Bloom v. General Truck Drivers, Office, Food & Warehouse Union, Local 952

• Citation: 783 F.2d 1356
• Decision Date: 28 February 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84-6620,84-6620
• Parties: 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3008, 104 Lab.Cas. P 11,831 Warren BLOOM, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. GENERAL TRUCK DRIVERS, OFFICE, FOOD & WAREHOUSE UNION, LOCAL 952; William Montgomery; Donald Cochran; Manuel Lopez; Gerold Scott, Defendants/Appellees, and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Defendant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Page 1356

783 F.2d 1356

121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3008, 104 Lab.Cas. P 11,831

Warren BLOOM, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. GENERAL TRUCK DRIVERS, OFFICE, FOOD & WAREHOUSE UNION, LOCAL 952; William Montgomery; Donald Cochran; Manuel Lopez; Gerold Scott, Defendants/Appellees and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Defendant.

No. 84-6620.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 10, 1985.

Decided Feb. 28, 1986.

Edward L. Smilow, Orange, Cal., for plaintiff/appellant.

Hirsch Adell, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants/appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before SKOPIL, FLETCHER and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges.

WIGGINS, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Warren Bloom seeks reversal of summary judgments against him in his action against his former union and its officers alleging wrongful discharge, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of his rights as a union member under section 101(a)(1) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA or the Act) (29 U.S.C. Sec. 411 (1982)). On appeal, Bloom argues that his complaint states a claim under the Act, that he may maintain a cause of action under state law, and that the individual defendants should be held liable for their actions. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Warren Bloom joined the General Truck Drivers, Office, Food & Warehouse Union, Local 952 (Local) in 1947. In 1963, he was hired by then-Secretary-Treasurer Lee Kearney as a business agent for the Local. Business agents have significant policymaking responsibility in the negotiation of contracts and in processing and resolving grievances. Under the Local's bylaws, only the Secretary-Treasurer has the power to hire or fire business agents. Kearney also appointed Bloom coordinator of the business agents. During the time involved here, Bloom also held the elected post of Recording Secretary, a post whose duties included attending meetings of the Executive Board and taking and storing minutes of all proceedings of the Local.

In early 1982, Kearney retired as Secretary-Treasurer and recommended Bloom to the Executive Board as his successor. The Board's initial vote to fill the position ended in a tie. A week later, the Board voted again, and defendant William Montgomery defeated Bloom. Following his election Four months later, Bloom (in his capacity as Recording Secretary) recorded a donation of $150 in the minutes of an Executive Board meeting. The donation was for a Boy Scouts of America luncheon the following day. Tickets for the luncheon were $150 each. The following day, a check for $300 was drawn to purchase two tickets to the luncheon, and defendants Donald Cochran and Manuel Lopez attended. The Executive Administrator, defendant Gerold Scott, in authority because of Secretary-Treasurer Montgomery's hospitalization, believed that Bloom had erred in recording the amount of the donation. A search was made for Bloom that morning but he could not be found. The minutes were subsequently altered to reflect a $300 donation. Bloom later signed the altered minutes but protested that they were incorrect. Bloom made his own investigation of the circumstances of the alteration and, on June 18, wrote a strongly worded letter of protest to the Board.

Montgomery removed Bloom as business agent coordinator.

At the next Executive Board meeting, held July 13, 1982, Bloom's original figure of $150 was approved in the minutes for the previous meeting, and the Board voted unanimously to donate another $150 to the luncheon. Bloom was present, voted for the motion, and recorded its passage in the minutes.

Nine days later, Montgomery fired Bloom from the position of business manager. Montgomery believed Bloom intended to run against him in the 1983 election.

On April 25, 1983, Bloom filed the initial complaint in the current action. On January 13, 1984, pursuant to stipulation, Bloom filed a first amended complaint, naming the Local, the Teamsters, Montgomery, Cochran, Lopez, and Scott as defendants. On September 25, 1984, the district court granted summary judgments to defendants Local, Montgomery, Cochran, Lopez, and Scott on the grounds that Bloom had failed to state a claim under 29 U.S.C. Secs. 411 and 412 and that the pendant state wrongful discharge action was preempted.

On November 20, 1984, final judgment was entered against Bloom and in favor of defendants Local, Montgomery, Cochran, Lopez, and Scott. That same day, the district court judge filed an order vacating the judgment and reentering it in accordance with Federal Rule 54(b) to allow immediate appeal. Bloom and the remaining defendant, Teamsters, have stipulated to a stay pending this appeal, the issues between them being derivative from and dependent on any decision here. Bloom has agreed to dismiss the action against Teamsters if the result of the appeal is not favorable to him.

Standard of Review

This court reviews the district court's grant of a summary judgment de novo. See e.g., Castelli v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 752 F.2d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir.1985). Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Arizona Laborers Local 395 Health & Welfare Fund v. Conquer Cartage Co., 753 F.2d 1512, 1515 (9th Cir.1985); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

DISCUSSION

I. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act

Appellant Bloom asserts in his brief that the expenditure of $300 on the luncheon when the Local membership had voted only $150 violated his rights to free speech and participation as a union member under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 411(a) (1982), ¹ giving him a cause of action under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 412 (1982). ² Notwithstanding the posture of his brief, however, Bloom actually bases his complaint on his firing as business agent for the Local, not on the expenditure of the $300. All the relief requested in his first amended complaint relates to the loss of his job; none of it deals with the alleged $150 excess donation. (Indeed, any harm from that donation was remedied at the Executive Board meeting following the donation, when the entire Board voted to donate the additional $150.) In short, the relief sought would do nothing to remedy the "infringement" that Bloom argues is the substance of his LMRDA claim.

Bloom frames his argument around the "excess" donation in an attempt to fall within the terms of the LMRDA; the action he actually complains of (his discharge) was not intended to be prohibited by the Act. Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 436-37 & n. 7, 102 S.Ct. 1867, 1870-71 & n. 7, 72 L.Ed.2d 239 (1982) (citing legislative history). A union employee who is discharged in a way that does not affect his rights as a union member has no cause of action under section 412. Id. at 440-42, 102 S.Ct. at 1872-74. ³ Bloom's discharge from union employment does not alone affect those rights. After his discharge, he retained all the rights and privileges of union membership he had had before. An indirect burden on membership rights, such as a forced choice between expressing one's opinion and losing one's job, is insufficient to state an LMRDA claim. See Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 440-42, 102 S.Ct. at 1872-74; Cehaich v. International Union, U.A.W., 710 F.2d 234, 238 (6th Cir.1983). Without some infringement on his rights as a union member, Bloom does not state an action under sections 411 and 412, despite his artful pleading. ⁴

II. Wrongful Discharge

Bloom also argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants on his state law claim of wrongful discharge. ⁵ He alleges that he was fired not for political reasons but because he resisted pressure to falsify the union's minutes, and that he therefore has a cause of action for wrongful discharge under state law. The district court ruled that federal law preempted his state claim.

A. Preemption Issue

Bloom first argues that his wrongful discharge action cannot be preempted by the LMRDA because it is specifically "saved" from preemption by the Act itself. He cites 29 U.S.C. Secs. 413, 523, and 524, which he asserts "save" his state claim. ⁶ Sections 413 and 523(a), however, save causes of action enjoyed by union members, and, as discussed above, Bloom is not bringing this action as a union member but as a union employee. Just as he is not entitled to the substantive protections of the LMRDA as an employee, so he cannot enjoy its savings clauses. The remaining section, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 524, saves only state criminal laws and thus cannot directly save appellant's civil action. ⁷

Even if his state claim is not specifically saved from preemption, Bloom argues that the district court erred in finding preemption on the facts alleged in his complaint. No federal statute directly covered the terms and conditions of Bloom's employment and, he correctly notes, he was an at-will employee under California law.

Federal labor law preemption of state law is a complex and difficult area of the law. Because the statutes are largely silent as to what aspects of state law Congress intended to preempt, we have developed a preemption doctrine "based on legislative history and judicial conceptions of what federal labor policy requires." Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir.1984). Preemption questions clearly require us to balance state and federal interests, although the relative importance attached to each interest is unclear. ⁸ Id.; Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1372-73 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 2319, 85 L.Ed.2d 839 (1985).

1. State interest

In the present case, the state's interest is strong. Bloom asserts in his complaint that he was fired for refusing to alter the minutes of a union meeting to cover up an unapproved expenditure (in effect an embezzlement) of union funds by other union officers. California law...