U.S. v. Boggs, 84-5271

• Citation: 775 F.2d 582
• Decision Date: 24 October 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-5271,84-5271
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Richard A. BOGGS, Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

Page 582

775 F.2d 582

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Richard A. BOGGS, Appellant.

No. 84-5271.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued May 7, 1985.

Decided Oct. 24, 1985.

Frances Ann McElsee (Leon T. Copeland, Federal Public Defender, Charleston, W.Va., on brief), for appellant.

James M. O'Brien, Asst. U.S. Atty. (David A. Faber, U.S. Atty., Richard S. Glaser, Asst. U.S. Atty., Charleston, W.Va., on brief), for appellee.

Before RUSSELL and WIDENER, Circuit Judges, and TURK, District Judge for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

WIDENER, Circuit Judge:

Richard Boggs appeals from his convictions on one count of trafficking in contraband cigarettes in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2342(a) ¹ and on one count of conspiracy to traffic in contraband cigarettes in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371. Finding no error, we affirm.

Richard A. Boggs, the appellant, and Anthony A. Lichnovsky, an unindicted co-conspirator and Boggs' brother-in-law, were both residents of Flushing, Michigan. On or about February 15, 1984, acting on his own and Lichnovsky's behalf, Boggs telephoned from Flint, Michigan, to J.T. Davenport & Sons, Inc., a wholesaler/stamper ² in Sanford, North Carolina, to place an advance order for the purchase of in excess of 3,000 cartons of cigarettes. Some time prior to this telephone call, Boggs had shown Lichnovsky the federal laws prohibiting trafficking in contraband cigarettes, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2341-2346, a copy of which Boggs had in his possession. On or about February 21, 1984, Lichnovsky withdrew approximately $15,000 in cash from a bank account in Michigan for the purpose of purchasing the cigarettes that Boggs had ordered from J.T. Davenport & Sons. Thereupon, Boggs and Lichnovsky traveled south together in Boggs' car, spending the night of February 21 in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. The next morning, they rented a Jartran truck and trailer from a local gas station and then proceeded to J.T. Davenport & Sons to pick up 3,044 cartons of cigarettes, for which they paid $18,207.80 in cash. Boggs and Lichnovsky then returned to their hotel, where they spent the night.

On the morning of February 23, 1984, Boggs left the hotel to purchase an additional 150 cartons of cigarettes from another wholesaler/stamper. He then returned to the hotel in Winston-Salem. At around noon of the same day, Boggs, driving the Jartran truck with the trailer attached, and Lichnovsky, driving Boggs' car, left their motel "traveling north for the purpose of selling the cigarettes ... in or about the Flushing, Michigan area." At the northernmost toll booth on the West Virginia Turnpike, approximately twenty miles south of Charleston, federal agents stopped both vehicles. Upon searching the Jartran truck, the agents discovered the 3,194 cartons of cigarettes, none of which bore any West Virginia cigarette tax stamps. We state, parenthetically, that Boggs does not question on appeal the validity of the search. Boggs did not have any paper in his possession showing who had or would assume responsibility for the payment of applicable cigarette taxes, either in West Virginia or Michigan or elsewhere. The agents then arrested Boggs and Lichnovsky for trafficking in contraband cigarettes.

The parties agreed to a trial to the court upon stipulated facts filed with the district court. Upon applying the applicable law to these facts, the district court found Boggs guilty of the charges contained in Counts One and Two of the indictment.

On appeal, Boggs raises three issues. First, Boggs argues that because he did not intend to sell in West Virginia the cigarettes seized on February 23, 1984, they were not subject to West Virginia cigarette taxes. Consequently, Boggs contends that the cigarettes did not come within the federal definition of contraband cigarettes contained in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2341, and therefore Boggs could not be convicted of trafficking or conspiring to traffic in contraband cigarettes. As his second point which is closely related to the first, Boggs argues that his indictment was defective in that it failed to state each element of the crimes charged. He also argues that the evidence does not support the verdict.

Boggs' principal contention on appeal is that he could not be convicted of trafficking or conspiring to traffic in contraband cigarettes because the cigarettes that he was transporting across West Virginia were not subject to West Virginia cigarette taxes, and therefore did not come within the federal definition of "contraband cigarettes" for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2342(a). Section 2341 of Title 18 of the United States Code defines "contraband cigarettes" as

a quantity in excess of 60,000 cigarettes which bear no evidence of the payment of applicable State cigarette taxes in the State where such cigarettes are found, if such State requires a stamp, impression, or other indication to be placed on packages or other containers of cigarettes to evidence payment of cigarette taxes,.... 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2341(2). ³

Boggs does not dispute the absence of West Virginia tax stamps on the cigarettes seized from him or that the quantity seized exceeded 60,000 cigarettes. Rather, he contends that the use of the term "applicable State cigarette taxes" in the federal definition of "contraband cigarettes" requires that before a court may find a defendant guilty of trafficking in contraband cigarettes, it must first find that the defendant had a legal duty to pay cigarette taxes in the state in which the cigarettes were found, in this case, West Virginia. In this case, Boggs argued to the district court, "... until there is a sale [in West Virginia] there is no violation."

The argument goes that such a preliminary finding requires an intent to sell the cigarettes in question in the State in which they are found, here West Virginia. Absent such intent, it continues, the State would not have authority to impose an excise tax on the cigarettes either under state law or under the commerce clause.

We think, however, that the West Virginia statutes disclose that West Virginia does have the authority to apply its Cigarette Tax Act, W.Va.Code Sec. 11-17-1 et seq., to people such as Boggs unless the cigarettes they possess are being legitimately transported in commerce, in which event exception is made.

West Virginia Code Sec. 11-17-19(b)(6) provides that:

"If any person, firm or corporation, who is not a wholesaler of tobacco products, ... shall have in his possession within the state more than 20 packages of cigarettes not bearing cigarette tax paid indicia of this State ... such possession shall be presumed to be for the purpose of evading the payment of taxes imposed or due thereon...."

A fair reading of this statute can only be that one having possession of more than 20 packages of unstamped cigarettes is presumed to have them available and thus intended for sale in West Virginia and subject to the West Virginia excise tax under West Virginia Code Sec. 11-17-3. ⁴ The defendant argues, however, that since it has been stipulated that he possessed the cigarettes "for the purpose of" selling them in or about the Flushing, Michigan area, he would not be responsible for having the West Virginia tax stamps thereupon. This argument would be more plausible were it not for Sec. 11-17-20 of the West Virginia Code, the first part of the catchline of which is "transportation of unstamped cigarettes." That section provides in pertinent part that:

"Every person who shall transport cigarettes not stamped as required by this article upon the public highways ... of this State shall have in his actual possession invoices or delivery tickets for such cigarettes which shall show the true name and complete and exact address of the consignor or seller, the true name and complete and exact address of the consignee or purchaser ... and the true name and complete and exact address of the person who has or shall assume payment of the West Virginia state tax, or the tax, if any, of the State at the point of ultimate destination...."

Inasmuch as Boggs' defense is that he was transporting the cigarettes through West Virginia "for the purpose of" selling them in Michigan, he was required to have in his possession invoices or delivery tickets showing the true name and complete and exact address of the person who had paid or assumed payment of the Michigan state tax. This he has stipulated that he did not have. Thus, West Virginia would have been perfectly justified in imposing upon Boggs its excise tax on account of his failure to comply with this rather simple and unburdensome requirement of West Virginia law or to subject him to criminal penalties for failure to comply therewith.

We do not think that merely requiring Boggs to have in his possession papers showing the name and address of the person who had paid the Michigan tax or had assumed its payment is an undue burden on interstate commerce within the meaning of the Constitution. See Arkansas Elec. Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 393-95, 103 S.Ct. 1905, 1917-18, 76 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 847, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970) ). This is especially true in this case where Congress, which has specific authority to regulate commerce between the States under the Constitution, has chosen to regulate the cigarette bootlegging traffic by regulating the very interstate commerce which the States may not, by providing, in its definition of contraband, for the States' application of their own tax laws. If a State's application of her own tax laws, as here, is adopted by Congress as Congress' definition of contraband, it cannot be said with reason that a State's exemption (that of possessing papers showing the name and address of the taxpayer in another State) is an undue burden on commerce. Neither when Congress recognized the application of a State's own tax laws as a...