State v. Johnson

Decision Date04 September 2001
Docket Number20635
Citation783 A.2d 1057
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GREGORY JOHNSON20635 THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Counsel Suzanne Zitser, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant). Christopher T. Godialis, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state's attorney, and Edward R. Narus, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Schaller, Spear and Hennessy, Js.

Schaller, J.

Opinion

The defendant, Gregory Johnson, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-55a, 1 felony murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-54c 2 and robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-134 (a) (2). 3 The defendant claims that (1) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of uncharged misconduct and failed to give a limiting instruction as to that evidence, (2) the prosecutor made improper comments during his closing argument that violated the defendant's rights to a fair trial and against self-incrimination and (3) the guilty verdict on the charges of robbery in the first degree and manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm is legally inconsistent. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On July 4, 1996, the Hartford police were called to 39 Ogilby Drive to investigate a shooting. At the scene, the officers found the victim, later identified as Ansley Gayle, barely breathing with a gunshot wound to his chest. Medical personnel transported the victim to Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center, where he was later pronounced dead.

Lisa Champagnie was with the victim when he was shot. The victim lived with Champagnie's best friend, Thania Edwards. Champagnie lived with her cousin, Audrey Duckworth. Duckworth was the girlfriend of the defendant, who also lived in the apartment at that time.

Champagnie had a cellular telephone account that served two cellular telephones. Champagnie gave Edwards one telephone with the understanding that Edwards would reimburse her for charges that she incurred. Edwards incurred $741.52 in charges and had not reimbursed Champagnie.

Champagnie learned that Edwards was travelling to Jamaica on vacation and decided to hold personal property of Edwards until she paid the telephone bill. On or about July 1, 1996, the defendant drove Champagnie to Edwards' apartment, occupied at the time only by the victim. Champagnie told the victim that she had Edwards' permission to take Edwards' duffle bag and suitcase, which permission she in fact did not have, and took the luggage that already had been packed for the vacation. When Edwards returned, she confronted Champagnie, and the two agreed that the luggage would be returned in exchange for partial payment of the bill.

On July 4, 1996, the victim telephoned Champagnie and informed her that he would bring the payment with him when he visited the defendant. Champagnie met the victim outside her apartment, and the victim paid her $183. Champagnie then went inside the apartment, returned with the defendant, and the three left together in Edwards' vehicle to retrieve the luggage. In the vehicle, the defendant warned the victim that he had a gun. Both the defendant and the victim were carrying handguns at the time.

The three arrived at the apartment of Champagnie's cousin at 43 Ogilby Drive, where Champagnie had stored the luggage. The victim retrieved the bags while the defendant and Champagnie waited. After the bags were placed in the trunk of the vehicle, an argument ensued between the victim and the defendant regarding money owed. It was later disclosed that the debt arose from a marijuana purchase by the victim. The victim replied that he did not have the money at that time. The defendant then grabbed at the victim's right pocket, and the victim grabbed the defendant by the collar. The defendant demanded the money again, then pulled the handgun from his waistband and shot the victim in the chest. The defendant then searched the victim and took money that he found in the victim's pocket.

Another witness to the shooting, Marshalene Chin, ran into her apartment at 39 Ogilby Drive and told her mother, Pamela Channer, what had transpired. Channer dialed 911 for the police and an ambulance. Chin did not know the defendant at the time of the shooting, but later identified him from a photographic array.

After the shooting, the defendant left the scene in a vehicle driven by Courtney Smith. Duckworth was a passenger in the vehicle. The defendant ordered Champagnie at gunpoint to get into Smith's vehicle. The four drove to the apartment of Verona Burnett at 211 Nahum Drive, where they stayed for several hours. The defendant there told Burnett that he had argued with the victim and had shot him.

The next day, the defendant contacted his cousin in New York City and asked for transportation and a place to stay. The defendant, Duckworth and Champagnie were driven to the home of the defendant's sister in Brooklyn, New York. The defendant held Champagnie there for two weeks, without her consent, claiming that if she left, he would kill her and members of her family.

Duckworth returned to Hartford and relayed information about the criminal investigation to the defendant in New York. The defendant contacted Chin, asking what she knew of the killing and the details on police actions in the investigation. The defendant also had Champagnie call an attorney in Hartford to inform the attorney that a friend of the victim, and not the defendant, had shot the victim. The defendant sent Champagnie to Hartford for the purpose of introducing this misinformation to the police, warning her that if she told the truth, either he or his friends would kill her.

An arrest warrant was issued for the defendant on July 19, 1996. The defendant successfully remained at large until he attempted to enter Canada at Toronto International Airport on June 27, 1997, where he was apprehended and returned by Canadian authorities.

At trial, the defendant's theory of defense was that his arrest was the result of a mistaken identity and that Champagnie and Chin had falsely implicated him. The defendant did not testify. No evidence was adduced concerning any person for whom the defendant was mistaken.

The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the murder count but guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of §§ 53a-55a (a), felony murder and robbery in the first degree. The court sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of fifty-five years imprisonment.

I.

The defendant claims first that the court improperly admitted evidence of uncharged misconduct and failed to give a limiting instruction as to that evidence. Specifically, the defendant claims that it was improper to allow Champagnie to testify that the defendant killed the victim as a result of a drug-related debt. We are not persuaded.

The following additional facts are relevant to our disposition of this claim. Outside the presence of the jury, the defendant sought to preclude Champagnie's testimony that the dispute arose out of an unpaid, drug-related debt. Defense counsel stated: '' I would object to that coming in because I don't think it has--I think the prejudicial effect is--outweighs any probative value that it has.'' Defense counsel further argued that ''[t]he fact of what the money was owed for, I don't see how that has any bearing on this case or why.'' The state responded that ''it's not being offered for the truth but that's what the defendant said and it gives the jury information as to why there may be a debt owed, what money was owed for what reason.'' The court concluded that ''[t]he jury has a right to know what they were arguing about,'' and allowed the testimony.

A.

''The standard of review is clear. The admission of evidence of prior uncharged misconduct is a decision properly within the discretion of the trial court. . . . [E]very reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the trial court's ruling. . . . [T]he trial court's decision will be reversed only where abuse of discretion is manifest or where an injustice appears to have been done....

''Evidence of a defendant's prior misconduct is not ordinarily admissible to prove his bad character or criminal tendencies. . . . Evidence of other misconduct, however, may be allowed for the purpose of proving many different things, such as intent, identity, malice, motive or a system of criminal activity . . . or an element of the crime. . . . Such evidence, however, to be admissible must also be relevant and material.'' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Clark, 62 Conn. App. 182, 186±n87, 774 A.2d 183, cert. granted on other grounds, 256 Conn. 905, 772 A.2d 597 (2001).

The court properly concluded that the testimony regarding the argument between the victim and the defendant was relevant. Our Supreme Court ''previously [has] held that evidence of a victim's mental state may be relevant to establish the defendant's motive to kill the victim. See, e.g., State v. Hull, 210 Conn. 481, 501±n 502, 556 A.2d 154 (1989) ([t]he victim's mental state was relevant both to show the victim's fear of the defendant . . . and to establish the defendant's motive for committing the crime [citations omitted]) . . . .'' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wargo, 255 Conn. 113, 138, 763 A.2d 1 (2000). Furthermore, the evidence was material because it helped establish an element of the crime; see State v. Green, 62 Conn. App. 217, 240±n41, 774 A.2d 157, cert. granted on other grounds, 256 Conn. 927, A.2d (2001); specifically, the requisite mental state for robbery. See State v. Brown, 199 Conn. 47, 54±n58, 505 A.2d 1225 (1986) (evidence of uncharged...

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