Martin v. Howard

• Decision Date: 13 November 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-483-Appeal.,99-483-Appeal.
• Citation: 784 A.2d 291
• Parties: Joan D. MARTIN v. Evan D. HOWARD et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

784 A.2d 291

Joan D. MARTIN v. Evan D. HOWARD et al.

No. 99-483-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

November 13, 2001.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Andrew W. Berg, Providence, Catherine A. Samartino, for Plaintiff.

Todd D. White, Gerald C. DeMaria, John W. Kershaw, Paul V. Curcio, Providence, for Defendant.

OPINION

FLANDERS, Justice.

This appeal tells the tale of a parishioner whose pastor engaged in a sexual relationship with her during a six-month period in 1995 and 1996 — allegedly without obtaining her valid or knowledgeable consent to do so. After sleeping with her pastor, however, did the parishioner then sleep on whatever rights she may have had to sue both the pastor and her church for their asserted wrongdoing? That question and the proper application of the governing statute of limitations are the focus of our inquiry.

Ultimately, in 1999, plaintiff-parishioner, Joan Martin (Martin), filed a complaint in Superior Court against defendant-pastor, the Reverend Evan D. Howard (Howard). She accused him of what amounted to clergy malpractice by engaging in an extramarital sexual affair with her. But did Martin do so in a timely fashion, or, as the trial justice ruled in dismissing her complaint, did she wait too long to take Howard and her church to court for their alleged misdeeds?

Facts and Travel

On January 16, 1999, Martin filed her complaint in Superior Court against Howard, the Central Baptist Church of Rhode Island (church), and the American Baptist Churches of Rhode Island (ABCORI) (collectively, the church defendants). She alleged that from September 1994 through February 1995 — while she was a parishioner and the church's elected moderator, and while Howard was the church's pastor and married to another woman — Howard engaged her in a sexual relationship without her "valid or knowledgeable consent." Thereafter, in February 1995, an ABCORI church official contacted her, informed her that Howard had admitted to his sexual relationship with her, and that the church defendants would address this situation through an internal church mediation process that would be conducted in a fair, impartial, and confidential manner.

Martin further alleged that a church official later notified her, on or about May 30, 1995, that Howard had been placed on a paid leave of absence for six months and that the church defendants had asked him to take steps to address his admitted misconduct. The church defendants, however, offered no specific redress to Martin in response to her asserted "victimization" by Howard. Moreover, in June 1995, Howard supposedly denounced her to the congregation in a letter the church defendants had allowed him to read from the church pulpit, blaming her for causing him to stray from his ministry and his marital vows. Later, in January 1996, Martin learned that, upon the expiration of his paid leave of absence, the church defendants had allowed Howard to resume his pastoral duties without taking any further action to remedy his alleged wrongdoing or to redress Martin's injuries. As a result, she averred, the church defendants allowed Howard to defame her and to blame her for his own misconduct, all of which led to her constructive removal from the church. Finally, Martin alleged, by reason of the foregoing, she suffered grievous emotional and psychological injuries for which she sought an award of money damages from defendants.

Martin then filed an amended complaint that she divided into eight counts. Count 1 averred that, in light of Howard's lubricious liaison with her, the church defendants were negligent in hiring, supervising, and retaining him as pastor of the church. Count 2 alleged that the church defendants were responsible for Howard's wrongful acts because he was acting as their agent, servant, or employee. In count 3, Martin alleged that all defendants breached the fiduciary duties they owed to her before, during, and after the mediation process. Count 4 alleged that the church defendants fraudulently misrepresented to Martin that her claims arising from Howard's conduct would be redressed through a fair, impartial, and confidential internal church mediation. Counts 5 and 6 alleged that defendants were guilty of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress upon Martin. Count 7 alleged that the parties had a "binding and enforceable agreement" that the church defendants would mediate Martin's claims; that they would do so in a fair, impartial, and confidential manner through an internal church procedure; and that defendants breached this agreement by failing to observe and protect her best interests, failing to include her in the mediation, intentionally protecting Howard to her detriment, and causing defamatory statements about her to be published. Finally, count 8 of the complaint alleged that defendants breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to treat Martin fairly and impartially in the course of and after the mediation had concluded.

As a result of defendants' conduct, Martin averred that she:

"has suffered and continues to suffer severe emotional and psychological distress, anxiety, depression, humiliation, embarrassment and loss of self esteem, has incurred and will continue to incur expenses for medical, psychiatric and psychological treatment, therapy and counseling, is unable to perform her normal daily activities and obtain the full enjoyment of life, has lost her Church, her self esteem and her spiritual center."

In response to Martin's amended complaint, defendants moved for its dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. After hearing argument and reviewing the parties' written submissions, a Superior Court motion justice granted the motion on the grounds that Martin had failed to initiate suit on her claims within the applicable three-year statute of limitations for filing personal-injury actions. See G.L.1956 § 9-1-14(b).

On appeal, Martin argues that she did not appreciate the full extent of her injuries during or immediately after ending her sexual relationship with Howard, which concluded in February 1995. As a result, she contends, the applicable statute of limitations should not have begun to accrue in this case immediately upon the surcease of her relationship with Howard. In any event, she suggests, fixing the accrual date for her claims necessarily involved the determination of disputed issues of material fact that should not have been resolved in the context of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion. Moreover, she reminds us, her complaint included claims for breach of contract, violation of fiduciary duties, and fraud, to which the motion justice should not have applied the three-year statute of limitations for actions alleging personal injuries. She further posits that the motion justice improperly barred her from conducting discovery while defendants' dismissal motion was pending and that the court should not have disposed of this case as it did without properly converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Assuming, without deciding, that one or more of Martin's personal-injury claims arising out of Howard's alleged clergy malpractice might have been cognizable if timely filed,¹ we address these and Martin's other arguments below.

I Stay of Discovery

We begin with Martin's argument that the motion justice improperly precluded her from conducting discovery while defendants' dismissal motion was pending. She contends that this stay of discovery hindered her from effectively defending against the pending motion to dismiss.

The Superior Court has broad discretion to regulate how and when discovery occurs. Colvin v. Lekas, 731 A.2d 718 (R.I.1999); Bashforth v. Zampini, 576 A.2d 1197 (R.I.1990). Thus, Rule 26(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure permits the motion justice to issue any order "which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense * * *." This accords with the underlying purpose of the Rules, which should always be "construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Super. R. Civ. P. 1.

Martin argues that the court's granting of defendants' request to stay discovery pending adjudication of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion unduly prejudiced her. She contends that she needed to engage in discovery to "flesh out the facts in her complaint" — especially because she was suffering from post-traumatic-stress disorder after her relationship with Howard had ended and, thus, still was having difficulty communicating in the aftermath of defendants' alleged misconduct.

In furtherance of the principle of "judicial parsimony," however, a trial court possesses the discretion to stay discovery in a civil case until one or more potentially dispositive issues have been decided. See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 694, 53 S.Ct. 736, 738, 77 L.Ed. 1449, 1454 (1933)

. Thus, for example, courts have the power to stay discovery on the merits until challenges to jurisdiction have been resolved. See Pyle v. Pyle, 81 F.Supp. 207 (W.D.La.1948); 8 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d § 2040 at 521-22 (1994). Indeed, this Court has been reluctant to allow litigants to engage in a discovery "fishing expedition" merely to establish personal jurisdiction. See Coia v. Stephano, 511 A.2d 980 (R.I. 1986); Smith v. Johns Manville Corp., 489 A.2d 336 (R.I.1985). Rather, under Rule 11, it is the duty of the plaintiff's attorney to conduct a good-faith investigation before filing a complaint that is sufficient to support allegations showing (1) the jurisdiction of the court, (2) the timeliness of the claims asserted therein, and (3), assuming the truth of the factual averments, the plaintiff's...