Meadows v. Palmer
| Decision Date | 05 November 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-5676,84-5676 |
| Parties | Dewey F. MEADOWS, Appellant, v. James PALMER, Director, Department of Corrections, et al. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil Action No. 83-00893).
Jean C. Godwin, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Keith A. Rosenberg, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Richard B. Nettler, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., for the District of Columbia, with whom John H. Suda, Principal Deputy Corp. Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel for the District of Columbia, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellees.
Before MIKVA, BORK and STARR, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court in Parts I-III filed by Circuit Judge MIKVA.
Opinion for the Court in Part IV filed by Circuit Judge BORK.
Dissent from Part IV filed by Circuit Judge MIKVA.
This case raises questions regarding the jurisdiction of the now extinct Civil Service Commission ("CSC"). On July 5, 1977, Dewey Meadows, a longtime employee of the District of Columbia, was detailed from his position as Chief of the Office of Automatic Data Processing ("ADP") for the Department of Corrections to a position in the Department of Corrections' Office of Resource Management. Following the expiration of the detail, Meadows was ultimately reassigned to the Project Implementation Staff ("PIS") of the Department of Corrections as a Computer Systems Analyst.
Meadows appealed both the detail and the reassignment to the Civil Service Commission. In separate opinions, the CSC determined that it lacked jurisdiction over both appeals: the detail did not constitute an "employment practice," and the reassignment did not constitute a "reduction in rank." The CSC's determinations were appealed to the District Court, which granted summary judgment for appellees.
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the District Court's grants of summary judgment.
At the time this case began in 1977, Meadows had been a government employee for over nineteen years. From 1968 to 1978, he served as the chief of ADP. According to Meadows, efforts began in 1977 to remove him from office or to coerce him into resigning. Two personnel actions were undertaken by Meadows' then-superiors at the Department of Corrections. The first personnel action at issue was a detail within the District of Columbia Department of Corrections from ADP to the Office of Resource Management. A detail is a temporary transfer of an employee from one department to another and is permitted under certain circumstances if procedural requirements, primarily concerning notice, are met.
Under the detail, which began on July 5, 1977, Meadows was to determine analytical requirements and functions of the District of Columbia Department of Personnel. Throughout the detail, Meadows was provided neither staff nor clerical assistance. Meadows appealed the detail to the CSC and filed a grievance with the Department of Corrections, alleging that the detail was procedurally defective and that, because there was no work for Meadows to perform, the detail lacked a proper purpose.
On October 31, 1977, about the time Meadows' detail was to expire, Meadows received notice that he had been reassigned to the PIS as a Computer Systems Analyst, effective November 2, 1977. At the same time, appellees began formal efforts to remove Meadows from the position of chief of ADP. As a result of these actions, Meadows filed suit in D.C.Superior Court (Civil Action No. 11265-77), seeking to enjoin the Department of Corrections from removing him from that position. Subsequently, the reassignment was rescinded, rendering the suit for injunctive relief moot. Meadows' detail was thereafter extended until March 4, 1978.
On January 18, 1978, the District of Columbia denied Meadows' grievance. On March 24, 1978, the CSC dismissed Meadows' appeal of the detail, on the grounds that it did not constitute an employment practice subject to review under Civil Service Regulations.
Upon expiration of the extended detail, Meadows returned to his position as Chief of ADP, where he remained for approximately two and a half weeks. On March 20, 1978, the Notice of Proposed Removal was rescinded and Meadows was simultaneously reassigned to the PIS as a Correctional Programs Systems Coordinator. Meadows appealed the reassignment to the CSC on the basis that it constituted an unlawful reduction in rank. On October 23, 1978 the CSC denied Meadows' appeal, concluding that the reassignment did not constitute a reduction in rank because Meadows' relative standing in the hierarchy of the agency remained unchanged following the reassignment, and he had not been lowered in numerical grade, class or level. Accordingly, the reassignment did not fall within the limited area of "adverse action," and the CSC therefore lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.
Meadows again filed suit in D.C.Superior Court challenging the CSC's disposition as to both the detail and the reassignment. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint, finding that exclusive jurisdiction rested in federal court. Meadows' appealed the dismissal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which on November 24, 1981 affirmed the decision of the Superior Court. Meadows v. Jackson, D.C.App. No. 81-163 (Nov. 24, 1981). Just before the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the reassignment, Meadows was transferred to the Department of Employee Services of the District of Columbia for an indefinite period of time. Meadows continues in that position today and has never challenged that transfer.
On March 29, 1983, Meadows filed a challenge to the CSC's decisions on the detail and the reassignment in the U.S. District Court. The District Court issued separate opinions on each of the personnel decisions, both of which are appealed here. In the first, the District Court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment as to the reassignment, holding that the CSC's decision on this matter was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law. In the second, the District Court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment as to the detail.
At the outset, it is helpful to delineate what laws we construe here and the path by which this appeal came to us. While no questions of jurisdiction present themselves, changes in the substantive and procedural laws governing government employees have created a veritable morass. The first change was the removal of District of Columbia employees from the federal personnel system, as part of the movement to confer home rule on the District of Columbia. The second change was the reform of the laws governing federal personnel. Implementation of home rule and the reform of the Civil Service system overlapped, giving rise to the confusion we confront today. Before reviewing the substance of this appeal, then, it is useful to specify what substantive law controls and through what procedural channels employee appeals travel in the period of time beginning in 1977 to the present day.
At the time the actions complained of in this case occurred, competitive service employees in the District of Columbia government operated under the federal personnel system. See Federal Personnel Manual ("FPM"), ch. 212, subch. 1-3(d) (1979). See also D.C.Code Secs. 3-105, 24-443 (1973). Employees were entitled to appeal adverse actions, including reductions in rank, to the Civil Service Commission pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Secs. 7512 & 7513(d) (1976). Under 5 U.S.C. Secs. 701-706 (1976), review of decisions of the CSC was in a federal district court. When the CSC went out of existence as a result of the federal reform law in 1978, the MSPB inherited the outstanding caseload. See Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1978 at Sec. 203, 43 Fed.Reg. 36037, 92 Stat. 3783, 3785 (1978). This procedural route controls the instant action.
District of Columbia employees are no longer governed by the federal personnel system. Under the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization (Home Rule) Act, Congress conferred authority on the District of Columbia to create its own personnel system. See Pub.L. No. 93-198, Sec. 422(3), 87 Stat. 774, 791 (1973). Accordingly, when the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 ("CSRA") was passed (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.), Congress deleted most references to the District of Columbia employees and, for the most part, they were not thereafter covered by the federal personnel system. The District of Columbia then enacted its own personnel system which provides for appeals to be taken to the District of Columbia's Office of Employee Appeals, and from there to the D.C.Superior Court. See Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act, D.C.Code Sec. 1.606.3(a) & (d) (1981). For District of Columbia employees, reductions in rank that are implemented today do not constitute adverse actions. Cf. D.C.Code Sec. 1-617.1(e) (1981) ().
The MSPB, created under the CSRA, had a limited involvement with D.C. employees in the period following January 1, 1979, when the District of Columbia's own personnel system was implemented. During that interim period, a contract between the District of Columbia and the MSPB provided for appeals by competitive service employees of the District of Columbia government from adverse personnel actions to the MSPB. See 5 U.S.C. Secs. 7511(a)(1)(A) & 7701 (Supp. V 1978). See also District of Columbia v. MSPB, 762 F.2d 129, 130-31 (D.C.Cir.1985).
Federal employees who claim to have suffered from adverse actions that occurred following the effective date of the CSRA may take appeals to the Merit Systems Protection Board, see 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7701 (1982), and from there to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7703 (1982)....
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