H.C. by Hewett v. Jarrard

• Decision Date: 15 April 1986
• Docket Number: No. 83-3676,83-3676
• Citation: 786 F.2d 1080
• Parties: H.C., by his next friend and attorney, Carol HEWETT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, and Raymond Ogletree * , individually, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dee JARRARD, in her capacity as Direct Services Supervisor of the Fla. Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1080

786 F.2d 1080

H.C., by his next friend and attorney, Carol HEWETT individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs and Raymond Ogletree ^*, individually, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dee JARRARD, in her capacity as Direct Services Supervisor of the Fla. Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 83-3676.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

April 15, 1986.

Jonathan Hewett, Lexington, Ky., C. James Dulfer, Cent. Fla. Legal Services, Inc., Daytona Beach, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.

Claire Dryfuss, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Fla. Dept. of Health & Rehab. Services, Harden King, Tallahassee, Fla., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.

Before KRAVITCH and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and PECK ^**, Senior Circuit Judge.

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:

Juvenile detainees brought a class action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983, challenging the conditions and practices at the Volusia Regional Juvenile Detention Center (Center) operated by the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). After extensive hearings, the district court entered sweeping injunctive relief designed to bring the Center up to constitutional standards. Raymond Ogletree had been incarcerated at the Center and was permitted to intervene in the class action to pursue individual damage claims. This appeal concerns only Ogletree's individual claims. The district court awarded nominal damages on Ogletree's claims that the imposition of extended isolation without notice and hearing and the conditions of that isolation violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The district court further concluded that the named defendants had not deliberately deprived Ogletree of medical attention and that defendant Wade's battery of Ogletree did not rise to a constitutional violation.

Ogletree appeals the award of only nominal damages on his first two claims and the district court's conclusions that he suffered no constitutional deprivation when he was assaulted by a superintendent at the Center and that the named defendants had not denied him medical attention. We conclude that Ogletree was entitled to more than nominal damages on his first two claims and remand to the district court to determine proper compensatory and punitive damages. Moreover, the district court's conclusions that Wade's assault and subsequent denial of medical attention did not violate Ogletree's constitutional rights are incorrect. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment for defendants on these latter claims and remand for a determination of damages.

I. BACKGROUND

The majority of youths confined at the Volusia Center await trial on delinquency charges. The Center also houses children who have been adjudicated delinquent but either have not had disposition hearings or are awaiting placement in a treatment facility.

The district court's findings and our review of the record reveal the following facts.

Ogletree, then sixteen years old, was confined to the Center from April 14, 1979 through May 10, 1979, and again from July 24, 1979 through September 10, 1979, pending trial on delinquency charges. Throughout Ogletree's incarceration, defendant-appellee Richard Wade, was the superintendent of the Center. ¹ On April 25, 1979, Ogletree laughed when another detainee attempted to flush a pair of undershorts down a toilet. Wade arrived on the scene after the first detainee had been removed and taken to isolation. Ogletree continued laughing and protesting the imposition of isolation on the first detainee. Ogletree testified that Wade then slammed him against a wall and informed him that he too would be placed in isolation. Wade and three staff members then took him to isolation. Ogletree testified that, once inside the cell, his shoulder was injured when Wade shoved him against the wall and a metal cot in the cell. Ogletree remained isolated for seven consecutive days as a result of this incident. ² He was not provided written notice of the charges against him nor given an opportunity to defend himself before an impartial person or to call witnesses in his behalf. Ogletree testified at trial that he never knew how long his isolation would last; his affidavit indicates that he was merely told that he would remain in isolation until Wade decided to release him. His demands for medical attention for his injured shoulder were ignored until the third day of isolation when he was transported to the emergency room of a local hospital. There, his wound was cleaned and he was injected with a muscle relaxant for pain. No further medical treatment was needed and Ogletree did not suffer permanent physical scarring.

Ogletree's seven day isolation took place in a small concrete cell with a solid door. The room had no furnishings except a metal bunk and toilet. Ogletree was stripped to his underwear and was not allowed visitors. He took his meals in the cell, but was released to shower at about 10 p.m. every other evening. He was not permitted any reading or writing materials or any other means to occupy himself, nor was he permitted outdoor exercise. He could not flush his own toilet because the controls were outside the cell. He had to bang on the door of his cell to capture the attention of workers who might not flush his toilet until several hours later.

Once when Ogletree banged on the cell door, the staff informed him that they were tired of his banging. Four staff members entered his cell and shackled his legs with metal cuffs to one end of his bunk. His wrists were handcuffed over his head to the other end of the bunk. ³ Ogletree testified that he remained restrained in this fashion for "several hours" and was not told when he would be unshackled. He also testified as to the mental anguish caused by both the isolation and the shackling.

Defendants did not controvert Ogletree's testimony. Wade testified that spring, 1979, was a very tense time due to crowded conditions and difficult youths at the Center. Wade claimed that Ogletree had a reputation for being an unmanageable troublemaker who regularly engaged in altercations with others. Wade further testified that Ogletree was isolated for more than six hours ⁴ because of an emergency situation prompted by a rumor that a gun had been secreted in the Center and by an incident in which a detainee had obtained the Center's master keys. On cross-examination it became apparent that Ogletree was isolated the day before the gun rumor circulated and several days after the keys incident with which Ogletree was not involved.

Ogletree introduced into evidence five incident reports which were the sum total of reports concerning him. There was no indication from these reports that Ogletree ever harmed or threatened to harm another detainee or Center employee or that he ever damaged property. One report reveals an instance of the use of profanity; another relates that Ogletree once was caught sneaking books into his cell because, according to the report's author, he was bored. A detention evaluation reflects that Ogletree generally participated in activities and followed rules and notes that Ogletree's biggest problem was his habit of "mouthing off."

II. OGLETREE'S CLAIMS ON APPEAL

Ogletree appeals the district court's determination that Wade's battery and subsequent denial of medical attention were not constitutional violations. The district court also concluded, however, that the denial of notice and hearing regarding the imposition of isolation as well as the length and conditions of the solitary confinement violated Ogletree's due process rights. Naturally, Ogletree does not appeal these latter conclusions; he merely contends that the court erred in awarding only nominal damages on these claims. We address this latter contention in part III, infra.

A. The Battery

The district court, relying on Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977), found that Wade's shoving of Ogletree did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. We disagree. In Ingraham, the Court concluded that the fourteenth amendment, rather than the eighth amendment, provided the appropriate framework for assessing the constitutional ramifications of corporal punishment administered by public school teachers. 430 U.S. at 670-71, 97 S.Ct. at 1412. The Ingraham Court held that "corporal punishment in public schools implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest, but ... traditional common-law remedies are fully adequate to afford due process." Id. at 672, 97 S.Ct. at 1413. Essential to the Ingraham analysis is that reasonable corporal punishment inflicted by teachers is lawful but excessive punishment is actionable. The Ingraham majority concluded that the procedural safeguards of notice and hearing were not required before teachers imposed corporal punishment because this punishment was "authorized and limited by the common law." 430 U.S. at 682, 97 S.Ct. at 1418.

The situation here is different. Initially we must decide whether the Volusia Center is closer to a public school (controlled by Ingraham ) or a prison (controlled by constitutional standards pertinent to detainees and convicts). The question is not difficult; the Center is for juveniles who have run afoul of the law. Regardless of one's view of corporal punishment in the schoolhouse, it is routinely permitted in numerous states. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 662-63 & nn. 23 & 28, 97 S.Ct. at 1407-08 & nn. 23 & 28. Indeed, as of 1977 only two states flatly prohibited this practice, id. at 663 & n. 27, 97 S.Ct. at 1408 & n. 27. Routine corporal punishment in schools was so thoroughly regulated by the common law and state statutes, that the Court declined to consider what instances of scholastic corporal punishment would give rise to a substantive due process violation. Id. at 659, 679 nn. 12 & 47, 97 S.Ct. at 1406, 1416 nn....