Zirnsak v. Colvin

Decision Date09 December 2014
Docket NumberNo. 14–1168.,14–1168.
Citation777 F.3d 607
PartiesRoseann ZIRNSAK, Appellant v. Carolyn W. COLVIN, Commissioner Social Security.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Sarah H. Bohr, Esq., Bohr & Harrington, LLC, Atlantic Beach, FL, Elizabeth A. Smith, Esq., Butler, PA, for Appellant, Roseann Zirnsak.

Nora Koch, Esq., Taryn Jasner, Esq., Beverly H. Zuckerman, Esq., Social Security Administration, Philadelphia, PA, David J. Hickton, Esq., Rebecca R. Haywood, Esq., Office of United States Attorney, Pittsburgh, PA, Counsel for Appellee Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner Social Security for Appellee, Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner Social Security.

Before: VANASKIE, COWEN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Roseann Zirnsak brings this action to appeal the final decision of the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, dated December 5, 2013, affirming the denial of her claim for Social Security Disability Income benefits. Zirnsak v. Colvin, No. 2:13cv303, 2013 WL 6622925 (W.D.Pa. Dec. 5, 2013). For the reasons that follow we will affirm the decision of the District Court.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

In October of 2001, Ms. Roseann Zirnsak (“Zirnsak” or “the claimant) was involved in a motor vehicle accident in which she sustained head and lung injuries

and skeletal fractures. Zirnsak v. Colvin, No. 2:13cv303, 2013 WL 6622925, at *3 (W.D.Pa. Dec. 5, 2013). She was hospitalized following that incident from October 8, 2001 through November 14, 2001. Id. While hospitalized, she was temporarily on life support. Id. Upon her discharge, she was sent to a rehabilitation facility. Id. Four days after entering the rehabilitation facility, she returned to the hospital for a procedure to have her gangrenous gallbladder removed. Id. After her discharge following that procedure, she again returned to the rehabilitation facility. Id. Zirnsak continued to be treated at a rehabilitation facility from January 16, 2002 through October 18, 2005. Id. In February of 2003, she suffered a seizure and sought treatment immediately thereafter. Id. She was prescribed medication, and she did not suffer any further seizures. Id. Between January 5, 2005 and August 11, 2006, Zirnsak underwent plastic surgery treatments for lipoma reductions. Id. at *4.

In the years following her accident, Zirnsak sought treatment from several medical professionals. Zirnsak received the following treatment relevant to her mental condition. Zirnsak was treated by Dr. Thomas Franz, M.D., from February 22, 2003 through February 3, 2010. Id. Dr. Franz treated Zirnsak for “traumatic brain injury

, left hemiparesis cognitive impairments with short-term memory deficits, organic affective changes[,] and a seizure disorder.” Id. Dr. Kevin Kelly, M.D., Ph.D., treated Zirnsak from February 14, 2003 through February 4, 2010. Id. He diagnosed Zirnsak with a seizure disorder. Id. Dr. David Newman, Ph.D., evaluated Zirnsak over a three-day period—from April 4–6, 2010. Id. His report summarizing that evaluation noted “a suggestion of mild short-term memory loss and a concentration deficit.” Id. Finally, on April 8, 2010, Michelle Santilli, Psy. D., performed a mental residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment of Zirnsak. Id. She concluded that Zirnsak could perform competitive work on a sustained basis. Id.

On January 6, 2010, Zirnsak applied for Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits alleging a disability commencing on May 11, 2006.Id. at *1.1 The parties agree that Zirnsak's date last insured was December 31, 2007. (Transcript (“Tr.”) at 32).2 Accordingly, the relevant period for Zirnsak's disability determination is the period from May 11, 2006 to December 31, 2007. The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied Zirnsak's application on May 17, 2010. (Id. ). On June 14, 2010, Zirnsak requested a hearing, which was subsequently held on June 22, 2011. (Id. ). At the hearing, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) James P. Pileggi heard testimony from Zirnsak, her husband, and a vocational expert. (Id. at 30–59). On July 15, 2011, ALJ Pileggi issued a decision denying Zirnsak's application for benefits. Zirnsak, 2013 WL 6622925, at *1. He found that Zirnsak was “not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from May 11, 2006, the amended alleged onset date, through December 31, 2007, the date last insured.” (Tr. at 22). As part of that finding, ALJ Pileggi found that Zirnsak was capable of performing certain jobs available in the national economy, so long as those jobs were sedentary and routine. (Id. at 16). He based that finding, in part, on testimony from a vocational expert who opined that Zirnsak was capable of working as an order clerk (food and beverage), charge account clerk, telephone clerk, or sedentary subassembler. (Id. at 21–22).

That decision became final on January 9, 2013, when, after reconsideration, the Appeals Council affirmed the prior determination. Zirnsak, 2013 WL 6622925, at *1. On March 1, 2013, Zirnsak filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of the Commissioner's final determination. Id. On August 12, 2013, United States Magistrate Judge Robert C. Mitchell filed a Report and Recommendation indicating that the decision of the Commissioner should be affirmed. Id. On December 3, 2013, United States District Judge David Stewart Cercone filed an Order adopting the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation as the opinion of the district court, affirming the denial of Zirnsak's claim for SSDI benefits, and entering judgment for the Commissioner. Id. Zirnsak timely filed this appeal on January 21, 2014.

II. Discussion3
1. Standard of Review

This Court reviews any findings of fact made by an ALJ under the deferential “substantial evidence” standard. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ; Schaudeck v. Comm'r, 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir.1999). We must affirm the ALJ so long as his conclusions are supported by substantial evidence. Craigie v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 56, 57 (3d Cir.1987). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir.2005). It is “more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. We review the record as a whole to determine whether substantial evidence supports a factual finding. Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 431. When performing that review, we are mindful that we must not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder. Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 552. We exercise plenary review over the District Court's determination of legal issues. Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 431.

2. The Administrative Law Judge's Assessment of Zirnsak's Mental Residual Functioning Capacity

The core issue in this case is whether Zirnsak was disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any point during the period from May 11, 2006 through December 31, 2007. Section 423(d)(1)(A) of the Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). An individual is disabled if her impairments are severe enough that not only is she incapable of performing her previous work, but she is also incapable of engaging in “any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id. § 423(d)(2)(A). It is the claimant's burden to establish that she is disabled. See id. § 432(d)(5)(A) ( “An individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless [s]he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the Commissioner of Social Security may require.”). The claimant must also establish that the onset date of disability occurred prior to the expiration of the claimant's insured status. 20 C.F.R. § 404.131 (2014).

A five-step, sequential evaluation process is employed to determine whether a particular claimant has met the burden of establishing disability. Id. § 404.1520(a). The five-step inquiry proceeds as follows. First, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant is “engaging in substantial gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If yes, then the claimant is not disabled. Id. Second, the Commissioner considers the severity of the claimant's impairment(s). Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant's impairment(s) are either not severe or do not meet the duration requirement, the claimant is not disabled. Id. Third, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant's impairment(s) meet or equal the requirements of one of the Commissioner's listed impairments. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant's impairment(s) meet the requirements of a listed impairment, then the claimant is disabled. Id.

If not, then the inquiry proceeds to the fourth step, where the Commissioner considers whether the claimant can return to her past work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). To determine whether the claimant can perform her past work, the Commissioner assesses the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”). Id. § 404.1520(e). A claimant's RFC measures “the most [she] can do despite [her] limitations.” Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). The Commissioner examines “all of the relevant medical and other evidence” to make its RFC determination. Id. § 404.1545(a)(3). If the Commissioner finds that the claimant can still perform her past work, she is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). It is important to note that during steps two through four of the inquiry, the claimant always bears the burden of establishing (1) that she is severely impaired, and (2) either that the severe impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, or that it prevents her from performing...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT