78 Olive St. Partners, LLC v. New Haven City Plan Commission
Decision Date | 20 March 2017 |
Docket Number | CV166065072S |
Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
Parties | 78 Olive Street Partners, LLC v. New Haven City Plan Commission et al |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In a May 12, 2016 decision by this court, the court addressed on appeal whether the New Haven City Plan Commission's approval of a Site Plan Application for property at 630 Chapel Street in New Haven violated the zoning ordinances of the city. Section 60(e) of the city ordinances sets forth thirty factors that must be taken into account for site plan approval. The plaintiff argued in its appeal that the plan submitted did not comply with three subsections of Section 60(e)--§ § 60(e)(7), 60(e)(3), and 60(e)(8). The court rejected the argument made that there was a failure to comply with § 60(e)(7) and § 60(e)(3). However, the court concluded that Section 60(e)(8) was not complied with. That subsection reads as follows: The court concluded that the record reflected that reports submitted by Spinnaker consultants admitted that there would be " a minor increase in runoff volume from the site . . ." as a result of the proposed development. This would not comport with the " shall not exceed" language of Section 60(e)(8). In light of that the last paragraph of the opinion stated:
In the plaintiff's Verified Appeal Complaint of September 21 2016 the plaintiff alleges revised plans and drawings were submitted by Milone & MacBroom on behalf of the defendant Spinnaker to address the remand issue, the latest materials being submitted on August 12, 2016. At the August 24, 2016 Commission meeting counsel for the plaintiff submitted a Verified Petition For Intervention under § 22a-19 of the general statutes and a report by its expert that the revised plans do not ensure compliance with section 60(e)(8) of the city ordinance in that they " do not result in no net increase in storm water runoff." Counsel also requested that the plaintiff's retained expert was prepared to testify as to this conclusion at the hearing. The Commission however, refused to take any action on the submission and request. On September 13, 2016 counsel for the city informed the plaintiff that the City Plan Staff had approved Spinnaker's revised plan to satisfy the court's remand order on August 16, 2016 and no action was taken by the Commission at its August 24, 2016 meeting. On September 15, 2016 notice in connection with the Revised Site Plan date was published to the effect that the Commission approved the submitted revised plans. The complaint states that this is inaccurate since on August 24, 2016 the Commission took no action on " the application." All of this violated § 8-3(g)(1) since the Commission did not cause notice of approval of the site plan application in a newspaper of general circulation--the purpose of which is to give an aggrieved party the opportunity to appeal.
But paragraph 18 then says " the action of the Commission in approving the Modified Site Plan was illegal, arbitrary capricious, and in abuse of its discretion in violation of city regulations, state law, and the court's May 12, 2016 decision for the following reasons:
Before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by the city and Spinnaker, the entity that offered the Site Plan to develop 630 Chapel Street. In briefs filed by the defendants various assertions are made: (1) The modified plan was approved by city staff pursuant to § 64(f)(7)f of the city ordinances, thus there was no " decision of a Board" appealable under § 8-8; (2) Section 22a-19 of the general statutes does not provide an independent basis for appeal. A later brief argues (1) the May 12, 2016 decision of the Court " was a final appealable judgment" therefore the time for appeal had expired long before the Verified Petition of September 21, 2016; (2) the court does not have further jurisdiction because the plaintiff did not avail itself of remedies it may have had (3) the plaintiff was well aware that an administrative site plan review would be performed by city staff to determine compliance with § 60(e)(8) of the city ordinances; (4) no appeal lies under § 22a-19 of the environmental protection act.
The plaintiff disagrees with these positions. The court will conduct a further examination of the facts supporting various positions as it deals with the legal issues raised.
The court will discuss the concept of a final judgment which is a pivotal issue in resolving the complicated issues raised by the motion to dismiss. It will then try to apply that discussion to the facts of this case.
The first question presented involves whether this court's May 12, 2016 decision was a final appealable judgment. The defendant argues that it was and, having failed to take an appeal, the plaintiff is now precluded from appealing the decision of the court under Sections 8-8(o) and 8-9 of the general statutes.
The court would note that as said by Judge Prescott in Connecticut Appellate Practice and Procedure, 5th ed. at page 43 § 2-1:1.1: State v. Coleman, 202 Conn. 86, 88-89, 519 A.2d 1201 (1987); see especially State v. Audet, 170 Conn. 337, 341-42, 365 A.2d 1082 (1976). As said in Bronson v. President, etc., of Mechanics' Bank, 83 Conn. 128, 133, 75 A. 709 (1910): Also see State v. Vachon, 140 Conn. 478, 485-86, 101 A.2d 509 (1953). As said in Fuller's Land Use Law and Practice, Vol. 9A, § 37:1: [2] See also Masone v. Zoning Board, 148 Conn. 551, 553, 172 A.2d 891.
On the other hand it is also true that even where the statutory scheme provides for an appeal the generally accepted rule is that there can only be an appeal from what is defined as a final judgment.
In any event the question whether this court's May 12, 2016 decision, despite its order of remand was a final judgment is crucial to the issue of whether this court has any jurisdiction to hear the verified appeal presently before the court. If a final judgment in fact exists, the remedy is by way of appeal to the Appellate Court not by filing what purports to be a new appeal to the trial court--leaving aside of course the issue of whether, despite the foregoing question the present appeal is procedurally viable in any event, given the fact that a prior appeal was filed regarding the...
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