Pearson v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr.
| Citation | 775 F.3d 598 |
| Decision Date | 07 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–1412.,13–1412. |
| Parties | Antonio PEARSON, Appellant, v. SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; Superintendent Gerald Rozum; Dept. Supt.Sylvia Gibson; Dept. Supt. Steven Gates; Major Daniel Gehlmann; D–Unit Manager Mandy–Jo Biser; D–Unit Manager Mr. Putman; Unit Manager Hunter; E–Unit Manager Edward Mulligan;Allen Joseph, Inmate Program Manager; Capt. Thomas Papuga; Security Captain Leo Glass; CFSM–II Paul Fisher; CFSM–I Donald Lepley; CFSS Joe Reams; CFSI Don Kot; Capt. Griffin; Capt. Peserva, (6–2 Shift); Lt. Regester; Sgt. Clippinger; Sgt. Frank Karl; Sgt. Moore, Warden; Sgt. Ritenour; Co I Troy; Co I Pritts; Co I McKenzie; Co I Krumel; Co I Ackerman; Co I Long; Co I Kimmel; Co I Foust; Co I Gaydis; Sharon M. Burks; Cindy G. Watson; Kristen P. Reisinger; Dorina Varner; Michael P. Wolanin; Edward J. Cwik, Corrections Employment Personnel; C.O. I. Singer. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jessica C. Collins, Esq., [argued], Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, Washington, D.C., Attorney for Appellant.
Kemal A. Mericli, Esq., [argued], Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA, Attorneys for Appellees.
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, RENDELL, SLOVITER, Circuit Judges.
This appeal requires us to decide whether Pennsylvania's statute of limitations is tolled while a prisoner exhausts administrative remedies prior to filing a civil rights lawsuit as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), or in the alternative, whether federal equitable tolling principles are applicable. Additionally, we must determine if the District Court erred when it dismissed, for failure to state a claim, the portion of Antonio Pearson's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that it deemed timely.1
Pearson is serving a life-term in the Pennsylvania prison system. According to Pearson, “Department of Corrections employees engaged in a two-year campaign of harassment against him in retaliation for the filing of a civil lawsuit and at least seven grievances.” Appellant's Br. at 3–4. Pearson's allegations are discussed below.
Beginning in 2006, Pearson filed a civil lawsuit against a number of prison officials in the Somerset County Court of Common Pleas. Thereafter, Pearson filed his first grievance alleging that corrections officers had performed a cell search to confiscate and read his legal materials on November 23, 2006. In a grievance addressing a January 9, 2007 incident, Pearson claimed that a corrections officer had refused to provide him with grievance paperwork unless Pearson informed the corrections officer what his grievance was about. Pearson filed another grievance that alleged that Corrections Food Service Instructor Don Kot punched him in the arm several times while he was working in the Dietary Department on February 2, 2007. Next, Pearson filed a grievance after a corrections officer told him on February 13, 2007 that he was not permitted to cite to the Department of Corrections' Code of Ethics in his grievances. Additionally, Pearson filed a grievance addressing a February 26, 2007 incident, in which he claimed that he was terminated from his dietary position by Corrections Food Service Managers Paul Fisher and Joe Reams and E–Unit Manager Ed Mulligan for filing his civil lawsuit and for filing the grievance about Kot's alleged assault.
Pearson also claims that he was subjected to a series of cell searches and relocations in retaliation for filing his civil lawsuit and grievances. Pearson states that on September 24, 2007 he was denied a meal by corrections officers because he “was running his mouth,” and on that date he filed a grievance claiming that he “was still being black-balled from getting a job.” App. at 68. Pearson also details an argument with Sergeant Clippinger that occurred on February 29, 2008 wherein he claims that Clippinger, without provocation, yelled at him in an aggressive manner in front of several other inmates stating that Clippinger was not afraid of Pearson's grievances.
Pearson was later assigned to a “blockworker” position on August 17, 2008. Pearson alleges that on October 19, 2008 Sergeant Frank Karl learned of his appointment and took steps to remove Pearson from the position; Pearson claims that he attempted to file a grievance but corrections officers removed it from his mailbox. Pearson was removed from his job the next day on October 20, 2008 by Karl. According to Pearson's amended complaint, Unit Manager Hunter told him that he was terminated from his position because of the grievances that he had filed.
Pearson filed a complaint alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on February 28, 2009,2 and was later granted leave to amend his complaint. 3 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and the Magistrate Judge recommended granting the motion on the basis that all of Pearson's “non-trivial” allegations that occurred prior to March 1, 2007 were time-barred under Pennsylvania's two year statute of limitations. App. at 4–6. Additionally, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Pearson's claim based on his termination from his position as a blockworker was timely, but that he failed to state a claim because there were “no facts that allow a plausible inference that [the termination] was caused by any protected activity of plaintiff's.” App. at 7. The Magistrate Judge reasoned that “if a retaliatory animus can be legally derived from temporal proximity of an inmate's grievances or lawsuits to a decisionmaker's decision, then frivolous inmate litigation [would] become [ ] the legal equivalent of a breeder reactor.” App. at 8. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation.
Pearson filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation claiming that the Magistrate Judge failed to toll the statute of limitations while Pearson exhausted his administrative remedies pursuant to the PLRA and erred by not accepting the allegations of his complaint as true with respect to his retaliatory discharge claim.4 In a second Report and Recommendation in response, the Magistrate Judge relied on Congress' intent to curb frivolous inmate litigation and concluded that because “[t]he choices of what remedies to afford, where inmates can file in state court, and the exhaustion requirements in state court are up to the state and the litigant” the PLRA is not a statutory prohibition.5 App. at 17. Additionally, the Magistrate Judge concluded that application of equitable tolling principles was inappropriate because Pearson made no showing that prison officials had prevented or obstructed Pearson from completing the grievance process to run out the statute of limitations. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's second Report and Recommendation.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). McGovern v. City of Phila., 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir.2009). We also exercise plenary review over a district court's application of statutes of limitations and tolling principles. Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 365 (3d Cir.2000). Lastly, we exercise plenary review over a district court's interpretation of state law. Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. KSI Trading Corp., 563 F.3d 68, 73 (3d Cir.2009).
Congress has not codified a statute of limitations applicable to suits for the vindication of civil rights and has instead “determined that gaps in federal civil rights acts should be filled by state law, as long as that law is not inconsistent with federal law.” Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 538, 109 S.Ct. 1998, 104 L.Ed.2d 582 (1989); see also42 U.S.C. § 1988. “[A] § 1983 claim is governed by the statute of limitations that applies to personal injury tort claims in the state in which such a claim arises.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 639 (3d Cir.2009). Additionally, a state's tolling principles also govern § 1983 claims when they do not conflict with federal law. Id.
As Pearson's § 1983 claims arise in Pennsylvania, we must apply Pennsylvania's statute of limitations. Under Pennsylvania law, personal injury claims must be brought within two years of the accrual of the claim. 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 5524(7). Pennsylvania law also provides that “[w]here the commencement of a civil action or proceeding has been stayed by a court or by statutory prohibition, the duration of the stay is not a part of the time within which the action or proceeding must be commenced.” 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 5535(b) (emphasis added). The PLRA states that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Therefore, the timeliness of Pearson's § 1983 claims hinges on whether the PLRA's exhaustion requirement is a “statutory prohibition” under Pennsylvania's tolling statute, and if so, how long the statute of limitations is tolled on Pearson's claims.
We have previously addressed this issue in non-precedential opinions. Most recently, we stated: “[t]hough this Court has not spoken on the issue, several courts of appeals have held that, because exhaustion of prison administrative remedies is mandatory under the [PLRA], the statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions should be tolled while a prisoner exhausts.” Pressley v. Huber, 562 Fed.Appx. 67, 70 (3d Cir.2014) (per curiam); see also Paluch v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't Corr., 442 Fed.Appx. 690, 694 (3d Cir.2011) (per curiam) (...
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