Vinson v. Vermilion Cnty.

• Decision Date: 27 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. 12–3790.,12–3790.
• Citation: 776 F.3d 924
• Parties: Brent VINSON, Husband, and Brandy Vinson, Wife, Mother and Next Friend of C.A.V. and C.R.V., Minors, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. VERMILION COUNTY, ILLINOIS, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

776 F.3d 924

Brent VINSON, Husband, and Brandy Vinson, Wife, Mother and Next Friend of C.A.V. and C.R.V., Minors, Plaintiffs–Appellants

v.VERMILION COUNTY, ILLINOIS, et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 12–3790.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Oct. 31, 2014.

Decided Jan. 27, 2015.

Richard L. Steagall, Attorney, Nicoara & Steagall, Peoria, IL, for Plaintiffs–Appellants.

Michael W. Condon, Attorney, Zrinka R. Davis, Attorney, Hervas, Condon & Bersani, Itasca, IL, Brad A. Elward, Attorney, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Peoria, IL, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before POSNER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

ROVNER, Circuit Judge.

Brandy Vinson, her husband Brent, and their two minor children, C.R.V. and C.A.V., sued several law enforcement officers and two local governments for conducting an illegal search of their home and attached garage in violation of the Fourth Amendment. They also asserted a state law claim for trespass. The district court dismissed part of the complaint for failure to state a claim and granted judgment on the pleadings for the remainder. We reverse and remand.

I.

We accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint on review of a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007) ; Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993) ; Bielanski v. County of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir.2008). Brandy Vinson is the daughter of Ronald and Cindy Olson. On June 4, 2009, Detectives David Sherrick and Stuart Shaw¹ of the Champaign County Sheriff's Department executed a search warrant at the Olson home. The detectives were looking for a trailer and lawn mowers that had been reported stolen but they found nothing at the Olsons' home. Although they had no reason to believe that the Vinsons were involved in the purported theft, and they possessed no warrant for the Vinson property, they nevertheless contacted Deputy Sheriff Jerry Davis of the Vermilion County Sheriff's Department and asked him to meet them for a search of the Vinsons' home in that county.

At approximately 3:30 p.m. on June 4, 2009, the three plainclothes officers arrived in two unmarked cars at the Vinson home and pulled into the home's driveway. The Vinsons' fourteen-year-old daughter, C.A.V., was returning to the house after checking the mailbox when the cars pulled in near the home's attached garage. C.A.V. was home with her nine-year-old brother, C.R.V., at the time and was alarmed by the appearance of three strange men in two cars. She went into the house through the back door and locked the door. She checked to make sure that her brother was inside the house and then called her mother at work to report the appearance of the men. While she was speaking to her mother, who was then in a high risk pregnancy with her third child, C.A.V. saw one of the men peering through a window into the home. C.A.V. told her mother that one of the men was looking into the house through the window. This caused both mother and daughter great distress. The man, after staring through the window, told C.A.V. that he was a police officer and said “he had to conduct a search of the house.” According to the complaint, “C.A.V. complied with the officer's statement, went upstairs with her brother and watched [the three officers] out the window while they searched the garage attached to the house and curtilage of the house.” The officers found nothing and left the property.

The Vinsons sued Detective Sherrick and Officers Shaw and Davis in their individual capacities; Dan Walsh, the Sheriff of Champaign County, in his individual and official capacities; Patrick Hartshorn, the Sheriff of Vermilion County, in his individual and official capacities; and Champaign and Vermilion Counties, local governmental entities. The first count of the complaint alleged a Fourth Amendment claim against Sherrick, Shaw and Davis, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That count also named Champaign and Vermilion Counties as parties responsible for the payment of any judgment under the Illinois Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/9–102 (hereafter “Tort Immunity Act”). The second count alleged common law trespass against Sherrick, Shaw and Davis, and sought to hold Walsh and Hartshorn liable under common law respondeat superior. The trespass claim again named the Counties as parties liable for any damages under the Tort Immunity Act. The Vinsons sought compensatory damages, punitive damages and attorneys' fees.

Originally, the Vinsons joined their claims with those of the Olsons, who sued many of the same defendants for the search of the Olson property and for the subsequent prosecution of Ronald Olson. When the defendants moved to dismiss certain claims in the original complaint filed jointly by the Olsons and the Vinsons,² the district court commented that the complaint was “vague and indefinite” in describing the search at the Vinson residence and noted that there was no assertion of forced entry. The court then concluded that the joinder of the Olson and Vinson claims in the same complaint violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) and that the claims should have been brought in separate suits.³ The court then held that the “Olson and Vinson claims are severed by the court for misjoinder under Fed.R.Civ.P. 18(a) and 21. Leave is granted the plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint within twenty-one days of this order correcting the deficiencies in the dismissed amended complaint. The Olson claims and the Vinson claims must be brought in separate suits[.]”

Within the time allotted by the district court, the Vinsons filed their separate complaint, bringing the claims we have just described. Walsh, Sherrick and Shaw then moved to dismiss the Vinsons' new complaint for failure to state a claim, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In the alternative, they argued that the Vinsons' claims were now barred by the statute of limitations. The district court concluded that the Vinsons failed to state a claim under the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The court first repeated its previous criticism that the Vinsons' claims were vague and indefinite. Noting that the new complaint added only a few insignificant details, the court found that the allegations were insufficient under Iqbal to state a claim. The court acknowledged the assertions that the officers peered through the windows and walked around the curtilage and into the back yard to look for “large items that would be readily apparent without the need to disturb small personal items.” The court also noted that the officers searched the attached garage. But none of this was problematic, the court found, because C.A.V. “consented” to the officers' search. The court based this conclusion on the allegation that, after an officer told C.A.V. that he had to search the house, she “complied with the officer's statement.” Turning to the dictionary definition of “comply,” the court found that it meant to conform, submit or adapt as requested:

Therefore, on its face, this complaint alleges that C.A.V. essentially consented to the defendants' search of the curtilage and garage to locate a stolen lawn mower and trailers (i.e., large, obvious items) that might be found on the premises.

Vinson v. Champaign County, Ill., No. 12–2099 (C.D.Ill. Aug. 10, 2012), Order at 3–4. That allegation of “consent,” the court held, required dismissal of the complaint under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The court then concluded that the common law trespass claim must be dismissed because it failed to allege wilful and wanton conduct, as required under Illinois law. Moreover, because the claim against Walsh depended on the validity of the trespass claim against Sherrick and Shaw, the court dismissed the claim against Walsh. Finally, even though Champaign County had not joined the motion to dismiss, the court concluded that dismissal of the claims against Sherrick and Shaw required dismissal of the County. The court declined to reach the statute of limitations issue.

Davis, Hartshorn and Vermilion County then separately moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion. The court first noted that Hartshorn and Vermilion County were entitled to judgment because there is no respondeat superior liability for section 1983 claims, and because the plaintiffs failed to plead a Monell claim against the County.⁴ Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). As for Davis, the court concluded again that there could be no claim for an unlawful search against the law enforcement officers present that day because C.A.V. “consented” to the search. The plaintiffs appeal.

II.

We review de novo the district court's decisions to dismiss claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and to enter judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c). Ball v. City of Indianapolis, 760 F.3d 636, 642–43 (7th Cir.2014). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) both employ the same standard: the complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ball, 760 F.3d at 643 ; Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 727–28 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 286, 190 L.Ed.2d 140 (2014). See also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to set forth in the complaint “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127...