Crews v. Monarch Fire Prot. Dist.
| Decision Date | 18 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–3070.,13–3070. |
| Parties | Leslie CREWS; Cary Spiegel; Michael Davis, Plaintiffs–Appellants v. MONARCH FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; Kim Evans; Steve Swyers, Defendants–Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
771 F.3d 1085
Leslie CREWS; Cary Spiegel; Michael Davis, Plaintiffs–Appellants
v.
MONARCH FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; Kim Evans; Steve Swyers, Defendants–Appellees.
No. 13–3070.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Sept. 8, 2014.
Filed Nov. 18, 2014.
Joe David Jacobson, argued, Saint Louis, MO, (Allen P. Press, Saint Louis, MO, on the brief), for Plaintiffs–Appellants.
Steven James Hughes, argued, Saint Louis, MO, (Robyn G. Fox, Natalie J. Higgins, Saint Louis, MO, on the brief), for Defendants–Appellees.
Before RILEY, Chief Judge, SMITH and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
RILEY, Chief Judge.
Three ex-fire chiefs—Leslie Crews, Cary Spiegel, and Michael Davis (collectively, chiefs)—appeal the district court's1 adverse grant of summary judgment on
their procedural due process claims challenging the manner of their terminations. The chiefs' claims focus on the abruptness of the termination decision by Monarch Fire Protection District's (Monarch) board of directors (board) and on two board members' public statements allegedly damaging the chiefs' reputations. With appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
In 2011, the Missouri Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict against Monarch in an employment discrimination lawsuit filed by some of Monarch's female firefighters. See Kessler v. Monarch Fire Prot. Dist., 352 S.W.3d 677 (Mo.Ct.App.2011) (per curiam). Four days after the decision was filed, Monarch's board held a closed, special meeting. Of Monarch's three directors—Kim Evans, Steve Swyers, and Robin Harris—only Evans and Swyers were physically present. Harris participated by telephone, but for this reason was unable to vote. During the meeting, the board voted to request the resignations of several of Monarch's high-ranking officers (including the chiefs) with the understanding that absent a resignation, the board would vote to terminate each chief's employment. Charles Billings, Monarch's attorney, informed Fire Chief Clifford Biele, Monarch's first-in-command under the board, of this decision and provided Chief Biele with resignation letters for the chiefs to sign.
Chief Biele called Crews and Spiegel (the only two present at the time) into his office and informed them of the board's decision. He explained the board voted to discharge the chiefs in light of the sexual discrimination found to have occurred at Monarch, and he informed Crews and Spiegel they would be terminated if they did not sign the resignation letters. Billings also spoke with Crews and Spiegel, explaining the decision was due to the recent Missouri appellate decision. Crews and Spiegel asked for time to think over their options, and after spending about a half hour in their own offices, they returned to Chief Biele and refused to resign. They maintained “there was no reason for them to resign” and they were being “wrongfully terminated.” Two police officers who were standing by then escorted Crews and Spiegel off the premises.
Chief Biele telephoned Davis, who was off duty at the time, and gave him the same news and option to resign. After taking time to consider, Davis called back and refused to resign.
Several days later, the full board met again in an open, public meeting where it voted to ratify the chiefs' termination.2 Harris, the third director, voiced his disagreement, but the termination decision was confirmed nonetheless. During the public meeting, Swyers and Evans defended their decision by relying on the Missouri appellate decision's description of Monarch as creating an environment “of abusive, hostile discrimination against female employees.”3 Monarch posted the minutes of that meeting on its official website. The chiefs also identify several online news articles attributing statements to
Swyers and Evans that indicate the chiefs were discharged for promoting an environment of unacceptable discrimination. The chiefs never requested a hearing to respond to these statements.
B. Procedural Background
The chiefs brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, alleging Evans and Swyers, individually, and Monarch violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by discharging the chiefs and disparaging their reputations. Monarch, Evans, and Swyers moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion, concluding (1) the chiefs, as at-will employees, held no property interest in their continued employment; (2) the chiefs forfeited their loss-of-liberty interest claim by failing to request a name clearing hearing; and (3) any constitutional violations were not “clearly established,” precluding individual liability for Evans and Swyers. The chiefs timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A party seeking summary judgment must “show[ ] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment, viewing the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Petroski v. H & R Block Enters., LLC, 750 F.3d 976, 978 (8th Cir.2014).
A. Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment pronounces, “No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The chiefs claim Monarch deprived them of their property (continued employment) and liberty (reputation) interests without affording them due process.4 See Christiansen v. W. Branch Cmty. Sch. Dist., 674 F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir.2012) (characterizing property and liberty interests).
1. Termination
To establish a constitutionally protected deprivation of property, the chiefs must show they each held “ ‘a property right in continued employment.’ ” Floyd–Gimon v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis. ex rel. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark., 716 F.3d 1141, 1146 (8th Cir.2013) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) ). Here, the property interest depends on Missouri state law, see id., which presumes the chiefs were at-will employees, terminable at any time and “ ‘for any reason or for no reason,’ ” Margiotta v. Christian Hosp. Ne. Nw., 315 S.W.3d 342, 345–46 (Mo.2010) (en banc) (quoting Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Mo.1998) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo.2014) (en banc)). Because at-will status under Missouri law dooms their claim of a property interest, see Hess v. Ables, 714 F.3d 1048, 1053 (8th Cir.2013) ; Greeno v. Little Blue Valley Sewer Dist., 995 F.2d 861, 864 (8th Cir.1993), the chiefs must overcome this state law presumption.
Admitting they “did not have express employment contracts,” the chiefs rely on Daniels v. Board of Curators of Lincoln University, 51 S.W.3d 1 (Mo.Ct.App.2001), to argue Monarch implicitly promised not to terminate the chiefs without
good cause. The chiefs maintain this implicit guarantee modifying their at-will status stemmed from Monarch's internal rules and regulations, which refer to the chiefs' positions as “permanent employees,” implement progressive discipline procedures and an expected minimum level of disciplinary review, and indicate termination should only be for cause.
In Daniels, the appeals court “address[ed] whether the [employer's] customs, practices and de facto policies established a property interest in” continued employment for the employee. Daniels, 51 S.W.3d at 7. The court concluded the employer's historical practices and employee handbook implicitly “promise[d] that termination would not occur without good cause” and this understanding between employer and employee “was the genesis of a property interest protected by the 14th Amendment.” Id. at 10. The Daniels court reached this conclusion by relying primarily on Winegar v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 20 F.3d 895, 899 (8th Cir.1994), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602–03, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), for the proposition that under the Due Process Clause, “[a] property interest in employment can ... be created by implied contract, arising out of customs, practices, and de facto policies,” Winegar, 20 F.3d at 899. See Daniels, 51 S.W.3d at 7–8.
The Daniels court and the chiefs' reliance on these cases is misplaced. Winegar establishes only that a...
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