Jenkins v. RED CLAY CONSOL. SCHOOL DIST., Civ. A. No. 89-230 LON.

Decision Date27 December 1991
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 89-230 LON.
Citation780 F. Supp. 221
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Delaware
PartiesAlden JENKINS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RED CLAY CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants.

Gary W. Aber, of Heiman, Aber & Goldlust, Wilmington, Del. (Brenda Wright and James Halpert of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for plaintiffs.

Alfred J. D'Angelo, Jr., of Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, Wilmington, Del. (Thomas J. Manley, and John R. McArthur of Hunton & Williams, Raleigh, N.C., of counsel), for defendants.

OPINION

LONGOBARDI, Chief Judge.

This is a class action suit arising under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. The named representative Plaintiffs brought the action on behalf of all of the eligible black voters in the Red Clay School District ("District"). They allege that the current method of electing members of the Red Clay Board of Education ("Board") unlawfully dilutes the voting strength of black citizens and has the effect of providing black citizens in the Red Clay School District less opportunity than white citizens to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice to the Red Clay Board of Education.

After denying a motion for preliminary injunction, the Court scheduled the matter for trial. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3) and (4) and 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(f). The Court also has jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

BACKGROUND

The District was established in November of 1980 by the Delaware State Board of Education. The regulations implementing 62 Del.Law, Ch. 351 describe the method of electing Board members in the District. Docket Item ("D.I.") 84, ¶ 5. Under the 1980 Census, the total population of the District was 123,240, of which 17,180 (13.95%) were black. The 1980 Census also shows that the District had a voting age population of 90,977. Black voting age citizens numbered 10,781 (11.1%). Id., ¶ 22. According to the 1990 Census, the total population of the District is 132,674. The black population is 19,252 (14.51%). The 1990 Census also shows that the District has a voting age population of 102,196, of which 13,257 (12.97%) are black. Id., ¶ 23.

The Plaintiffs do not allege that the method of electing the Board members was established with any discriminatory or unlawful purpose or intent. Id., ¶ 6. Indeed, the State Board reorganization plan, including the method of electing school board members, was reviewed and approved by Judge Schwartz in Evans v. Buchanan, 512 F.Supp. 839, 857 (D.Del.1981) ("Five of the twenty-three persons elected to interim boards are black and each received more votes than some of the whites elected to the boards").

There are seven seats on the Board. Members are elected to five year terms and the elections are staggered so that one or two seats are up for election each year. With the exception of the initial election which was conducted in January of 1981, the elections are held annually in May. Candidates must reside in and serve from one of seven nominating districts and elections are non-partisan. The only requirement to become a candidate for the Board is a petition of twenty eligible district voters. There is no voter registration requirement and all district residents over eighteen years of age are eligible to vote. The elections are conducted at-large and voters may vote for only one candidate from each nominating district at any polling place in the district. The candidate receiving a plurality of votes is elected. D.I. 84, ¶ 7. This system has been described as an at-large or multi-member district as opposed to a single-member district scheme.

In 1981, there were elections for six of the seven nominating districts. The board member for the seventh seat, district G, was appointed. In district A, one black candidate and six white candidates ran for the seat; a white candidate won the seat. In district B, one black candidate and five white candidates ran for the seat; the black candidate won the seat. The six candidates running for the district C seat were white. The four candidates running for the district D seat were white. In district E, one black candidate and four white candidates ran for the seat; a white candidate won the seat. The nine candidates running for the district F seat were white.

In 1982, two white candidates ran for the seat in district C. The incumbent white candidate ran unopposed for the seat in district G.

In 1983, a black and a white candidate ran for the seat in district A. In district D, the incumbent white candidate ran against a black candidate. The white candidates won in both elections.

In 1984, three white candidates ran for the seat in district C. Two white candidates ran for the seat in district E.

In 1985, the incumbent black candidate ran against a white candidate for the seat in district B. The white candidate won the seat. In district G, the incumbent white candidate ran unopposed.

In 1986, a white candidate was appointed to fill the seat in district C. In district F, three white candidates ran for the seat.

In 1987, four white candidates ran for the seat in district C.

In 1988, one black candidate and two white candidates ran for the seat in district A. A white candidate won the seat. In district D, the white incumbent candidate ran unopposed.

In 1989, two white candidates ran for the seat in district E.

In 1990, two black candidates ran for the seat in district B. Two white candidates ran for the seat in district G.

In 1991, a black and a white candidate ran for the seat in district C. The black candidate won the seat. In district F, two white candidates ran for the seat. Id., ¶ 11; D.I. 106.

THE LEGAL STANDARDS

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended provides in pertinent part:

(a) No voting ... procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color....
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.

42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).

The Senate report accompanying the 1982 amendment identified factors which might indicate a section 2 violation:

1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.

Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of Plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation are:

whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized need of the members of the minority group.
whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.
S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 177, 206-07.

In 1986, the United States Supreme Court examined a multi-member districting plan under the amended section 2. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). After carefully considering the legislative history of the amendment, the Court decided that without proof of the existence of racial bloc voting, the existence of an at-large election system in conjunction with a lack of proportional representation does not establish a violation. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46, 106 S.Ct. at 2764.

The Court stated that while many of the Senate factors may be relevant to a claim of vote dilution, three factors are essential to a claim that an at large election system illegally impedes minority voters' ability to elect representatives of their choice. The minority group must prove that it is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district." Id. at 50, 106 S.Ct. at 2766. In addition, the minority group must prove that it is politically cohesive. Id. at 51, 106 S.Ct. at 2766. Finally, the minority group must prove that the white majority votes...

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3 cases
  • Jenkins v. Manning
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • June 18, 1997
    ...process and to elect candidates of their choice to the Red Clay Board of Education." Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 780 F.Supp. 221, 221-22 (D.Del.1991) ("Jenkins I"), rev'd, Jenkins II, 4 F.3d The Red Clay School District was established in November 1980. The Board ha......
  • Clay v. Board of Educ. of City of St. Louis
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • August 9, 1995
    ...conduct is consistent with the expert testimony offered on behalf of the plaintiff in Jenkins. See, Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 780 F.Supp. 221, 227 (D.Del.1991), rev'd on other grounds, 4 F.3d 1103 (3rd Cir.1993). Several other Courts have relied on the analytica......
  • Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. School Dist. Bd. of Educ.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • August 19, 1993
    ...had failed to prove a Sec. 2 violation, and therefore entered judgment for the defendants. See Jenkins v. Red Clay Consolidated School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 780 F.Supp. 221 (D.Del.1991). Plaintiffs' appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. In Thornburg v. Gingles, 47......

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