State v. Wasson

• Decision Date: 08 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–0950.,14–0950.
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Respondent v. Taylor R. WASSON, Jr., Defendant Below, Petitioner.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

236 W.Va. 238

778 S.E.2d 687

STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Respondent

v.Taylor R. WASSON, Jr., Defendant Below, Petitioner.

No. 14–0950.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Sept. 22, 2015.

Decided Oct. 8, 2015.

Benjamin M. Hiller, Esq., Public Defender Corporation, Martinsburg, WV, for Petitioner.

Cheryl K. Saville, Esq., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Martinsburg, WV, for Respondent.

Opinion

LOUGHRY, Justice:

The petitioner, Taylor R. Wasson, Jr., appeals an August 25, 2014, order of the Circuit Court of Berkeley County, requiring him, inter alia,to pay restitution in the amount of $5,478.93 to State Farm Insurance Company (“State Farm”) within one year of his release from incarceration. In this appeal, Mr. Wasson contends that the circuit court erred by ordering him to pay restitution to State Farm because it was not a “direct victim” of his criminal act. Upon consideration of the parties' briefs and arguments, the submitted record, and pertinent authorities, we find no error and, therefore, affirm the circuit court's order.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In October 2013, Mr. Wasson was indicted and charged with burglary, grand larceny, conspiracy to commit burglary, and misdemeanor unlawful possession of a firearm. It was alleged that Mr. Wasson burglarized the home of Samuel and Betty Boynton on May 10, 2013. Subsequently, Mr. Wasson entered into a plea agreement with the respondent, the State of West Virginia (“State”), whereby he agreed to plead guilty to the burglary charge in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts set forth in the indictment.¹Upon entry of his guilty plea, Mr. Wasson was sentenced to an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years in a state penitentiary for the burglary conviction. By agreement of the parties, a hearing was scheduled to address the matter of restitution.

A restitution hearing was held on June 3, 2014. Mrs. Boynton testified that she and her husband had filed a claim with their insurance company, State Farm, for their lost property.²She stated the total dollar amount of their claim was $12,404.95. Due to depreciation that amount was reduced by State Farm to $11,218.73.³Mrs. Boynton explained that she and her husband ultimately received a settlement in the amount of $5,478.93 from State Farm pursuant to their insurance contract.⁴Based on this evidence, the circuit court ordered Mr. Wasson to pay restitution to the Boyntons in the amount of $5,739.80 for their unrecovered loss. The Court further ordered Mr. Wasson to pay $5,478.93 to State Farm, which was the amount that State Farm paid to the Boyntons to settle their claim. The court's decision was set forth in the final order entered on August 25, 2014, and this appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

Our standard for reviewing orders of restitution was set forth in syllabus point one of State v. Lucas,201 W.Va. 271, 496 S.E.2d 221 (1997), as follows: “The Supreme Court of Appeals reviews sentencing orders, including orders of restitution made in connection with a defendant's sentencing, under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, unless the order violates statutory or constitutional commands.” Because the issue upon which Mr. Wasson bases his appeal involves statutory interpretation, we will also employ a de novostandard of review. As explained in syllabus point one of Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L.,194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995), “[w]here the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novostandard of review.”

III. Discussion

West Virginia Code §§ 61–11A–1through –8(2014), known as the Victim Protection Act (the “Act”) “codif[y] the principal statutory law governing court-ordered restitution by a person convicted of a crime.” Lucas,201 W.Va. at 276, 496 S.E.2d at 226. Addressing the subject of restitution, this Court has previously observed that

[r]ead in pari materia,the provisions of W.Va.Code,61–11A–1 [1984], W.Va.Code,61–11A–4(a) [1984], W.Va.Code,61–11A–4(d) [1984], W.Va.Code,61–11A–5(a) [1984]and W.Va.Code, 61–11A–5(d) [1984], establish that at the time of a convicted criminal defendant's sentencing, a circuit court should ordinarily order the defendant to make full restitution to any victims of the crime who have suffered injuries, as defined and permitted by the statute, unless the court determines that ordering such full restitution is impractical.

Lucas,201 W.Va. at 273, 496 S.E.2d at 223, syl. pt. 2. This Court further recognized in Lucasthat

[u]nder W.Va.Code,61–11A–1through –8and the principles established in our criminal sentencing jurisprudence, the circuit court's discretion in addressing the issue of restitution to crime victims at the time of a criminal defendant's sentencing is to be guided by a presumption in favor of an award of full restitution to victims, unless the circuit court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that full restitution is impractical, after consideration of all of the pertinent circumstances, including the losses of any victims, the financial circumstances of the defendant and the defendant's family, the rehabilitative consequences to the defendant and any victims, and such other factors as the court may consider.

201 W.Va. at 273, 496 S.E.2d at 223, syl. pt. 3. In this appeal, Mr. Wasson does not challenge the portion of the circuit court's final order requiring him to pay restitution to the Boyntons. He only asserts error insofar as the order requires him to pay restitution to State Farm.

Mr. Wasson argues that he should not be required to pay restitution to State Farm because it was not a “direct victim” of his criminal act. Focusing upon West Virginia Code § 61–11A–4(a), Mr. Wasson contends that State Farm is not a “victim” within the meaning of this provision so as to give the insurer the right to an award of restitution. This provision of the Act provides:

The court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of a felony or misdemeanor causing physical, psychological or economic injury or loss to a victim, shall order, in addition to or in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to any victim of the offense, unless the court finds restitution to be wholly or partially impractical as set forth in this article.

W.Va.Code § 61–11A–4(a). Mr. Wasson maintains this provision only allows an insurance company to be granted an award of restitution when a criminal defendant intends to and does obtain money or other benefits from said company through his or her criminal conduct. Acknowledging that the Act does not explicitly define “victim,” Mr. Wasson relies upon this Court's decisions in Lucasand State v. McGill,230 W.Va. 85, 736 S.E.2d 85 (2012), to support his argument.

In Lucas,the defendant was convicted of first degree arson after he set fire to his grocery store business and collected the insurance proceeds. At his sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay restitution of $1,430,000.00 to Aetna Casualty Company, which was the exact amount the company paid to settle the defendant's insurance claim as a result of the fire. On appeal, the defendant argued that Aetna was not a “victim” under the Act and, therefore, was not entitled to restitution. Rejecting the defendant's argument, this Court held that “[w]here a criminal defendant intends to and does obtain money or other benefit from an insurance company by committing a criminal act of arson, the insurance company is a direct victim of the crime and is eligible for restitution under the provisions of W.Va.Code, 61–11A–4(a)[1984].” 201 W.Va. at 274, 496 S.E.2d at 224, syl. pt. 8.

In contrast, in McGill,this Court reversed a circuit court order requiring a defendant to pay restitution to the state for expenses incurred in apprehending him after he escaped from custody. We explained that the Act is aimed at compensating the “direct victims of the crime–that is, individuals harmed directly by the criminal acts at issue–rather than society as a whole.” Id.at 89, 736 S.E.2d at 89. Therefore, we concluded the word “victim” could not be read so broadly as to include law enforcement authorities. Accordingly, this Court held in syllabus point five of McGillthat “[t]he restitution provisions of the Victim Protection Act of 1984, West Virginia Code §§ 61–11A–1to 8, do not extend to recovery of costs or expenses incurred by governmental agencies in apprehending perpetrators of criminal acts.” 230 W.Va. at 86, 736 S.E.2d at 86.

Based upon the above, Mr. Wasson maintains that the award of restitution to State Farm was improper because he did not intend to, nor did he obtain, any money, property, or benefit from the company as a result of his criminal conduct. Upon review of the record, we find Mr. Wasson's reliance upon Lucasand McGillto be misplaced. Here, the circuit court made no finding that State Farm was a “direct victim” of Mr. Wasson's criminal activity. Rather, the circuit court granted State Farm an award of restitution pursuant to West Virginia Code § 61–11A–4(e), a provision authorizing restitution payments to third parties that have reimbursed the victim. In that regard, the statute provides, in pertinent part:

The court shall not impose restitution with respect to a loss for which the victim has received or is to receive compensation, except that the court may, in the interest of justice, order restitution to any person who has compensated the victim for loss to the extent that the person paid the compensation.

Id.(emphasis supplied).

The circuit court concluded that State Farm was a “person” within the meaning of West Virginia Code § 61–11A–4(e)and, therefore, was entitled to restitution because it compensated the Boyntons for a portion of their loss. Acknowledging that the term “person” is not defined by the provisions of the Act, the circuit court relied upon West Virginia Code § 2–2–10(2013), a statute that provides controlling rules for...