Szucs v. L & D Scaffolding, Inc., 94-17222
| Citation | 78 F.3d 594 |
| Decision Date | 14 February 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-17222,94-17222 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. Laszlo SZUCS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. L & D SCAFFOLDING, INC., a California corporation; J.H. Fitzmaurice, Inc.; J.H. Fitzmaurice, Inc./R.M. Fitzmaurice Joint Venture, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Before: ALARCON, LEAVY, and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.
J.H. Fitzmaurice, Inc. ("Fitzmaurice") and L & D Scaffolding, Inc. ("L & D") appeal from the judgment entered following a jury verdict in favor of Laszlo Szucs in his personal injury action against Fitzmaurice and L & D. Fitzmaurice and L & D contend that: (1) the jury's finding of negligence is not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the amount of damages is excessive; and (3) the district court erred by excluding the defense of unclean hands. We affirm the judgment of the district court because neither the record nor the law supports these contentions.
Laszlo Szucs, a citizen of Hungary, visited his brothers, Antal, Andras and George, in California. The three brothers owned Szucs Brothers, Inc. (the "Szucs Brothers"), a painting contractor. During his visit, Laszlo Szucs agreed to help his brothers paint a housing project. The Szucs Brothers were painting the housing project pursuant to a subcontract entered into with Fitzmaurice, the general contractor for the housing project. Fitzmaurice also subcontracted with L & D, a scaffolding contractor, to erect scaffolding for the project.
A few hours after Laszlo Szucs began working at the housing project, he fell 10 feet from a scaffold and sustained fractures in both of his legs. Laszlo Szucs testified that he had just stepped onto the scaffold and was reaching for a pipe when the scaffold moved and he fell off. Andras Szucs testified that he saw a portion of the scaffold's railing move and heard Laszlo Szucs shout in Hungarian that the scaffolding was moving. Photographs taken after the accident depict a scaffold leaning away from the building.
An expert testified that the scaffold had not been properly erected, braced and tied to the building. Other witnesses testified that a tie-in which should have secured the scaffold to the eaves of the building had either been removed or had never been installed. There was also testimony that it was common in the construction industry for other subcontractors to cut scaffolding ties from a building rather than work around them.
Laszlo Szucs brought a personal injury action against several defendants including Fitzmaurice and L & D. The jury returned a verdict for Laszlo Szucs in the amount of $390,544.74. The jury awarded $60,544.74 in economic damages and $330,000.00 in non-economic damages. The jury found L & D to be 80% at fault, Fitzmaurice to be 5% at fault, Laszlo Szucs to be 6% at fault, and Szucs Brothers to be 9% at fault.
After the presentation of Laszlo Szucs's case in chief, and again after the judgment on the verdict was entered, Fitzmaurice and L & D moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. Alternatively, Fitzmaurice and L & D moved for a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. The district court denied these motions. Fitzmaurice and L & D timely appeal from the denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law and the judgment entered pursuant to the jury verdict. Fitzmaurice and L & D also timely appeal from the district court's grant of Laszlo Szucs's motion in limine to exclude evidence that Laszlo Szucs was in violation of United States immigration law at the time of the accident.
The district court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. Because the alleged negligent conduct occurred in California, its substantive law applies. Sequoia Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, 971 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir.1992).
Fitzmaurice and L & D contend that the district court erred in denying their motion for a judgment as a matter of law because the jury's finding of negligence is not supported by substantial evidence. We review the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo to determine if the plaintiff's claims were supported by substantial evidence. Erickson v. Pierce County, 960 F.2d 801, 804 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1035 (1992). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion even if it is possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence." Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir.1994). Courts cannot weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses in determining whether substantial evidence exists. Murray v. Laborers Union Local No. 324, 55 F.3d 1445, 1452 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1995).
Under California law, the elements which a plaintiff must prove to support a claim of negligence are: (1) the existence of a duty; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) injury. Romito v. Red Plastic Co., 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 836 (Cal.Ct.App.1995). L & D does not dispute that it owed a duty of due care to Laszlo Szucs or that it breached this duty by failing to provide a properly erected scaffold. Neither Fitzmaurice or L & D dispute that Laszlo Szucs was injured.
Fitzmaurice contends that a rational jury could not have found that it breached its duty of care to Laszlo Szucs. The existence and nature of a duty of care is a question of law. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278, 281 (Cal.1989). In this case, the jury was instructed that:
We have here the general contractor and subcontractor, and as a general rule of liability, no liability is imposed upon a general contractor for injuries caused by the negligence of a subcontractor. The rule, however, is not applicable where the general contractor has actual or constructive knowledge of a condition hazardous to those who come upon the premises, and such a degree of control as permits reasonable preventative or protective measures to be taken by him.
Fitzmaurice does not challenge this instruction or otherwise contend that, under California law, a general contractor owes no duty of care to the employees of subcontractors. Instead, Fitzmaurice asserts that the evidence demonstrates that its duty of care "shifted" to the Szucs Brothers because the terms of the subcontract between Fitzmaurice and the Szucs Brothers provided that the Szucs Brothers had the sole responsibility for inspecting the scaffold and providing a safe work environment. We disagree.
Fitzmaurice cites no authority for its position that it should be released from its duty of care to Laszlo Szucs by virtue of its contract with the Szucs Brothers. Our review of California law persuades us that, regardless of whether the contract may provide Fitzmaurice with a possible indemnity claim against the Szucs Brothers, it does not release Fitzmaurice of its duty of care to Laszlo Szucs. Laszlo Szucs was not a party to this contract and thus cannot be bound by its terms. See Mannix v. Tryon, 91 P. 983, 986-87 (Cal.1907) (); Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Bd of Administration, Public Emp. Retirement Sys., 153 Cal.Rptr. 62, 64 (1979) ()
Alternatively, Fitzmaurice argues that the jury's finding that it breached its duty to Laszlo Szucs is not supported by substantial evidence. This contention also lacks merit. It is undisputed that the scaffold tie-in to the eaves was missing. Paul Mendiola, an L & D employee, testified that the tie-in to the eaves had been "removed." Other evidence was presented that it is the practice in the industry for other subcontractors to cut, and not replace, scaffolding ties while working on a building. Mr. Mendiola testified that this practice occurred at the housing project. Fitzmaurice's superintendent, Arthur Royson, testified that he periodically inspected scaffolds at the project site and that he required subcontractors to correct safety problems. This evidence supports a reasonable inference that Fitzmaurice knew or should have discovered that subcontractors were cutting, and not replacing, scaffolding ties at the housing project, and that Fitzmaurice could have taken reasonable steps to remedy this problem.
Fitzmaurice and L & D both argue that the jury could not have reasonably concluded that their breaches caused Laszlo Szucs's injury because nobody actually witnessed the accident and Laszlo Szucs's testimony is confusing. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the jury's finding of causation.
It is undisputed that Laszlo Szucs fell from the scaffold. While his testimony is somewhat confusing, Laszlo Szucs clearly testified that he fell when the scaffold moved. Laszlo Szucs's expert, James Hinson, testified that, assuming the scaffold moved when Laszlo Szucs stepped on it, the movement was most likely caused by inadequate bracing of the scaffold and insufficient tying of the scaffold to the building. From this evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that Laszlo Szucs's fall was caused both because L & D had not properly erected the scaffold and because the eaves tie-in was missing.
Fitzmaurice and L & D further contend that the failure of the Szucs Brothers and Laszlo Szucs to detect the scaffolding defects was a superseding,...
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