Williams v. Atkins, 85-1522

• Decision Date: 21 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1522,85-1522
• Citation: 786 F.2d 457
• Parties: Dora Mae WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Charles M. ATKINS, Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare, Defendant, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 457

786 F.2d 457

Dora Mae WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Charles M. ATKINS, Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare, Defendant, Appellant.

No. 85-1522.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Argued Dec. 3, 1985.

Decided March 21, 1986.

Kim E. Murdock, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom Francis X. Bellotti, Atty. Gen., and Carl Valvo, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boston, Mass., were on brief, for defendant, appellant.

Steven Savner, Mass. Law Reform Institute, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for plaintiffs, appellees.

Before COFFIN, BREYER, and TORRUELLA, Circuit Judges.

COFFIN, Circuit Judge.

In 1976, a class action suit was filed in the federal district court of Massachusetts on behalf of food stamp applicants and recipients, alleging violations of the Food Stamp Act of 1964. The plaintiff class alleged that the defendant, Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare, failed to issue immediately food stamp authorization-to-purchase cards to households eligible for food stamps and in immediate need of assistance. A consent decree was entered into and filed in November, 1976. The decree established procedures whereby food stamp recipients in dire need of assistance would receive authorization-to-purchase cards "over the counter", that is, upon request at their local welfare offices.

In 1982, Congress amended the Food Stamp Act, so that it conflicted in part with the terms of the consent decree. The Commissioner, bound by inconsistent legal requirements, sought to vacate the consent decree. The district court denied the Commissioner's motion for relief from judgment, and the Commissioner appealed. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and vacate the consent decree.

I.

The Food Stamp Act was passed in 1964 and was designed to enable needy households to receive public assistance in the purchase of food. 7 U.S.C. Secs. 2011-2025 (1970). At the national level, the program is administered by the Food and Nutrition Service ^S of the Department of Agriculture. The FNS is charged with overseeing the operation of the food stamp programs in the various states and with establishing national eligibility standards. States have a choice as to whether they will participate in the food stamp program, but once a state decides to participate, it is bound to follow the federal requirements. ¹ Massachusetts elected to participate in the food stamp program and thus subjected itself to the requirements of the federal statute and regulations in operating its program.

In many states, including Massachusetts, the participating households were not issued food stamps directly by the issuing agency (in Massachusetts, the Department of Public Welfare). Instead, they were given an Authorization to Purchase (ATP) card, ² which stated on its face the amount that the household was entitled to purchase and the purchase requirement. ³ The participating household took the ATP card to a food stamp issuing center, paid the purchase price, and surrendered the card.

Plaintiffs filed their class action suit in July, 1976, on behalf of all food stamp applicants and recipients, against the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare. Plaintiffs alleged that by "failing to provide immediate issuance of food stamp authorization to all households eligible for food stamps who stand in immediate need of food assistance", the Commissioner was violating the Food Stamp Act of 1964, and the regulations promulgated thereunder by the FNS. Specifically, plaintiffs challenged the Commissioner's failure to provide a system whereby initial and replacement ATP cards could be provided over-the-counter at local welfare offices to eligible recipients in immediate need of assistance.

The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order, requiring the Commissioner to "deliver forthwith to the named plaintiff [sic] their ATP cards" and "to implement 'over-the-counter' delivery of ATP cards to eligible food stamp households in immediate need of assistance." The parties began settlement negotiations and, in November, 1976, the consent decree agreed upon by the parties was entered as an order by the district court. The consent decree provided for over-the-counter issuance of ATP cards to the four groups that formed the plaintiff class. ⁴

Federal food stamp law and accompanying regulations were amended several times after entry of the consent decree. Most significant is the 1982 amendment to the Act, which restricts the state's ability to provide expedited service to food stamp households. 7 U.S.C. Secs. 2011-2029 (Supp.1985). In November, 1984, the Commissioner filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) and (6), ⁵ seeking to vacate the consent decree on the ground that over-the-counter issuance of ATP cards to the plaintiff class as required by the decree now violated federal law. The motion was supported by an affidavit stating that the FNS had formally notified the Commissioner that it intended to suspend or disallow federal funds unless the state discontinued the practice of same-day issuance of ATP cards to the plaintiff class.

The plaintiffs opposed the Commissioner's motion to vacate the decree, arguing that the decree should be modified to provide the plaintiff class with expedited delivery in a manner not in conflict with federal law. A hearing was held before the district court, and, after being informed of the parties' inability to negotiate a modified decree, the district court denied the Commissioner's motion, without prejudice to future motions to modify the decree. The Commissioner appeals from that decision.

II.

It is uncontested that the district court had the power to modify or vacate the consent decree in this case. As early as 1932, in United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106, Justice Cardozo stated:

"We are not doubtful of the power of a court of equity to modify an injunction in adaptation to changed conditions though it was entered by consent.... A continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need." 286 U.S. at 114.

The court's power to alter or vacate a decree derives from the fact that a federal statutory or constitutional claim, enabled the court to enter the decree initially. System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651, 81 S.Ct. 368, 373, 5 L.Ed.2d 349 (1961). It is the statute or the constitutional provisions that the decree intended to enforce, "and only incidentally the parties", that the court serves in entering a decree. Id.

Necessarily, federal courts have the power "to continue to further the objectives of that Act when its provisions are amended." Id. And litigants cannot agree to be bound by a decree regardless of future changes in federal law. "The parties could not become the conscience of the equity court and decide for it once and for all what was equitable and what was not, because the court was not acting to enforce a promise but to enforce a statute." Id. at 652-53, 81 S.Ct. at 374.

Two opinions of this court provide guidance in determining whether a decree need be modified or vacated in light of changed circumstances. In Theriault v. Smith, 523 F.2d 601 (1st Cir.1975), a consent decree had been entered in 1974 granting AFDC benefits to the plaintiffs. The legal basis for the decree had been our interpretation of a federal statute. When the Supreme Court rejected our view of the statute, the defendant moved to vacate the decree, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5). In affirming the district court's decision to vacate the consent decree, we observed that a subsequent Supreme Court opinion had represented a fundamental change in the legal predicates of the consent decree. We stated: "[i]t may well be unreasonable to require defendant, for the indefinite future, to abide by a consent decree based upon an interpretation of law that has been rendered incorrect by a subsequent Supreme court decision." Id. at 602.

In Coalition of Black Leadership v. Cianci, 570 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.1978), we reviewed a consent decree that had been entered as a result of a class action suit filed on behalf of black residents of Providence, alleging various civil rights violations by police officers and public officials. The 1973 decree established a procedure whereby residents' complaints against police officers could be filed, investigated, and resolved. In 1976, a state law was enacted (the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights) that required certain procedures to be followed in the processing of civilian complaints against police officers. The district court denied the officers' motion to vacate the decree based on the recently enacted state law.

We affirmed. We found that the consent decree had been designed to protect the rights of citizens "to be free from 'racially discriminatory police conduct' ". Id. at 13. Thus, the legal foundation for the plaintiffs' claim had not in any way been affected by the enactment of the state law whose purpose was to protect police officers from an impairment of their rights when their conduct was questioned. We stated that despite the "obvious subject matter overlap between the decree and the legislation, it is also obvious that neither was developed to meet these dual and partially inconsistent purposes." Id. at 14. We rejected the officers' contention that the procedures required by the decree but not by the legislation were "so onerous that they amount to unfair hardships inflicted on police officers and yet are so marginal that they provide no additional protection to civilian complainants." Id. at 14.

These cases reflect competing considerations: on the one hand, the court cannot disregard substantial changes in law or fact that undermine the basis for the consent decree. On the other hand, the plaintiffs are entitled to continuing injunctive relief despite the occurrence of related, but not...