French v. Owens

• Citation: 777 F.2d 1250
• Decision Date: 12 February 1986
• Docket Number: 85-1065,Nos. 83-2280,s. 83-2280
• Parties: Richard A. FRENCH, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Norman G. OWENS, et al., Defendants-Appellants. Richard A. FRENCH, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Norman G. OWENS, et al., Defendants-Appellants, United States of America, Amicus Curiae.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Page 1250

777 F.2d 1250

Richard A. FRENCH, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Norman G. OWENS, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

Richard A. FRENCH, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Norman G. OWENS, et al., Defendants-Appellants, United States of America, Amicus Curiae.

Nos. 83-2280, 85-1065.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 5, 1985.

Decided Nov. 26, 1985.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Feb. 12, 1986.

David A. Arthur, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, Ind., for defendants-appellants.

Donald R. Lundberg, Leg. Services Organization of Ind., Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before CUDAHY and ESCHBACH, Circuit Judges, and MORTON, Senior District Judge. ^*

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana requiring extensive reforms at the Indiana Reformatory at Pendleton, Indiana. Defendants, officials of the Reformatory, allege on appeal that the court erred in finding constitutional violations and exceeded its authority in issuing a detailed injunction. We have reviewed the order and affirm most of its provisions. We vacate with respect to several provisions and remand to the district court for further consideration.

I.

Four prisoners at the Indiana Reformatory at Pendleton ("the Reformatory" or "Pendleton") filed a class action suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 on behalf of all persons who are or will be in the facility. The suit complained of overcrowding and of the prison's use of mechanical restraints. It protested poor medical care and food, inadequate recreation, discrimination against those in protective custody, insufficient safety personnel and noncompliance with fire and occupational safety standards. After a 16-day trial, the district judge, exercising his pendent jurisdiction, found that many of these conditions violated various provisions of Indiana law. He also found that the practice of double-celling, in concert with other overcrowded and unsanitary conditions, violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. French v. Owens, 538 F.Supp. 910 (S.D.Ind.1982). Therefore, he issued a permanent injunction ordering detailed changes.

Defendants appealed. While the appeal was before this court, the Supreme Court decided Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), which held that under the eleventh amendment, federal courts lacked jurisdiction over claims for injunctive relief against state officials based upon state law. In light of Pennhurst, we remanded this case to the district court so it could consider whether the conditions that it had found violated state law also violated federal law.

On remand, the court found that most of the conditions which violated state law, offended the eighth amendment as well. It therefore issued an amended order. That order also accounted for improvements that had been made at the facility over the two-year period since conditions had originally been considered.

Defendants again appeal. The United States has filed an amicus brief stating its position in detail on the various alleged violations and on the remedies prescribed.

II.

"In analyzing a challenge to prison conditions based on the Eighth Amendment, a court should examine each challenged condition of confinement ... to determine whether that condition is compatible with the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' " Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir.1981) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958) (plurality opinion)). We therefore examine the specifics of Judge Dillin's order to determine if there have been violations of the eighth amendment and, if so, whether the remedy is appropriate. ¹

A. Double-Celling

Built in 1923, by 1982 the Pendleton reformatory housed almost 2,000 prisoners, over twice its intended capacity. To accommodate the rise in population, prison officials placed two prisoners in cells that were intended for one. More than one-third of all cells were converted to double cells. After reviewing the record and personally visiting the prison site, Judge Dillin concluded that "rampant" double celling, in conjunction with general conditions of overcrowding, violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments. ²

By 1982, the gross available space per man in the double cells was 24 square feet, the net amount approximately half that. In the Administrative Segregation Unit--where prisoners are kept who need to be separated from the general inmate population--the ceilings are lower and inmates on the top bunks of double cells are unable to sit up. There is no space for a chair on the floor. As a result, some have developed back problems.

The district court found that the forty per cent of prisoners in double cells spend large amounts of time together, up to 20 to 23 hours per day for the several hundred prisoners in protective custody or without work assignments.

Deplorable conditions exist beyond the double-celling problem. All cells and dormitories are inadequately ventilated. There is no means of distributing heat to the cells and, in summertime, no system for circulating air to the cells. Rooms are dirty and odorous. Toilets and lavatories are "virtually uncleanable." Lighting is poor. Cells have no hot water.

Especially in light of the poor supervision, safety, medical care and food preparation at the facility, Judge Dillin found the conditions intolerable. He ordered that the population be reduced to 1,615 and enjoined double celling.

As the district court acknowledged, the mere practice of double celling is not per se unconstitutional. In Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), the Supreme Court upheld its use in some instances. The institution at issue in Rhodes, however, was described as a "top-flight, first class facility." Id. at 341, 101 S.Ct. at 2396. It had been built in the 1970s. Prisoners there shared double cells of 63 square feet, one-third larger than the cells at Pendleton. Each cell contained a night stand and shelf and radio unit. All cells had hot water. Similarly, this court upheld the use of double celling at the State Prison at Pontiac, Illinois in Smith v. Fairman, 690 F.2d 122 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 946, 103 S.Ct. 2125, 77 L.Ed.2d 1304 (1983). Pontiac's double cells ranged in size from 55 to 65 square feet, giving prisoners there 20 to 35 per cent more space than their Pendleton counterparts. Most of the cells at the Pontiac facility were "neat and clean" and much of the crowding in prisoners' cells was due to the inmates' books, records, stereos and electronic equipment. Food at Pontiac was found to be nutritious and wholesome. Violence had dramatically declined and medical care was found adequate.

While these institutions passed constitutional muster, the Rhodes court noted that prison conditions could be cruel and unusual when they "deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities," 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399, or when they result in punishments that " 'involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' or are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime." Id. at 346, 101 S.Ct. at 2399 (citations omitted).

In this circuit, we determine whether there have been "serious deprivations of basic human needs," id. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399, by examining the "totality of conditions of confinement." Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 874 (7th Cir.1981). In this light, the picture painted of Pendleton is very different from that seen in Smith or Rhodes, from the lack of space and furnishings, to the unwholesome food, medical neglect and continuous threats to prisoners' safety. We agree that such conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1492 (9th Cir.1984) (injunction upheld against double celling where it "engender[s] violence, tension and psychological problems"); Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3587, 82 L.Ed.2d 885 (1984) (overcrowding can violate eighth amendment).

On appeal, defendants contend that even if the conditions were cruel and unusual, the district court's remedy was too broad. They assert that if the population is reduced, there should be no need to ban double celling.

At this time we disagree. The district court has broad powers to forge an adequate remedy to permanently correct any constitutional violation. As the Supreme Court has stated, "once a constitutional violation is demonstrated, the scope of the district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth is inherent in equitable remedies." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1275, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). Here, where there was narrowly cramped double celling as a feature of severely overcrowded, unsafe and unsanitary conditions, we cannot conclude that the district court exceeded its broad remedial power. Under present conditions, a complete ban on double celling is fully justified. However, since double celling is not per se unconstitutional, if the Indiana prison system eliminates the severe overcrowding at Pendleton and the pernicious evils that accompany it, the state can at a later date seek some modification of the ban on double celling. If adequate reasons were shown and overall conditions warrant, such a request would, of course, be entitled to consideration.

B. Mechanical Restraints

Plaintiffs also complained that the use of mechanical restraints at Pendleton was unconstitutional. Mechanical restraint was employed against those who threatened suicide or were physically disruptive. Between January 1980 and January 1982, mechanical restraint was used 84 times. Prisoners were often chained for between 12 and 24 hours, with instances recorded...