Vance v. Corrigan

Decision Date30 April 1883
Citation78 Mo. 94
PartiesVANCE et al., Appellants, v. CORRIGAN.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court.--HON. S. H. WOODSON, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Pratt, Brumback & Ferry for appellants, argued that Mrs. Vance and not Barnes was the owner, citing Cooley on Tax., (1 Ed.) 278, 279; Blackwell on Tax Titles, (3 Ed.) 144, 145; Trustees v. Boston, 12 Cush. 59; Shaff v. Improvement Co., 57 N. H. 110; Proctor v. R. R. Co., 64 Mo. 123; Hartford v. Brady, 114 Mass. 470; s. c., 19 Am. Rep. 377; United States v. Villalonga, 23 Wall. 35; Davis v. Dodds, 20 Ohio St. 473.

Jno. C. Tarsney for respondent.

HOUGH, C. J.

This is an action of ejectment to recover the north half of lot 29 in Swope's addition to the City of Kansas. The petition is in the usual form, and the answer is a general denial. The case was tried by the court upon an agreed statement of facts from which it appears that on the 28th day of August, 1865, George W. Barnes, of Ohio, who was then owner in fee of the land in controversy by virtue of a certain deed to him then of record, conveyed the same to Sarah A. Vance, also of Ohio. The deed to Sarah Vance was not recorded until the 25th day of September, 1876. On March 1st, 1872, a special tax bill was issued by the City of Kansas and delivered to Dwyer & O'Neil, for a plank sidewalk constructed by them, in front of said lot, under a contract with said city. Suit was brought in 1873 to enforce the lien of said special tax bill, and publication was duly made against George W. Barnes as the owner of said lot, and on the 18th day of September, 1873, judgment was regularly rendered in favor of the plaintiff in said suit for the amount of the tax bill and interest, and special execution was awarded for the enforcement of said judgment. Execution was duly issued under said judgment and the sheriff levied upon and sold thereunder “all the right, title and interest” of the defendant Barnes, in and to the north half of said lot, to Edward Corrigan, the defendant herein, for $79.95, and executed to him a deed reciting the judgment, execution, levy and sale, and conveying to him “all the right, title, interest and estate of the said George W. Barnes, of, in and to the above described real estate” that he “might sell as sheriff as aforesaid, by virtue of the execution and notice. To have and to hold,” etc. Sarah A. Vance died intestate, September 26th, 1876, leaving appellants, other than the husbands of the female appellants, her sole heirs at law. Neither Barnes nor Sarah A. Vance ever had actual possession of the lot. There is nothing to show whether or not Corrigan had any knowledge or notice of the deed of Barnes to Vance, or of the latter's ownership of the land prior to the record of her deed, or to show whether or not Sarah A. Vance had any knowledge or notice of the existence of the special tax bill for sidewalk, or the suit thereon, until after Corrigan received his deed from the sheriff.

The question is, did the deed of the sheriff to the defendant pass the title to the lot in controversy, as against the unrecorded deed of plaintiffs' ancestor?

It is the settled law of this State, that a purchaser at execution sale, is a purchaser from the judgment debtor, within the meaning of the recording act. Draper v. Bryson, 26 Mo. 108. If, therefore, the defendant had purchased the land under an ordinary judgment against Barnes, there could be no question but that he would take the title as against the unrecorded conveyance from Barnes to Sarah Vance. Davis v. Ownsby, 14 Mo. 170; Valentine v. Havener, 20 Mo. 133; Stillwell v. McDonald, 39 Mo. 282; Potter v. McDowell, 43 Mo. 93; Reed v. Ownby, 44 Mo. 204; Black v. Long, 60 Mo. 181; Fox v. Hall, 74 Mo. 315. We are called upon to decide, therefore, whether there is any difference between the effect of a sale under execution for the enforcement of the special tax bill in question, and a sale under ordinary executions.

The charter of the City of Kansas provides that all suits to enforce special tax bills, shall be brought against the owner of the land, and preliminary thereto, the city engineer is required to assess the cost of the work done, as a special tax against the property chargeable therewith, and to make out a certified bill of such assessment against said property, in the name of the owner, and such certified bill is declared to be prima facie evidence of the liability of the person therein named, as the owner of such property. Acts 1870, p. 343 et seq. Now, it is quite evident that unless the prima facie case as to ownership, made by the tax bill, is...

To continue reading

Request your trial
125 cases
  • Keaton v. Jorndt
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • June 23, 1914
    ...is not foreclosed, but may redeem the land from the sale of the taxes. Stafford v. Fizer, 82 Mo. 393. Since the decision in Vance v. Corrigan, 78 Mo. 94, it has been deemed sufficient for the collector to bring the suit against the apparent or record owner of the land. Harrison v. Bowers, 2......
  • Lee & Boutell Co. v. Brockett Cement Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • June 21, 1937
    ...Ladd v. Anderson, 133 Mo. 625; Harrison v. Moore, 199 S.W. 188; Hayes v. Allenberger, 226 Mo. 119; Boogher v. Neece, 75 Mo. 383; Vance v. Corrigan, 78 Mo. 94; Strong v. Whylard, 204 Mo. 341; Tydings v. Pitcher, 82 Mo. 379; Woodward v. Householder, 289 S.W. 571. (9) Rights of innocent purcha......
  • Bullock v. Peoples Bank of Holcomb, 38368.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • August 27, 1943
    ...the trustee of said title for and on behalf of the fee simple owner, Thaddeus J.R. Bullock. Bradley v. Goff, 243 Mo. 95; Vance v. Corrigan, 78 Mo. 94; Hall v. French, 165 Mo. l.c. 438; Bone v. Tyrell, 113 Mo. 175; Brown v. Fulkerson, 125 Mo. l.c. 403. (23) A person is said to stand in a fid......
  • Wilcox v. Phillips
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • November 21, 1906
    ...an unrecorded patent of which appellants had no notice, actual or constructive. We, therefore, stand on the doctrine laid down in Vance v. Corrigan, 78 Mo. 94; Allen v. Ray, 96 Mo. 542; Payne v. Lott, 90 Mo. 676; Lucas v. Land & Cattle Co., 186 Mo. 456; St. Joseph v. Forsee, 110 Mo.App. 127......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT