Williams v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 84-3874
| Decision Date | 14 February 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-3874,84-3874 |
| Citation | 781 F.2d 1573 |
| Parties | Harry J. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and United States Coast Guard, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
J. Michael Shea, Tampa, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert B. Nicholson, Robert J. Wiggers, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Div., Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before HILL and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and GARZA *, Senior Circuit Judge.
This appeal involves a Coast Guard letter of warning issued to appellant following an administrative determination of negligence. Appellant challenges this civil penalty on three grounds: the Coast Guard lacked jurisdiction to impose penalties on him under 46 U.S.C. Sec. 1461(d) (1976), 1 the investigative and hearing procedures violated his constitutional rights and the administrative decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
Appellant holds a master's license from the United States Coast Guard, all-oceans, unlimited tonnage with an endorsement for piloting on the waters of Tampa Bay along with a Florida full pilot's license to pilot on Tampa Bay, which authorizes him to pilot vessels of all sizes, tonnages and nationalities. On February 6, 1980, appellant boarded the M/V THALASSINI MANA, a Greek vessel headed toward Tampa Bay. The M/V THALASSINI MANA was required to take a state pilot upon entering Tampa Bay and, while aboard, appellant was operating solely under the auspices of his state license. Upon boarding, appellant asked the master for the ship's "particulars," a maritime term of art which refers to a vessel's characteristics, including speed, draft, height and any unusual characteristics. The master responded but omitted the height of the jumbo boom; appellant saw the boom was up but assumed it would clear the Sunshine Skyway Bridge. Near the bridge, appellant became concerned and specifically requested the height, but it was too late; the jumbo boom struck a portion of the bridge's center span, damaging both bridge and vessel.
A Coast Guard investigating officer boarded the M/V THALASSINI MANA when it docked. On the basis of the investigative file, the Coast Guard Marine Safety Office concluded that the proximate cause of the accident was the master's negligence in failing to ensure the boom would clear the bridge but "[a] contributing cause of this casualty was negligence on the part of the pilot for his failure to correctly ascertain the height of the M/V THALASSINI MANA prior to attempting to pass under the bridge." (R. at 353). This report recommended appellant be assessed a monetary penalty for violation of 46 U.S.C. Sec. 1461(d) (1976) and was the basis for administrative proceedings against appellant.
Appellant filed this suit, seeking to enjoin the Coast Guard, claiming it lacked jurisdiction over him. The district court denied his motion for a preliminary injunction and the Coast Guard held an evidentiary hearing on this charge. The hearing officer subsequently issued a written decision finding a violation but concluding a monetary penalty was unwarranted and instead issuing a letter of warning. Appellant's appeal of this decision was denied by the Commandant of the Coast Guard. Appellant then amended his complaint in this action to add due process and evidentiary issues relating to the investigation and administrative hearing. The case was submitted to the district court on cross-motions for summary judgment with stipulated issues and facts. The district court granted summary judgment for the government, holding that the Coast Guard had jurisdiction, its procedures were constitutional and that substantial evidence supported the Coast Guard's findings of negligence.
Jurisdiction Under 46 U.S.C. Sec. 1461(d)
The primary issue in this case is whether 46 U.S.C. Sec. 1461(d) (1976) applies to state-regulated pilots operating large commercial vessels. This section was originally enacted as part of the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (the "Act"), Pub.L. 92-75, 85 Stat. 213 (1971). It provided that: "No person may use a vessel, including one otherwise exempted under [46 U.S.C. Sec. 1453(c) (1976) ], in a negligent manner so as to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person." 46 U.S.C. Sec. 1461(d) (1976). Appellant contests the Coast Guard's power over him on two grounds: Congress delegated exclusive regulatory authority over pilots to the states and the Federal Boat Safety Act does not apply to large commercial vessels.
Appellant's first contention is that section 1461(d) does not apply to state-licensed harbor pilots because the states have virtually exclusive regulatory power over pilots 2 under 46 U.S.C. Sec. 211 (1976) which provided:
Until further provision is made by Congress, all pilots in the bays, inlets, rivers, harbors, and ports of the United States shall continue to be regulated in conformity with the existing laws of the States respectively wherein such pilots may be, or with such laws as the States may respectively enact for the purpose.
This argument misconstrues the effect of section 211 which does not grant states the exclusive power to regulate pilots, but merely allows state regulation until Congress provides otherwise. 3 Since section 1461(d) contemplates federal jurisdiction, the Coast Guard's jurisdiction over state-licensed pilots is consistent with section 211 if Congress intended to include them within the scope of section 1461(d). The comprehensive language of section 1461(d), which provides that "no person" may operate a vessel negligently, clearly demonstrates Congress' intent to cover all pilots, whether or not they were also subject to state regulation. The exercise of federal regulatory power in section 1461(d), does not usurp or detract from state regulatory power; 4 it is simply concurrent regulation over commerce. The Act's legislative history indicates Congress intended to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the coastal states in controlling the negligent use of vessels, preempting only state boat and safety equipment standards. S.Rep. No. 92-248, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in 1971 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1333, 1341. We hold 46 U.S.C. Sec. 211 (1976) does not preclude federal regulation of state-licensed pilots.
Second, appellant argues section 1461(d) does not apply to pilots of commercial vessels because the purpose of the Act was to improve recreational boating safety. In interpreting a statute, the starting point is its language. The language of the Act and section 1461(d) does not support, and in fact refutes, appellant's argument. "Absent a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). The Act's applicability section indicates the Act applies to "vessels" used on waters subject to the United States' jurisdiction. 46 U.S.C. Sec. 1453(a) (1976). The Act defines "vessel" as including "every description of watercraft ... used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on the water." 46 U.S.C. Sec. 1452(2). Where Congress intended to restrict a provision to small, noncommercial vessels, it used the term "boat," defined in 46 U.S.C. Sec. 1452(1) (1976). See e.g., 46 U.S.C. Sec. 1454 (1976). Section 1461(d) was not restricted to persons operating "boats," it prohibits the negligent use of a "vessel," including those otherwise exempted by 46 U.S.C. Sec. 1453(c). Moreover, the inclusion within section 1461(d) of vessels exempted by section 1453(c)(1) buttresses the conclusion that appellant was subject to this act while piloting the M/V THALASSINI MANA because one category of otherwise exempt vessels made subject to section 1461(d) is "foreign vessels temporarily using waters subject to United States jurisdiction...." 46 U.S.C. Sec. 1453(c)(1) (1976).
Appellant cites the Act's declaration of purpose and policy, 46 U.S.C. Sec. 1451 (1976), along with various citations to the Act's legislative history, to support his claim that Congress did not intend to include large commercial vessels within the scope of the Act. We do not find in these citations any clear indication of congressional intent sufficient to override the statutory language. On the contrary, the legislative history supports a broad reading of the word "vessel." 5
The word 'vessel' is defined in broad context and is construed to include surface effect vehicles, such as hover-craft, operating over the water. 'Boats' are defined as a more limited category within the term 'vessels.' The distinction is necessary because certain aspects of the bill, notably those sections dealing with safety standards and equipment, pertain only to the category embraced by the term 'boat.' Other sections (e.g., those dealing with numbering), pertain to a broader category of vessels (i.e. undocumented vessels equipped with propulsion machinery). Still other provisions, (e.g., the prohibition against negligent operation), pertain to all vessels.
S.Rep. No. 92-248, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in 1971 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1333, 1337. Congress drafted section 1461(d) broadly to include all persons operating vessels; it did not restrict the scope to recreational boats. We hold that this Act gave the Coast Guard jurisdiction over appellant during his operation of the M/V THALASSINI MANA in Tampa Bay.
Appellant also contends several aspects of the Coast Guard's investigative process and civil penalty proceeding violated his constitutional rights. We find his claims regarding lack of Miranda warnings and right to counsel, 6 improper use of the investigative file, 7 laches, 8 and lack of discovery procedures/witness unavailability 9 are clearly without merit. In addition, a...
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