Energetics, Inc. v. Allied Bank of Texas

Decision Date21 March 1986
Docket NumberNo. 85-2098,85-2098
Parties, 42 UCC Rep.Serv. 1568 ENERGETICS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALLIED BANK OF TEXAS, Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CREDIT SUISSE, Third Party Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Louis H. Salinas, Jr., Kevin R. Risley, Houston, Tex., for Allied Bank of Texas.

Pamela A. Prestridge, Houston, Tex., for Credit Suisse.

B. Lawrence Theis, Walter & Theis, Denver, Colo., for Energetics, Inc.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before CLARK, Chief Judge, POLITZ and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

JERRE S. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:

In this diversity suit, a lender bank appeals a judgment declaring that from a depositor's account it wrongfully offset money which belonged to a third party. We find that the bank wrongfully offset the funds, but the district court's judgment did not state the correct amount. We reverse the district court judgment of $604,597.97 and remand for entry of judgment in the sum of $428,362.70.

Appellant Allied Bank of Texas made approximately $20,000,000 in loans to an oil and gas contractor, Republic Drilling & Service, Inc. Republic also maintained a regular deposit account at the bank. Funds in this account were deposited as "prepayment" drilling expenses by appellee Energetics, Inc., the operator in an oil and gas venture with Republic. 1 The account was designated "Well Account-Energetics." 2 Republic defaulted on the bank loans. The bank then took control of the funds in Republic's deposit account as an offset against the defaulted loans. At the time of the offset, the amount in Republic's deposit account was $604,597.97. 3

Energetics filed this suit claiming that the bank had wrongfully offset the account because the money not yet expended for drilling costs by Republic still belonged to Energetics. The district court agreed, and ordered the bank to return the $604,597.97 to Energetics. The district court ruling in favor of Energetics was based upon the "equitable exception" to the bank's right of offset. 4 The district court also held that the trustee in bankruptcy of Republic 5 was entitled to $176,797.94 of the $604,597.97 provided that he file a claim for the funds. This ruling in favor of the trustee was made because there was testimony that Energetics owed an outstanding $176,797.94 debt to Republic.

On appeal to this Court, the bank argues: (1) the equitable exception to offset should not have been applied to the facts of this case; and (2) if the exception is applied, the recovery by Energetics was excessive and the judgment is invalid because it awards $176,797.94 to the trustee in bankruptcy of Republic, who is not a party before the court. We find that the equitable exception to offset does apply but that Energetics' recovery should be limited to $428,362.70. We remand for the entry of judgment in accordance with this conclusion.

I. EQUITABLE EXCEPTION TO OFFSET

The law of Texas has long recognized that a bank has the right to offset funds in a depositor's account against indebtedness owed by the depositor to the bank. Elizarraras v. Bank of El Paso, 631 F.2d 366, 371 (5th Cir.1980). Energetics brought this action claiming the "equitable exception" to the bank's right of offset. This equitable exception is also well established in Texas law. As adopted or recognized by the Texas Supreme Court in National Indemnity Co. v. Spring Bank State Branch, 162 Tex. 521, 348 S.W.2d 528 (Tex.1961), it provides that a bank cannot apply funds on deposit to the individual debt of the depositor when the funds belong to a third party and are held in trust for that third party by the depositor, "if there has been no change in the bank's position to its detriment." Id. 348 S.W.2d at 529. The equitable exception is not limited to funds held pursuant to an express trust but applies to any funds "held in a fiduciary capacity." South Central Livestock v. Security State Bank, 551 F.2d 1346, 1350 (5th Cir.1977), modified on other grounds and aff'd, 614 F.2d 1056 (1980).

Allied Bank argues that the equitable exception was erroneously applied to the facts of the present case because: (1) the bank had no knowledge that the funds belonged to Energetics; (2) Energetics did not own the funds; and (3) Energetics failed properly to trace the funds. We reject each of these contentions.

First, Allied Bank argues that the equitable exception to the bank's right of offset should not be applied because the bank had no knowledge that the funds were held in a fiduciary capacity at the time that it took the offset. The bank argues that the National Indemnity rule did not survive the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in Texas.

The adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in Texas, however, did not abolish the National Indemnity rule. South Central Livestock, 551 F.2d at 1350. The common law on commercial transactions is still the law of Texas except in those instances where it has been "displaced by the particular provisions" of the Code. Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code Sec. 1.103 (Vernon 1968); see also First National Bank v. Lone Star Life Ins., 524 S.W.2d 525 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1975), ref. n.r.e., 529 S.W.2d 67 (1975). It is clear that Texas law does not consider the equitable exception as it applies to funds held in a deposit account to have been displaced by the Commercial Code. Continental National Bank v. Great American Management, 606 S.W.2d 346 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Pan American National Bank v. Holiday Wines, 580 S.W.2d 7 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); South Central Livestock, 551 F.2d at 1350. We conclude that the National Indemnity rule is still the applicable law in cases such as the one before us.

In the present case, the district judge found that Allied Bank was given notice four days after it took the offset that the funds belonged to Energetics. The bank did not return the funds. 6 Under the equitable exception doctrine the funds should have been returned to Energetics unless the bank could show that it had changed its position to its detriment. As stated in Continental National Bank v. Great American Management:

[F]urthermore even where innocently seized, the funds must be yielded up to the equitable owner when the entrustment fact is established unless he who is in possession can and does show that he has changed his position to his injury so that it would be inequitable to require him to yield up the funds.

606 S.W.2d at 348 (emphasis in original). 7 Allied Bank did not even attempt to make a showing of detrimental reliance. Thus, Allied Bank's contention that its lack of knowledge precluded the applicability of the equitable exception is without merit. 8

Second, the bank argues that Energetics did not establish that it was the owner of the funds in question. The district court found that the prepayment funds were held by Republic as a fiduciary for Energetics. Our review of factual findings of the district court is limited to review under the "clearly erroneous" standard. F.R.Civ.P. 52(a).

Appellant argues that Energetics did not own the funds because it took a tax deduction for them in 1981. Appellant cites tax regulations and tax court decisions stating that this deduction can only be taken once the funds have been parted with "irretrievably." The tax characterization of the funds, however, is not the question for our review. We agree with the district court that the "tax treatment is irrelevant because ... it has [nothing] to do with the ownership for the purposes of offset for [this] case." See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 287, 66 S.Ct. 532, 536, 90 L.Ed. 670 (1946) (Tax court deciding a tax question "is not governed by how Michigan law might treat the same circumstances for purposes of state law."); see also Bagur v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 603 F.2d 491 (5th Cir.1979) (Tax law characterization is separate from state law characterization of same issue); Estate of Johnston v. United States, 586 F.Supp. 500 (D.C.Tex.1984). The only question before us is whether the funds were controlled by and belonged to Energetics under Texas law.

There was evidence that Energetics had complete control over the account and the money was not to be used by Republic except upon approval by Energetics. 9 There was testimony that Energetics could order withdrawal of funds from the account at any time including all of the funds in the account. There was also testimony that Energetics directed how the funds were to be used, that Republic had no voice in how they were used, and that Republic could not keep the funds for itself. The name on the account was "Well Account-Energetics." Thus, there was ample evidence to support the district court's finding that the funds belonged to Energetics. Whether the tax deduction was properly taken by Energetics is not at issue before us. 10

Third, Allied urges that Energetics did not properly trace the funds that were in the Republic account. The district judge found that "plaintiff has clearly traced these funds," and that the "ideas of tracing" of the accountant hired by defendants "leave a great deal to be desired." We do not find this conclusion to be "clearly erroneous." Mr. Webber, Energetics' accountant, traced the funds through the cashing of a Certificate of Deposit. In fact, the bank's own accountant admitted that, practically speaking, the funds had been traced. We find that the district court did not err, therefore, in applying to the facts of this case the equitable exception prohibiting offset.

II. DAMAGES

Appellant contends that any recovery should be limited to $396,672.75, or, alternatively, to $428,362.70. Energetics and Republic entered into a written agreement regarding the prepayment fund three months after the bank undertook the offset. In that agreement, Energetics...

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