Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., Civ. A. No. S90-0209(P)(R).
| Decision Date | 18 February 1992 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. S90-0209(P)(R). |
| Citation | 785 F. Supp. 614 |
| Parties | Earl Wayne COATS, Plaintiff, v. PENROD DRILLING CORPORATION, Hytorc M.E., Maritime Industrial Services, and Lee's Materials Services, In Personam, Penrod Rig No. 69, In Rem, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
Maurice C. Hebert, Jr., and David M. Flotte, New Orleans, La., Raymond O. Brown, Pascagoula, Miss., for plaintiff.
Bernard Ticer and James Womack, New Orleans, La., for Penrod Drilling Corp.
William B. Gibbens, III, and Troy Ingram, New Orleans, La., for Hytorc, M.E. and Maritime Industrial Services.
Thomas W. Acosta, Jr., Port Allen, La., for Lee's Materials Services.
This cause comes before the Court on a profusion of pending motions, including: (1) Defendant Penrod Drilling Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike All Defense Experts on the Issue of Foreign Law and to Strike All Foreign Law Issues, Motion to Strike Issues of Alleged Failure to Fill Lines with Hydraulic Fluid, Motion for Summary Judgment on Sieracki Seaman Status, Motion to Strike Affidavit of Defense Counsel, and Motion for a Second Declaration that United States Law Applies; (3) Defendant Lee's Materials Services' Motion for Summary Judgment; and, (4) Defendant Maritime Industrial Services Co., Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment. Having reviewed the various motions and the parties' memoranda and authorities related to same, the Court finds as follows:
I.
This action involves a maritime tort claim for injury and damages allegedly sustained by the Plaintiff, Earl Wayne Coats ("Coats"), while he was employed by Hytorc, M.E., a division of Maritime Industrial Services ("MIS/Hytorc"), and working in Dubai, United Arab Emirates ("UAE"). Coats was hired by Mr. David Shelton, head of the Hytorc Division of MIS, in Laurel, Mississippi. Shelton traveled from UAE to Laurel, Mississippi, to meet with Coats and offered Coats a job with MIS/Hytorc. Coats flew to UAE on December 1, 1987, at which time he began work for MIS/Hytorc. Coats had been working for MIS/Hytorc for several months when he was injured on April 12, 1988, while working on board the PENROD NO. 69.1
The PENROD NO. 69 is owned by Defendant Penrod Drilling Corporation ("Penrod") and registered in the United States with a home port of New Orleans, Louisiana. At the time of Coats' injury, the PENROD NO. 69 was located in the Port of Mina Saqr, Ras al Khaymah, one of the Emirates comprising the UAE. The rig was located against the bank with access available via a gangway. Coats was conducting pressure testing at the time of his injury. He was standing behind a stabbing board, operating a pressure pump remotely, when the pressure in the system had reached approximately 6,000 psi (pounds per square inch). Coats left the area behind the stabbing board and walked over to the area where the pressure gauge was located near the items being tested. Suddenly and unexpectedly, the bullplug blew out of the companion flange and the fluid under pressure erupted, striking Coats and knocking him down. As a result of the accident, Coats sustained a knee injury. He was sent to the United States for medical treatment, where he has remained.
Coats filed this action on April 10, 1989, asserting various maritime tort claims against Penrod for Penrod's alleged negligence, unseaworthiness of its vessel, and for maintenance and cure. Coats brings similar maritime tort claims against Defendant MIS/Hytorc, and also alleges certain contract claims against MIS/Hytorc based upon administration of certain health benefits and for retaliatory termination of such benefits. Coats also named as defendants Lee's Materials Services, Inc. ("Lee's"), which apparently acted as an agent for MIS/Hytorc in the United States, and PENROD NO. 69, which Coats sues in rem.
The defendants have previously moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, and Coats has also moved for summary judgment on various issues. These motions have been ruled upon by this Court, per Judge Daniel M. Russell, in several earlier orders. In a Memorandum Order issued April 25, 1990, Judge Russell denied the Motions to Dismiss of MIS/Hytorc and Lee's and granted Coats' Motion for Summary Judgment declaring that there is in personam jurisdiction over MIS/Hytorc and that this district is a convenient forum. In a second Memorandum Order, issued May 3, 1990, Judge Russell denied Coats' Motion for Summary Judgment for maintenance and cure and punitive damages and granted MIS/Hytorc's Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Coats' claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688. In a third Memorandum Order issued November 29, 1990, Judge Russell granted the Motion to Dismiss of MIS/Hytorc, dismissing Coats' claims under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., but denied MIS/Hytorc's motion insofar as it sought dismissal of Coats' general maritime claims. In his third Memorandum Order, Judge Russell declined to address which substantive law should apply and directed the parties to brief that issue. Judge Russell also issued a fourth Memorandum Order on November 29, 1990, in which he denied Coats' Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's earlier denial of Coats' motion for summary judgment on Jones Act seaman status.
II.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must afford the non-moving party all favorable inferences from the pleadings, affidavits, and other material placed before the Court for consideration. See Fine v. American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290 (5th Cir.1990). The Court's objective in considering a summary judgment motion is to decide "whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Professional Managers, Inc. v. Fawer, Brian, Hardy & Zatzkis, 799 F.2d 218, 223 (5th Cir.1986) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Generally speaking, where the facts are conceded by the parties, the Court may utilize the summary judgment procedure to decide contested questions of law. Here, there are several questions of law to be decided.
Penrod has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asking this Court to apply UAE law to the Complaint in this matter. MIS/Hytorc has also filed a Memorandum in Support of Application of Foreign Law. Coats responded with a Motion for Second Declaration that United States law applies. Thus, the choice of law inquiry into what law applies is placed squarely before the Court in this case.
Coats filed his original Complaint under the Jones Act, the LHWCA, the general maritime law, and the laws of Mississippi for damages arising out of his personal injury. This Court has previously ruled that Coats has no claim under either the Jones Act or the LHWCA. Although Coats has moved for summary judgment declaring that he has seaman status under the authority of Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099 (1946) (i.e., "Sieracki" seaman status), for the purpose of deciding what law applies, the Court will assume momentarily that Coats' claims are brought under the general maritime law and Mississippi substantive law. Given the varied nature of Coats' claims, the Court cannot reach a singular decision that either the general maritime law, Mississippi law or UAE law applies to all of Coats' claims. The Court must make two choice of law decisions: (1) what law applies to Coats' common law tort and contract claims; and, (2) what law applies to Coats' general maritime claims.
Under Mississippi law, the Court must apply a "center of gravity" or "most substantial contacts" approach to the question of what law applies. See Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509 (Miss.1968); Price v. Litton Systems, Inc., 784 F.2d 600 (5th Cir.1986). Mississippi derives its "center of gravity" approach from the factors set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Section 145 of the Restatement provides the general rule in tort cases:
Mitchell, 211 So.2d at 515. The contacts identified in § 145 are to be weighed in accordance with the general principles set forth in § 6 of the Restatement:
Mitchell, 211 So.2d at 516. There are also specific factors to be applied in...
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