Washington v. James

• Citation: 782 F.2d 1134
• Decision Date: 03 February 1986
• Docket Number: No. 356,D,356
• Parties: Albert WASHINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles JAMES, in his capacity of Deputy Superintendent of Security of Attica Correctional Facility; Harold J. Smith, Superintendent of Attica Correctional Facility; and Donald Chesworth, Director (BCI) Bureau of Criminal Investigation, Division of State Police, Individually and in their official Capacity, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 84-2398.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

Page 1134

782 F.2d 1134

Albert WASHINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles JAMES, in his capacity of Deputy Superintendent of Security of Attica Correctional Facility; Harold J. Smith Superintendent of Attica Correctional Facility; and Donald Chesworth, Director (BCI) Bureau of Criminal Investigation Division of State Police, Individually and in their official Capacity, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 356, Docket 84-2398.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Oct. 30, 1985.

Decided Feb. 3, 1986.

Barbara Kolsun, New York City (Burrows & Poster, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Lew A. Millenbach, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of N.Y., Albany, N.Y. (Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of State of N.Y., Robert Hermann, Sol. Gen., William J. Kogan, Asst. Sol. Gen., State of N.Y., Albany, N.Y., of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Before MANSFIELD, MESKILL and CARDAMONE, Circuit Judges.

MESKILL, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, Curtin, C.J., dated November 14, 1984, dismissing New York state prisoner Albert Washington's pro se civil rights complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The complaint sought injunctive relief and damages in connection with the destruction by appellees of a package addressed to Washington and the interception and opening of his outgoing legal mail. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

Albert Washington's complaint, App. at 7-9, alleges the following facts. On March 11, 1982, Washington, an Attica prison inmate, was taken to a holding cell and locked therein for approximately one hour during which time the chief package room officer sorted packages in his sight. Appellee James, the Deputy Superintendent at Attica, arrived with personnel from the State Police Bureau of Criminal Investigation and interrogated Washington about the contents of a package addressed to him. James asked Washington what kind of explosives might be contained in the package. Washington responded that the package must contain food. During the course of the interrogation, James showed Washington "a legal letter ... pertaining to his case" which he had mailed to a paralegal, his legal assistant. Washington had had no prior knowledge that the letter had been intercepted by the administration. James referred "to a portion of the letter in which [Washington] was instructing counsel as to his case." The complaint went on to allege that Washington "heard on the local news" that the package and its contents had been destroyed by a high-pressure hose but that no bomb had been found. The complaint ended its succinct fact summary by stating that Washington had not received the contents of his package or any information as to its whereabouts.

Washington sought compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief (1) preventing appellees from (a) taking any retaliatory steps against him for bringing this suit or against any other inmate for submitting affidavits in the case; (b) transferring him to another prison during the pendency of this action; or (c) "using ... arbitrary and capricious conduct ... due to his Religious or Political beliefs;" and (2) requiring the prison officials to remove any reference to this suit or the events described in the complaint from the records and to afford him the same mail privileges as other similarly classified Attica inmates.

Appellee prison officials moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), for the proposition that the intentional or negligent deprivation of a prisoner's property does not violate the prisoner's constitutional rights where an appropriate state remedy exists. App. at 13. The affidavit in support of the motion stated that "based upon a letter intercepted by the administration" at Attica, James had made the determination that a package addressed to Washington might contain explosives. App. at 12-13. This was the only reference to mail in appellees' affidavit. Appellees admitted that the contents of the package had been destroyed. App. at 13.

Subsequently, Washington filed an affidavit and memorandum of law entitled "First Amendment" and subtitled "Legal Mail." In it, he alleged that appellees had failed to follow the Department of Correctional Services' (DOCS) Directive 4421 ¹ when they intercepted his legal mail and consequently denied him access to the courts in violation of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Attached to Washington's affidavit was the affidavit of fellow prison inmate John Sapp who swore that on May 24, 1984, three days after the date of Washington's original complaint and more than two years after the incident which gave rise to the complaint, he had observed Washington's outgoing legal mail being "separated from the general populations [sic] mail and sent up to the Security Office to be censored. While all other out-going mail goes out after being stamped." App. at 19.

The district court agreed with appellees' argument that under Hudson v. Palmer the destruction of Washington's property did not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. This holding is not challenged on appeal.

In its discussion of the legal mail claim, the court noted first that Washington "mention[ed] in his complaint and in more detail in his response" that appellees "questioned him about a letter he had sent to his paralegal, leading plaintiff to believe his legal mail had been opened." App. at 20. Somewhat cryptically, the court stated that Washington did not "specifically mention [the opening of his mail] as a claim for which he requests relief," noting further that Washington emphasized the destruction of his property and appellees' lack of response to his requests for its replacement. App. at 20-21. The court made no mention of Sapp's affidavit. Notwithstanding its apparent lack of certainty as to whether Washington had stated a second claim, the court went on to analyze the legal mail claim finding that Directive 4421 was more supportive of appellees' motion to dismiss than it was of Washington's position because the directive "allows mail to be intercepted if there exists reasonable suspicion to believe its contents endanger or threaten the security, safety, or operation of the facility or the person to whom it is addressed." App. at 21-22. The court summarily decided that appellees' actions were excused because the directive "clearly applies to the bomb threat scenario." App. at 22. The complaint was dismissed and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Because Washington has subsequently been moved from Attica, most of the injunctive relief sought can no longer be given and is no longer needed. Therefore, some aspects of this controversy are moot. Martin-Trigona v. Shiff, 702 F.2d 380, 386 (2d Cir.1983). Nevertheless, injunctive relief could be granted in certain respects, for example, by requiring appellees to remove from Washington's record any references to this suit. Additionally, on the record, it is unknown if prisoner Sapp is currently an inmate at Attica so that injunctive relief barring retaliation by appellees against him may still be appropriate.

Washington also requested a declaratory judgment that appellees' acts, policies and practices violated his constitutional rights and sought punitive damages in the amount of $50,000 preserving, thereby, a " 'legally cognizable interest in the outcome.' " Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 156, n. 2 (2d Cir.1984) (quoting United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1208, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980) ). See also Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233, 234 (2d Cir.1961) (mere fact of transfer to another prison facility does not render civil rights action moot). Cf. Wilkinson v. Skinner, 462 F.2d 670 (2d Cir.1972) (amendment of prison mail regulation rendered challenge to constitutionality of old regulation moot). Live controversies remain; this case is not moot. ²

On this appeal we must decide whether Washington's complaint sufficiently alleged a legal mail claim to allow this action to proceed. Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). This principle is strictly applied when an action is brought claiming a violation of civil rights. Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853, 857 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853, 91 S.Ct. 54, 27 L.Ed.2d 91 (1970). See Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 167 (2d Cir.) (in banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 439 U.S. 974, 99 S.Ct. 554, 58 L.Ed.2d 645 (1978). Because Washington brought this action pro se, the complaint should not be held to as rigorous a standard as formal pleadings prepared by an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam). See also Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Frankos v. LaVallee, 535 F.2d 1346, 1347 & n. 2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 918, 97 S.Ct. 310, 50 L.Ed.2d 284 (1976). We are also required at this stage to accept his allegations as true. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733, 12 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1946) (per curiam).

In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, a plaintiff must allege that some person acting under color of state law deprived him of a federal right. Gomez v. Toledo...