Forsman v. Forsman

Decision Date20 June 1989
Docket NumberNo. 860430,860430
PartiesAudrey FORSMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. George FORSMAN, Ronald G. Flinders, and Does I through X, Defendants and Appellees. UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, NARCOTIC & LIQUOR LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, Plaintiff, v. George Leland FORSMAN, Defendant and Cross-Claimant.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

J. Kent Holland, Gordon J. Swenson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.

John R. Lund, Raymond Berry, Salt Lake City, for George Forsman.

R. Paul Van Dam, Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt Lake City, for the Dept. of Public Safety and Ronald Flinders.

HALL, Chief Justice:

Plaintiff was injured while a passenger in an automobile driven by her husband, George Forsman, which collided with an automobile owned by the Utah Department of Public Safety and driven by its employee, Ronald Flinders. Plaintiff thereupon sued both her husband and Flinders for damages sustained as a result of the collision. 1

The trial court granted summary judgment of dismissal, concluding that plaintiff's cause of action against her husband was barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity and that her cause of action against Flinders was barred by failure to give timely notice of a claim against him pursuant to the requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act. 2

The operative facts are not in dispute. At the time of the accident, plaintiff and defendant George Forsman were husband and wife and residents of the state of California. The accident occurred on June 22, 1983, in the state of Utah. At the scene of the accident, defendant Flinders stated that he was employed by the state of Utah and that the automobile he was driving was owned by and registered to the state of Utah. Within one year following the accident, a licence plate search was conducted for No. MPV 372, the number reflected on the investigating officer's report of the accident for the vehicle driven by Flinders. The Utah Department of Motor Vehicles reported that there was no record of the issuance of any such license plate number.

Also within one year of the accident, plaintiff sought to confirm that Flinders was an employee of the state of Utah but was advised by the Utah Division of Personnel Management that no such person was employed by the state of Utah. Efforts to contact Flinders by mail were to no avail. Correspondence directed to the address given in the police report of the accident in question and to yet a different address disclosed by a driver's license check was returned undelivered.

Plaintiff filed this action on November 13, 1984, prior to learning that Flinders was in fact an employee of the state of Utah, acting in an undercover capacity with protective identity.

I

First, as to the applicability of the doctrine of interspousal immunity heretofore espoused by this Court, 3 by reason of the particular facts and circumstances of this case, it would appear that Utah law should not be applied.

Plaintiff and defendant Forsman were at the time of the accident married and domiciled in the state of California, a jurisdiction which does not recognize the doctrine of interspousal immunity for negligent tort. 4

Utah has not heretofore decided whether the law of the domicile or the law of the situs of the tort should apply. On this issue, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws states as follows:

§ 145. The General Principle

(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6 [stating choice-of-law principles].

(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:

(a) the place where the injury occurred,

(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,

(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and

(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.

....

§ 169. Intra-Family Immunity

(1) The law selected by application of the rule of § 145 determines whether one member of a family is immune from tort liability to another member of the family.

(2) The applicable law will usually be the local law of the state of the parties' domicile.

Comment:

....

b. Rationale. An immunity from tort liability is commonly possessed in varying circumstances by one spouse against the other spouse.... [T]he state of the parties' domicile will almost always be the state of dominant interest, and, if so, its local law should be applied to determine whether there is immunity in the particular case.

(Emphasis added.)

While some jurisdictions have held that the law of the situs of the tort is to be applied, numerous courts have adopted the view espoused by the Restatement that the law of the domicile best serves the family relationships involved.

In Emery v. Emery, 5 the California Supreme Court concluded that as between California domiciliaries involved in an automobile accident in Idaho, the law of their domicile should govern. The court's rationale was as follows:

We think that disabilities to sue and immunities from suit because of a family relationship are more properly determined by reference to the law of the state of the family domicile. That state has the primary responsibility for establishing and regulating the incidents of the family relationship and it is the only state in which the parties can, by participation in the legislative processes, effect a change in those incidents. Moreover, it is undesirable that the rights, duties, disabilities, and immunities conferred or imposed by the family relationship should constantly change as members of the family cross state boundaries during temporary absences from their home. 6

In Schwartz v. Schwartz, 7 a case identical on its facts, a husband and wife, both domiciliaries of New York, experienced an automobile accident in Arizona. The wife sued her husband in Arizona. Interspousal tort suits were not permitted in Arizona, but they were permitted in New York. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the law of the domicile had application and quoted with approval from Clark v. Clark 8 as follows:

"[The] old rule is today almost completely discredited as an unvarying guide to choice of law decision in all tort cases.... No conflict of laws authority in America today agrees that the old rule should be retained.... No American court which has felt free to re-examine the matter thoroughly in the last decade has chosen to retain the old rule.... It is true that some courts, even in recent decisions, have retained it.... But their failure to reject it has resulted from an unwillingness to abandon established precedent ... not to any belief that the old rule was a good one. 222 A.2d at 207 [citations omitted]." 9

We are persuaded by the rationale of the Restatement rule, infra, and the numerous jurisdictions which follow it. We therefore adopt the rule in Utah and reverse and remand with instructions to apply the law of the domicile on the issue of interspousal immunity.

II

The remaining issue is whether plaintiff's action is barred for failure to give timely notice of claim. We conclude from the record before us that a genuine issue of material fact remains to be resolved, namely, whether the State is estopped to assert the lack of timely notice of claim. 10 This is to be seen in that the trial court specifically found that "there was unrefuted testimony by affidavit that the State of Utah denied through the Division of Personnel Management that Defendant Flinders was an employee of the State of Utah." Hence, on remand, plaintiff should be allowed to present evidence of her claim of estoppel. 11

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

STEWART, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

HOWE, Associate Chief Justice (concurring and dissen...

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