In re Hughes, s. COA15–699

• Decision Date: 16 February 2016
• Docket Number: COA15–763,Nos. COA15–699,COA15–829.,s. COA15–699
• Citation: 785 S.E.2d 111,245 N.C.App. 398
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: In the Matter of HUGHES, by and through V.H. Ingram, Administratrix of the Estate of Hughes, Claim for Compensation Under the North Carolina Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program, Claimant–Appellant. In the Matter of Redmond, by and through L. Nichols, Administratrix of the Estate of Redmond, Claim for Compensation Under the North Carolina Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program, Claimant–Appellant. In the Matter of Smith, Claim for Compensation Under the North Carolina Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program, Claimant–Appellant.

245 N.C.App. 398

785 S.E.2d 111

In the Matter of HUGHES, by and through V.H. Ingram, Administratrix of the Estate of Hughes, Claim for Compensation Under the North Carolina Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program, Claimant–Appellant. In the Matter of Redmond, by and through L. Nichols, Administratrix of the Estate of Redmond, Claim for Compensation Under the North Carolina Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program, Claimant–Appellant. In the Matter of Smith, Claim for Compensation Under the North Carolina Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program, Claimant–Appellant.

Nos. COA15–699

COA15–763

COA15–829.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Feb. 16, 2016.

Pressly, Thomas & Conley, PA, Statesville, by Edwin A. Pressly ; and UNC Center for Civil Rights, by Elizabeth McLaughlin Haddix, Pittsboro, for Claimant–Appellants.

Attorney General, Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General, Marc X. Sneed, for North Carolina Department of Justice, Tort Claims Section.

McGEE, Chief Judge.

Ms. Hughes ("Hughes"), Ms. Redmond ("Redmond"), and Mr. Smith ("Smith")¹ were all "sterilized involuntarily under the authority of the Eugenics Board of North Carolina in accordance with Chapter 224 of the Public Laws of 1933 or Chapter 221 of the Public Laws of 1937." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 143B–426.50(5) (2013). Hughes died in 1996, Redmond died in 2010, and Smith died in 2006.

In 2013, the General Assembly enacted the Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program ("the Compensation Program"), N.C. Gen.Stat. § 143B–426.50 et seq. , in order to provide compensation to victims of the North Carolina Eugenics laws. Because the North Carolina Industrial Commission ("Industrial Commission") concluded that Hughes, Redmond and Smith were "asexualized involuntarily or sterilized involuntarily under the authority of the Eugenics Board of North Carolina in accordance with Chapter 224 of the Public Laws of 1933 or Chapter 221 of the Public Laws of 1937[,]" they were "qualified recipients" under the Compensation Program. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 143B–426.50(5) (2013). However, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 143B–426.50(1) limited which qualified recipients could become successful claimants as follows: "Claimant.—An individual on whose behalf a claim is made for compensation as a qualified recipient under this Part. An individual must be alive on June 30, 2013, in order to be a claimant." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 143B–426.50(1) (emphasis added).

The estates of Hughes, Redmond, and Smith ("Claimants") filed claims pursuant to the Compensation Program. However, because Hughes, Redmond and Smith each died before 30 June 2013, those claims were denied. Each Claimant followed the appeals process from the initial denial of their claims to the rehearings by deputy commissioners. Following denials by the deputy commissioners, Claimants filed appeals to the Full Commission. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 143B–426.53 (2013). Following denial of their claims by the Full Commission, Claimants filed notices of appeal with this Court. Id. On appeal, Claimants argue that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B426.50(1), by limiting recovery to victims or heirs of victims living on or after 30 June 2013, violates the North Carolina and the United States Constitutions.

Because we conclude this Court is without jurisdiction to consider Claimants' appeals, we must dismiss and remand to the Industrial Commission for transfer to Superior Court, Wake County.

According to the Compensation Program: "The [Industrial] Commission shall determine whether a claimant is eligible for compensation as a qualified recipient under this Part. The Commission shall have all powers and authority granted under Article 31 of Chapter 143 of the General Statutes with regard to claims filed pursuant to this Part." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 143B–426.53(a) (2013). Article 31 of Chapter 143 of the General Statutes constitutes the Tort Claims Act. According to the Tort Claims Act: "The North Carolina Industrial Commission is hereby constituted a court for the purpose of hearing and passing upon tort claims against the State Board of Education, the Board of Transportation, and all other departments, institutions and agencies of the State." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 143–291(a) (2013). Therefore, the Industrial Commission acts as a court when determining whether claimants under the Compensation Program meet the criteria for compensation.

Claimants argue that N.C. Gen.Stat. § 143B–426.50(1)

violates the guarantees to equal protection and due process under Article 1, Section 19 of the Constitution of the State of North Carolina and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States because there is no rational basis to deny compensation to an otherwise qualified claimant who dies before June 20, 2013 while granting compensation to the heirs of a qualified claimant who dies after June 30, 2013.

The General Assembly, by statute enacted in 2014, created a new procedure and venue for facial constitutional challenges of its enactments. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1–267.1 states in relevant part:

[A]ny facial challenge to the validity of an act of the General Assembly shall be transferred pursuant to G.S. 1A–1, Rule 42(b)(4), to the Superior Court of Wake County and shall be heard and determined by a three-judge panel of the Superior Court of Wake County, organized as provided by subsection (b2) of this section.

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1–267.1(a1) (2014) (emphasis added). The General Assembly had the authority to limit jurisdiction in this manner.² N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1–267.1 further states in relevant part:

No order or judgment shall be entered ... [that] finds that an act of the General Assembly is facially invalid on the basis that the act violates the North Carolina Constitution or federal law, except by a three-judge panel of the Superior Court of Wake County organized as provided by subsection (b) or subsection (b2) of this section.

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1–267.1(c) ; see also N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1–81.1(a1) (2014) ( "Venue lies exclusively with the Wake County Superior Court with regard to any claim seeking an order or judgment of a court, either final or interlocutory, to restrain the enforcement, operation, or execution of an act of the General Assembly, in whole or in part, based upon an allegation that the act of the General Assembly is facially invalid on the basis that the act violates the North Carolina Constitution or federal law. Pursuant to G.S. 1–267.1(a1) and G.S. 1–1A, Rule 42(b)(4), claims described in this subsection that are filed or raised in courts other than Wake County Superior Court or that are filed in Wake County Superior Court shall be transferred to a three-judge panel of the Wake County Superior Court if, after all other questions of law in the action have been resolved, a determination as to the facial validity of an act of the General Assembly must be made in order to completely resolve any issues in the case.") (emphasis added).

These provisions became law, and thus effective, on 7 August 2014. 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 100, § 18B.16(f) ("The remainder of this section is effective when it becomes law and applies to any claim filed on or after that date or asserted in an amended pleading on or after that date that asserts that an act of the General Assembly is either facially invalid or invalid as applied to a set of factual circumstances on the basis that the act violates the North Carolina Constitution or federal law."). N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 42(b)(4) states:

Pursuant to G.S. 1–267.1, any facial challenge to the validity of an act of the General Assembly, other than a challenge to plans apportioning or redistricting State legislative or congressional districts, shall be heard by a three-judge panel in the Superior Court of Wake County if a claimant raises such a challenge in the claimant's complaint or amended complaint in any court in this State, or if such a challenge is raised by the defendant in the defendant's answer, responsive pleading, or within 30 days of filing the defendant's answer or responsive pleading. In that event, the court shall, on its own motion, transfer that portion of the action challenging the validity of the act of the General Assembly to the Superior Court of Wake County for resolution by a three-judge panel if, after all other matters in the action have been resolved, a determination as to the facial validity of an act of the General Assembly must be made in order to completely resolve any matters in the case. The court in which the action originated shall maintain jurisdiction over all matters other than the challenge to the act's facial validity and shall stay all matters that are contingent upon the outcome of the challenge to the act's facial validity pending a ruling on that challenge and until all appeal rights are exhausted. Once the three-judge panel has ruled and all appeal rights have been exhausted, the matter shall be transferred or remanded to the three-judge panel or the trial court in which the action originated for resolution of any outstanding matters, as appropriate.

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 42(b)(4) (2014) (emphasis added). Pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 143B–426.53(a), in the matters before us "[t]he Commission shall have all powers and authority granted under Article 31 of Chapter 143 of the General Statutes with regard to claims filed pursuant to this Part." Pursuant to Article 31 of Chapter 143:

The Industrial Commission is hereby authorized and empowered to adopt such rules and regulations as may, in the discretion of the Commission, be necessary to carry out the purpose and intent of this Article. The North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of Evidence, insofar as they are not in conflict with the provisions of this Article, shall be followed in proceedings under this Article.

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 143–300 (2013) (emphasis added). We disagree with the dissenting opinion's conclusion that Rule 42(b)(4) does not apply in the matters before u...