Stewart v. American Airlines, Inc.

• Citation: 776 F. Supp. 1194
• Decision Date: 29 October 1991
• Docket Number: No. H-91-2149.,H-91-2149.
• Parties: Douglas STEWART, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., and AMR Corporation, Defendants.
• Court: United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Southern District of Texas

776 F. Supp. 1194

Douglas STEWART, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., and AMR Corporation, Defendants.

No. H-91-2149.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.

October 29, 1991.

Chris A. Stacy, Chris A. Stacy & Assoc., Houston, Tex., for plaintiff.

Victoria E. Moss, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, Tex., for defendants.

ORDER

KENT, District Judge.

Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff's Motion should be GRANTED, and therefore Defendant's Motion is not reached.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this Action in the District Court of Harris County, Texas, 281st Judicial District. Plaintiff's Original Petition asserts only State law tort claims. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that he was a passenger on the Defendant American Airlines' ("American") Flight # 4856 from John F. Kennedy Airport, in New York City, to Washington National Airport. The airplane was operated by a regional carrier owned by Defendant AMR Corporation ("AMR"), which is also American's parent company. At some point during the flight, the airplane suffered a deflated nose wheel. The airplane jolted, which caused Plaintiff to be jostled back and forth, which, in turn, resulted in injuries to his neck.

Defendants removed to this court on August 1, 1991. Defendants allege that removal was proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a)-(b) (West 1973 & Supp.1991) and also move to dismiss Plaintiff's State law claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on the ground that such claims are pre-empted by the Federal Aviation Act ("FAA"). 49 U.S.C.A.App. § 1301 et seq. (West 1976 & Supp.1991). In other words, since Plaintiff's State law claims are pre-empted by the FAA, this Action is removable pursuant to Section 1441. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2430, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Similarly, since Plaintiff's State law claims are preempted, his Complaint, which alleges only State law causes of action, necessarily fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff contends that his claims are not pre-empted, or, alternatively, that Federal pre-emption is merely a defense to his State law claims. Therefore, this Action does not arise under the FAA or any law or treaty of the United States, and thus, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must remand the case to State Court.

II. DISCUSSION

A State Court Action is not removable to Federal Court if the Action could not have originally been brought in Federal Court. Thus, removal is proper only where original diversity or Federal question jurisdiction is present. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a) (West Supp.1991); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, supra, 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S.Ct. at 2429.

A. DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP

The record indicates that Plaintiff is a citizen of the United Kingdom, while Defendants are both Delaware Corporations. Thus, it appears that Defendants might have been able to predicate removal on the ground that complete diversity of citizenship exists between the parties. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)(2) (West Supp.1991). Thus, this Action could have originally been brought in Federal Court pursuant to Section 1332, and removal might have been proper pursuant to Section 1441.

Defendant did not, however, file a petition for removal within 30 days alleging diversity of citizenship as a ground for this Court's jurisdiction as required by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446 (West Supp.1991). See also Gaitor v. Peninsular & Occidental S.S., 287 F.2d 252, 255 (5th Cir.1961) (Defendant seeking removal in a diversity case must make affirmative showing that all requirements for diversity jurisdiction are present); 14A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3733, at 533-35 & n. 5 (1985 & Supp.1991). More importantly, it is unclear from the record whether removal based on diversity of citizenship is proper, even if complete diversity exists. For purposes of determining whether diversity exists, a corporation is considered to be a citizen of both its State of incorporation and the State where it has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(c)(1) (West Supp.1991). Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(b) (West 1973), removal based on diversity of citizenship is proper only if none of the defendants is a citizen of the State in which the Action is brought. Thus, if Defendants' principal place of business is in Texas, then this Action cannot be removed on the ground that complete diversity exists. The record, however, is devoid of allegations concerning Defendants' principal place of business. Thus, this Court cannot determine whether removal based on diversity of citizenship might have been proper. It is clear, however, that it is not the function of this Court to engage in discovery for the benefit of the parties. Therefore, the Court considers only the issue properly briefed and presented to the Court: whether this case was properly removed on the ground that Plaintiff's State law claims are pre-empted by the FAA. See Gaitor v. Peninsular & Occidental S.S., supra, 287 F.2d at 255.

B. FEDERAL QUESTION

Under the "well-pleaded complaint rule," Federal question jurisdiction is proper only where the Federal question appears on the face of Plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13, 57 S.Ct. 96, 97-98, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936). Where original Federal question jurisdiction exists, a case may be removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a) (West Supp.1991). Removal may not, however, be predicated solely on the existence of a defense grounded in Federal law, even a defense that Plaintiff's claim is pre-empted by Federal law. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, supra, 482 U.S. at 392-93, 107 S.Ct. at 2429-30; Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 12, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2847, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983).

The "complete pre-emption" doctrine, however, stands as an independent corollary to the "well-pleaded complaint rule." Williams, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. at 2430, Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 22, 103 S.Ct. at 2852. The pre-emptive force of certain Federal statutes is so great that they convert otherwise ordinary State law claims into Federal claims for purposes of the "well pleaded complaint rule." Williams, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. at 2430; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1547, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987). Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 675, 94 S.Ct. 772, 781, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974). In the instant case, before determining whether the "complete pre-emption doctrine" applies or whether pre-emption is merely a Federal defense, the Court must first determine whether Plaintiff's claims are, in fact, pre-empted by the FAA.

Congress has explicitly stated the FAA pre-empts all State law claims to the extent that such claims "relate to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier...." 49 U.S.C.A.App. § 1305(a)(1) (West Supp. 1991). Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims are necessarily related to services provided by Defendants, and are, therefore pre-empted. In particular, Defendants focus on Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants were negligent in failing to properly maintain their aircraft, failing to correct unsafe conditions, and contracting with and transporting passengers on a regional carrier which did not properly maintain its aircraft. Relying on Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox,¹ Defendants argue that such claims directly concern or are connected with specific services provided by Defendants, and are, therefore, preempted by Section 1305.

In Trans World Airlines, the Fifth Circuit held that State deceptive advertising laws were pre-empted by the FAA to the extent that such laws attempted to regulate the advertising of fares by interstate and international airlines. First, the Court concluded that, in enacting the FAA, Congress intended to pre-empt State regulation of airline fare advertising, and that such regulations were an attempt to regulate "rates" for purposes of Section 1305. 897 F.2d at 780-82. More importantly, for present purposes, the Court held that the State laws in question related to airline rates, even though they were not specifically directed at airlines in particular:

"Although the state laws against deceptive advertising are not aimed specifically at airlines, and clearly do not attempt to set rates, the conclusion is inescapable that such laws do `relate to' rates when applied to airline fare advertising.... A law relates to a particular subject `if it has a connection with or reference to' that subject. It cannot be gainsaid that enforcement of a state law regulating fare advertising by airlines has a connection with or reference to rates within the meaning of § 1305(a)(1). Therefore, such state action is expressly preempted by § 1305(a)(1)."

897 F.2d at 783.

Trans World Airlines is not, however, dispositive of the issues presently before this Court. First, the Trans World Airlines Court did not hold that all State laws which relate to airline advertising are preempted by the FAA. Moreover, Trans World Airlines clearly does not teach, as Defendants appear to claim that it does, that all state law claims against air carriers are pre-empted by the FAA. Trans World Airlines only addresses laws that relate to "rates, routes, or services." Airline fare advertising necessarily concerns airline "rates," and thus, State laws regulating such advertising necessarily relate to airline "rates" within the meaning of Section 1305.

By contrast, it is far from clear that, in the instant case, Plaintiff's claims relate to "services" within the meaning of Section 1305. First, those cases which have held that a Plaintiff's claims were claims relating to "services" and therefore pre-empted by Section 1305 all involved services provided by individual airline...