IN RE MARRIAGE OF ARMSTRONG
Decision Date | 07 October 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 03-319.,03-319. |
Citation | 78 P.3d 1203,2003 MT 277 |
Parties | In re the MARRIAGE OF Cathy Jeanne ARMSTRONG, Petitioner and Respondent, and Harry John Armstrong, Respondent and Appellant. |
Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: Leanne M. Schraudner, Schraudner & Hillier, L.L.P., Bozeman, Montana.
For Respondent: Cathy J. Armstrong, pro se, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
¶ 1 Harry John Armstrong appeals from the order entered by the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, granting the motion of Cathy Armstrong to strike a mediated property settlement agreement. We dismiss the appeal.
¶ 2 Cathy petitioned the District Court for dissolution of her marriage to Harry. The parties attended a mediation which resulted, among other things, in a property settlement agreement (PSA) which was reduced to writing and fully executed by the parties. Later, Cathy moved to strike—and Harry moved to adopt—the mediated PSA.
¶ 3 The District Court held a hearing, received testimony and obtained supplemental briefs on the legal issue of enforcing the mediated PSA in the context of §§ 40-4-201 and 40-4-305, MCA. It subsequently entered its order granting Cathy's motion to strike the PSA based on its interpretation of the referenced statutes.
¶ 4 Harry moved for Rule 54(b), M.R.Civ. P., certification of, and entry of final judgment on, the order striking the PSA. Cathy opposed the motion. The District Court entered its Order granting certification and entry of final judgment, and Harry appeals.
¶ 5 The dispositive issue before us is whether the District Court's certification order meets the necessary criteria. We conclude it does not.
¶ 6 Neither party raised this issue on appeal. We raise it sua sponte, however, because if a trial court abuses its discretion in certifying an order as final under Rule 54(b), M.R.Civ.P., this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Kohler v. Croonenberghs, 2003 MT 260, ¶ 9, 317 Mont. 413, ¶ 9, 77 P.3d 531, ¶ 9 (citations omitted).
¶ 7 Rule 54(b), M.R.Civ., provides a mechanism whereby—under certain circumstances—a trial court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, of the claims or parties in a pending legal action. In entering a Rule 54(b) motion, however, the trial court must expressly determine "that there is no just reason for delay...." Our recent decision in Kohler, together with Weinstein v. University of Mont. at Missoula (1995), 271 Mont. 435, 898 P.2d 101, and Roy v. Neibauer (1980), 188 Mont. 81, 610 P.2d 1185, set forth in detail the appropriate considerations, procedural steps and underlying rationale for Rule 54(b) certifications. The Rule is intended to balance the undesirability of piecemeal appeals with the necessity of making review available when it best serves the parties' needs. Roy, 188 Mont. at 85, 610 P.2d at 1188 (citation omitted). However, the Rule also is intended to be used sparingly and only in the "infrequent harsh case[;]" it is not to be used "routinely or as a courtesy or accommodation to counsel...." Roy, 188 Mont. at 85, 610 P.2d at 1188 (citations omitted).
¶ 8 In addition, we have enumerated a number of factors we normally would consider in reviewing a Rule 54(b) certification:
Roy, 188 Mont. at 87, 610 P.2d at 1189 (citation omitted). We also observed that, depending on the particular case, all or only some of the factors might bear on the propriety of a Rule 54(b) certification. Roy, 188 Mont. at 87, 610 P.2d at 1189 (citation omitted). It is against this backdrop that we address the certification order at issue here.
¶ 9 In the present case, the District Court stated the following reasons for granting Harry's motion:
610 P.2d at 1188 (citation omitted).
¶ 12 It has been clear since our 1980 decision in Roy, 188 Mont. at 86,610 P.2d at 1189, that a proper exercise of discretion with regard to a motion for Rule 54(b) certification requires a trial court to do more than merely recite magic words from the Rule itself or the Roy factors. Instead, a trial court must clearly articulate its reasoning behind any factors set forth, so this Court has some basis for distinguishing between well-grounded orders and "mere boiler-plate approval unsupported by the facts or an analysis of the law." Kohler, ¶ 14 (citation omitted). The District Court's certification order in this case recites magic words; it does not provide this Court with any basis for determining whether it is—or is not—a well-grounded order.
¶ 13 Furthermore, we take this opportunity to address several of the District Court's bases for certification individually, in hopes of providing additional guidance to both counsel trying to meet their burden in a Rule 54(b) motion and trial courts in the "certification order" arena. Bases a.—that the determination of this issue "may" eliminate the need for a trial on property issues, saving resources for both the trial court and the litigants in this case—and e.—"could" shorten the time of...
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