judgment and sentence. State v. Campbell, 112 Wn.2d 186, 189-90, 770 P.2d 620 (1989). A notice of appeal of a post-judgment order under RAP 2.2(a)(13) ordinarily will not call up the underlying final j......
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Table of Cases
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§ 5.4 How to Initiate Review: Filing Notice
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