Gaddy v. Linahan, 83-8660
| Citation | 780 F.2d 935 |
| Decision Date | 22 January 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-8660,83-8660 |
| Parties | James H. GADDY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Leland Q. LINAHAN, Jr., Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) |
William O. Miller, Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner-appellant.
Paula K. Smith, Atlanta, Ga., for respondent-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before TJOFLAT and JOHNSON, Circuit
Judges, and DUMBAULD *, District Judge.
Petitioner, James H. Gaddy, is serving a life sentence in Georgia for the crime of malice murder. 1 He was convicted on a plea of guilty of having participated with his uncle, Henry James Gaddy, in the malice murder of Henry Franklin Black in Fulton County, Georgia, on February 23, 1978. Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 (1982) vacating his conviction and sentence on the ground that his guilty plea was involuntary; he claims that he did not understand the elements of the offense of malice murder when he tendered his plea. The district court denied the writ without an evidentiary hearing. Because the facts necessary to decide petitioner's claim have not been resolved, we vacate the district court's judgment and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.
Petitioner and his uncle were arrested by the police, following a high speed automobile chase, in Griffin, Georgia, two days after Black's body had been found. Black had been stabbed to death in his residence, apparently during the course of a burglary. The record does not indicate who actually stabbed the victim.
On March 14, 1978, petitioner and his uncle were indicted by a Fulton County grand jury for malice murder and, in a separate indictment, for burglary. Shortly thereafter, Henry James Gaddy pled guilty to both charges. Petitioner's case was subsequently set for trial in Fulton County Superior Court but was continued for reasons not disclosed by the record. His case was rescheduled for trial on April 19, 1978. On that day, petitioner appeared for trial, represented by an assistant public defender, Billy Spruell, and tendered a plea of guilty to malice murder pursuant to a plea agreement Spruell had worked out with the prosecutor. The agreement, which had not been reduced to writing, called for a plea of guilty to malice murder in exchange for the prosecutor's recommendation that petitioner be spared the death penalty and be given a life sentence, and a dismissal of the burglary indictment.
After announcing his intention to plead guilty, the court and the prosecutor questioned petitioner at considerable length, during which time they permitted him to consult his mother, who was present in open court. Petitioner's responses during the plea colloquy indicated that he had a limited mental capacity. Petitioner did not know his birth date; his mother had to advise the court that he had been born on September 20, 1946. Although he had attended school through the eighth grade, he could not read or write. He signed his name with an "X." He had worked as a brick mason but could not recall the name of his last employer. The court noted, for the record, petitioner's "limited education and his inability to read."
After a few introductory questions, the court directed the prosecutor to read the indictment to petitioner:
[The Prosecutor:] All right, sir.
Mr. Gaddy, this indictment alleges that on the 23rd day of February, 1978 that you did unlawfully and with malice aforethought cause the death of Henry Franklin Black, a human being, by stabbing him with a knife; contrary to the laws of said State, the good order, peace and dignity thereof. Do you understand what that means?
MR. GADDY: That's right.
Q Mr. Gaddy, you are represented by Mr. Spruell of the public defender's office?
A That's right.
Q And have you talked to Mr. Spruell about this murder charge?
A Yes, sir.
Q And do you understand the charge and everything relating to it?
A That's right.
Petitioner went on to acknowledge, in response to the prosecutor's questioning, that he knew that by pleading guilty he was waiving his constitutional rights, including his right to be tried by a jury, to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses, to present evidence, and to testify in his own behalf. He also acknowledged that, despite the prosecutor's promise to recommend a life sentence, the court could sentence him to death. Then, after assuring the prosecutor that he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily, petitioner, in the colloquy that followed, told the prosecutor that he had taken some drugs earlier in the day:
[By the Prosecutor]:
Q Mr. Gaddy, are you under the influence of any drugs or alcohol?
A I drink a lot.
Q Have you today?
A No, sir.
Q Have you had any drugs at all today?
A Yes, sir.
Q Take any kind of medication today?
A No, sir.
The prosecutor did not ask the petitioner what drugs he had taken that day. Nor did the court pursue the point when it questioned petitioner moments later. 2 The prosecutor then concluded his examination of petitioner:
Q Are you completely--have all your faculties, you understand everything that's going on here?
A I don't understand all of it but I understand most of it.
Q You understand you're pleading guilty to murder?
A Yes, sir.
Q Mr. Gaddy, to this charge of murder ... how do you plead; guilty or not guilty?
A Guilty.
At this point, the prosecutor had petitioner and his attorney sign the indictment. Petitioner signed with an "X"; his mother witnessed his mark by affixing her signature to the indictment. Thereafter, the court addressed petitioner:
....
(Whereupon a recess was taken in the hearing.)
....
The court then addressed petitioner's counsel:
The court never asked Spruell whether he had explained the elements of the crime of malice murder to petitioner and how the prosecutor might establish those elements. Nor did the prosecutor, during the hearing, state what he expected the evidence would show if the case proceeded to trial. The plea colloquy ended with the court finding that petitioner had tendered his guilty plea freely and voluntarily, accepting his plea, and adjudging him guilty of malice murder. The court then sentenced petitioner to imprisonment for life in accordance with the prosecutor's recommendation.
Within two days, petitioner decided to withdraw his plea of guilty and so informed his attorney. Spruell advised him that there was nothing else that could be done and consequently did not pursue the matter. Petitioner subsequently retained another attorney and, on November 14, 1978, moved the sentencing court for leave to withdraw his guilty plea. Declaring his innocence, petitioner said he pled guilty because of the threat of a death sentence and also because of his "total ignorance." Citing excerpts from his plea hearing, petitioner maintained "[t]hat the plea given ... was entered under a misapprehension as to the offense to which [he] was pleading guilty." Petitioner's motion was denied.
One year later, in November 1979, petitioner applied to the Superior Court of Upson County, Georgia for a writ of habeas corpus. He alleged that his malice murder conviction was invalid under the fourteenth amendment due process clause because it was based on an involuntary guilty plea. Petitioner claimed that his plea was involuntary because: (1) he was under the influence of drugs at the time he entered the plea; (2) he was coerced into entering the plea by his attorney and the prosecutor who advised him that if he did not plead guilty he would get the electric chair; and (3) he did not understand the elements of the offense of malice murder. 3
The state habeas court conducted an evidentiary hearing on February 18, 1980, at which the petitioner and his trial attorney, Billy Spruell, testified. Petitioner testified that he had ingested cocaine while in jail on the morning he entered his guilty plea. He said that he took cocaine that morning because he was nervous and anxious about his upcoming trial. Spruell testified that he had no knowledge that petitioner had ingested cocaine that morning and that it was not apparent to him that the petitioner was under the influence of any drug at the time he entered his plea. Spruell did not recall petitioner's affirmative response to the prosecutor's question as to whether petitioner had taken drugs that day.
The testimony at the evidentiary hearing, however, shed no light upon the degree, if any, to which petitioner had understood the elements of malice murder at the time he tendered his plea. Petitioner testified that, prior to entering his plea, he spoke with Spruell two or three times. Petitioner knew that his case was scheduled for trial on April 19, 1978, the date he pled guilty, and said that he intended to go to trial. Petitioner did not indicate precisely when...
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