78 S.W. 569 (Mo. 1904), State v. Cantwell
| Citation | 78 S.W. 569, 179 Mo. 245 |
| Opinion Judge | FOX, J. |
| Party Name | THE STATE v. CANTWELL et al., Appellants |
| Attorney | Harry J. Cantwell, E. D. Anthony and Edward D'Arcy for appellants. Edward C. Crow, Attorney-General, and Bruce Barnett for the State. |
| Case Date | February 01, 1904 |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Page 569
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court. -- Hon. R. A. Anthony, Judge.
Affirmed.
(1) Liberty includes the right to acquire property, and that means and includes the right to make and enforce contracts. State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98; Forer v. People, 141 Ill. 171; Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117; In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98; Leep v. Railroad, 58 Ark. 407. (2) Laws, therefore, interfering with the right of employer and employee, to contract in regard to terms of service in a lawful business, are void, unless they can be upheld as coming within the police power of the State. State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307; Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 28 N.E. 1126; State v. Goodwill, 33 W.Va. 179; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431; State v. F. C. Coal & Coke Co., 33 W.Va. 188; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98; Cooley Const. Lim. (6 Ed.), 744-5. "Liberty of Contract Under the Police Power," Judson, 25 Am. Law. Rev. 871; Low v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127; 1 Tiedeman on State & Fed. Control, p. 335; Wheeling B. & T. Co., v. Gilmore, 1 Ohio Dec. 390; In re Eight-Hour Bill, 21 Colo. 29; Ex parte Kuback, 85 Cal. 274; McCarty v. Mayor, 96 N.Y. 1; In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415; Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36; Smith's "Wealth of Nations," b. 1, ch. 10, pt. 2. (3) But the police power of the State is founded upon the maxim: "So use your own so as not injure others." It can not be invoked to prevent a man from injuring himself. Knapp v. Kansas City, 48 Mo.App. 493; In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415; Thorpe v. Railroad, 27 Vt. 140; State v. Goodwill, 33 W.Va. 185; Cooley Const. Lim. (6 Ed.), p. 710; Wheeler v. Stock Yards, 66 Mo.App. 267; St. Louis v. Green, 7 Mo.App. 474. (4) Police measures, to be valid, must have for their object the promotion of the welfare of the general public, not merely that of an individual or individuals. The Legislature can not in the exercise of the police power, interfere with the property of one man for the benefit of another. St. Louis v. Fitz, 53 Mo. 583; St. Louis v. Roche, 128 Mo. 541; Ex parte Smith, 125 Mo. 223; Morrison v. Morey, 146 Mo. 543; State v. Greer, 78 Mo. 188; In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415; In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98; Rockwell v. Nearing, 35 N.Y. 302; People v. Phyfe, 136 N.Y. 557; 1 Tiedeman on State and Fed. Control, p. 237; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98; Low v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 153; Drew v. Smith, 38 Cal. 325. (5) A law, moreover, which does not apply to all persons similarly situated, but which, on the contrary, allows an act prohibited to one person to be done by another under precisely similar conditions, can not be upheld as a regulation of health. In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98. (6) Such a law, imposing, as it does, peculiar disabilities upon persons arbitrarily selected from a general class, is a special law and void. Where distinctions between persons are attempted, they must be founded upon natural differences. State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307; State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163; State v. Walsh, 136 Mo. 400; Low v. Rees Printing Co., 143 Neb. 127; State v. Hoyt, 71 Vt. 59; City of Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238; Davis v. Clark, 106 Pa. St. 377; Railroad v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205; Railroad v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96; Luman v. Hitchens Bros. Co., 90 Md. 14; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98; In re Day, 181 Ill. 73; Frazer v. McConway & F. Co., 82 F. 257. A law, therefore, founded upon a distinction between those working under ground in search of minerals and those working under ground not in search of minerals, is unconstitutional. It makes no difference whether the persons discriminated against be many or few, important or insignificant. Constitutions must be liberally construed, so as to uphold the principles underlying them. Railroad v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 635. (7) When it is sought to uphold a law as an exercise of the police power, the courts must be able to see that the means adopted by the Legislature for carrying out its purposes, are reasonable; that they are fairly calculated to attain the end proposed, and they are not unduly oppressive upon individuals. State v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 385; In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133; Lake View v. Rose Hill Cem. Co., 70 Ill. 191; Wheeling B. & T. Co. v. Gilmore, 8 Ohio C. C. 666; 1 Ohio Dec. 390; State v. Goodwill, 33 W.Va. 179; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98; In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98; Mayor of Baltimore v. Redecke, 49 Md. 217; Coe v. Schultz, 47 Barb. 64. (8) While a business may be regulated so as to protect the public and those engaged therein, it is not within the power of the Legislature to either partially or totally prohibit such business, as a means of regulation. Prohibition must rest upon the unlawfulness of the business proscribed. Lake View v. Rose Hill Com. Co., 70 Ill. 191; Mayor of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217; Ex parte Kuback, 85 Cal. 274; Wheeling B. & T. Co. v. Gilmore, 8 Ohio C. C. 658; In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98. (9) The constitutional provisions concerning "due process of law" have been violated in the act under consideration. Const. Mo., art. 2, sec. 80; Const. U.S. art. 5 of amendments; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98; Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171; Millet v. People, 117 Ill. 294. (10) The business of mining is not affected with a public interest, and the Legislature has no greater control over it than it has over other purely private enterprises. State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 320; In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 429, Cooley on Const. Lim. (6 Ed.), p. 738. (11) The court, when asked to uphold a law, will look not to its immediate effects alone, but to the consequences of the possible abuse of the legislative power it is asked to sanction. In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98; In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415. (12) The tendency of the law is toward widening the sphere of contract. U. S. v. Martin, 94 U.S. 400; Sir Henry Maine's "Ancient Law" (1 Am. Ed.), pp. 163-296; In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 430; In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98; Wheeling B. & T. Co. v. Gilmore, supra.
(1) The court properly excluded the evidence offered by defendants to show that underground work is no more injurious than employments on the surface, and that work done in excavating for minerals is no more injurious than other underground work. Such considerations were for the Legislature in passing the act and not for the courts in construing it; the legislative determination upon this question is conclusive on the courts. State v. Bixman, 162 Mo. 1. (2) There is no merit in the contention that the statute in question impairs the obligation of contracts. A statute can not be said to impair the obligation of contracts made after it went into effect. Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U.S. 391. (3) It is clearly one of the police powers of the State to prohibit the employment of its citizens upon such terms and conditions as to impair their health. Laws similar to the one in question have been declared constitutional. People v. Lochner, 76 N.Y.S. 396; State v. Holden, 14 Utah 96; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366; Peacock v. Limburger, 67 S.W. 518; Ex parte Northrup, 41 Ore. 489; People v. Phyfe, 136 N.Y. 554; People v. Havnor, 149 N.Y. 204; Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass. 383. (4) The statute is not unconstitutional because designed to operate on one class only, provided it affects equally all those who come within that class. Hamman v. Central Coal and Coke Co., 156 Mo. 232; State ex rel. v. Yancey, 123 Mo. 391; State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439; Lynch v. Murphy, 119 Mo. 163; State v. Bishop, 128 Mo. 373; State v. Hathaway, 115 Mo. 36; Northwestern Masonic Aid Assn. v. Waddell, 138 Mo. 628; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 32. (5) (a) The doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of Colorado in the Morgan case is not applicable to the case at bar, for the reason that the act construed in that case made it an offense for one to contract to do work in a smelter for longer than eight hours a day, whereas the Missouri act in question makes it an offense for one to employ others to work over eight hours a day in mines. In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415. (b) The Colorado act interferes with individuals in regard to their actions pertaining to their own welfare only, while the Missouri act is to prevent mine operators from conducting their business in such manner as will amount to oppression of their employees. (6) Every possible doubt must be construed in favor of the constitutionality of the law. Hamman v. Cen. Coal and Coke Co., 156 Mo. 242.
OPINION
[179 Mo. 250]
The defendants were jointly tried, convicted and fined twenty-five dollars each in the circuit court of Madison county in March, 1903, for working their employees in mines longer than eight hours a day in violation of the act of March 23, 1901, designated as sections 8793 and 8794 of the Revised Statutes of 1899, and found on page 211 of the Laws of 1901.
The prosecution was by information, which charges the offense to have been committed in July, 1902.
The defendants admitted that they were in charge of and operating the mine of the Catherine Lead Company, defendant Cantwell being president, Magenau, superintendent, and Edwards, mine captain; and admitted that they had knowledge at the time that their [179 Mo. 251] employees were working under ground longer than eight hours out of twenty-four, in shafts 100 feet and 150 feet in depth.
The defense produced evidence to the effect that the employees worked in excess of eight hours a day under a contract entered into voluntarily by them, and not under force or compulsion from...
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