Matusiak v. Kelly, 597
| Citation | 786 F.2d 536 |
| Decision Date | 20 March 1986 |
| Docket Number | D,No. 597,597 |
| Parties | Chester MATUSIAK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Walter KELLY, Superintendent of Attica Correctional Facility, Elizabeth Holtzman, District Attorney Kings County, and Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New York, Respondents- Appellees. ocket 85-2233. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit) |
Phylis Skloot Bamberger, Federal Defender Services Unit, The Legal Aid Soc., New York City, for petitioner-appellant.
Darrell Fields, Asst. Dist. Atty., Kings County, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Elizabeth Holtzman, Dist. Atty., Kings County, Barbara D. Underwood, Asst. Dist. Atty., Kings County, Brooklyn, N.Y., on brief), for respondents-appellees.
Before OAKES, KEARSE and PIERCE, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Chester Matusiak, a New York State prisoner who pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, in violation of N.Y.Penal Law Sec. 125.25(1) (McKinney 1975), appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Charles P. Sifton, Judge, denying his petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 (1982), for a writ of habeas corpus. Matusiak contends that the district court erred in rejecting his claim that his plea of guilty should be set aside on due process grounds because the state court (a) erroneously found him competent to stand trial and (b) accepted his plea of guilty although he was not capable of knowingly and voluntarily entering such a plea. Respondents (the "State") contend that dismissal of the petition is required because Matusiak has not exhausted his state court remedies with respect to the latter claim and that, in any event, the petition lacks merit. Finding that all of Matusiak's present claims were adequately presented to the state courts, and finding merit in the claim that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for entry of an order conditionally granting the writ.
In June 1979, Matusiak, then 20 years old, was arrested and charged with having acted in concert with Richard Dyser to cause the death of Edward Mascia. Shortly after his arrest, Matusiak, who had been institutionalized in at least five different psychiatric hospitals since the age of 11, was placed on a suicide watch. Upon his initial arraignment in Criminal Court, the court ordered a psychiatric examination pursuant to N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law art. 730 to determine whether he was fit to proceed to trial. A qualified psychiatrist and a certified psychologist examined Matusiak, and both found him fit to proceed. In the meantime, Matusiak was indicted on three counts of second-degree murder, one count of first-degree robbery, and one count of first-degree burglary. On July 13, 1979, upon his postindictment arraignment in New York Supreme Court, Matusiak entered a plea of not guilty to all of the offenses charged.
In late October 1979, because of his delusional and other aberrant behavior, Matusiak was transferred from the prison where he was being detained to the Kings County Hospital Center ("Hospital Center") in Brooklyn. On November 1, 1979, at Matusiak's request, Supreme Court Justice John R. Starkey, ordered another psychiatric examination pursuant to art. 730. Two Hospital Center psychiatrists, including one of the examiners who had found him fit to proceed in July 1979, examined Matusiak and found him not fit to proceed. Another psychiatrist examined him and found him fit to proceed.
On November 21, 1979, a competency hearing was conducted before Justice Philip E. Lagana at the Hospital Center. At the hearing, Matusiak's attorney and both of the psychiatrists who had found Matusiak
unfit to proceed testified to his incompetence to stand trial. The record included the reports of these two psychiatrists and the report of the psychiatrist who had found Matusiak fit to proceed in early November. Matusiak himself also testified. The court concluded that Matusiak was fit to proceed.
On October 6, 1980, nearly one year after Matusiak had last been adjudged competent to proceed to trial, he pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree murder, in a proceeding before Justice William C. Thompson. In the course of the plea hearing, the court advised Matusiak that he had an absolute constitutional right to a jury trial and that he could bring in witnesses, including doctors, and could cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses. When asked if he understood that by pleading guilty he would give up his constitutional right to have a trial by jury, Matusiak responded, "Yes." Nonetheless, the colloquy that surrounded this response and led to the acceptance of the plea of guilty was tortuous.
Matusiak's attorney advised the court that Matusiak wished to withdraw his prior plea of not guilty and to enter a plea of guilty to second-degree murder notwithstanding the availability of a defense of insanity. Counsel stated that he had intended to present this defense through Matusiak's psychiatric record and the opinion of a court-appointed psychiatrist who had examined Matusiak and concluded that Matusiak had not known the nature and consequence of what he was doing or that what he was doing was wrong. When asked by the court if he wanted to plead guilty, Matusiak stated that he did but that 15 years was a long time. The court told Matusiak that he could go to trial and added that the court would do whatever he wanted. Matusiak replied that he was "positive" that he wanted to plead guilty. Immediately thereafter, however, when the court sought to be sure that Matusiak genuinely wished to waive his defense of insanity, Matusiak responded that he wanted to go to trial:
(Transcript of hearing held October 6, 1980 ("Tr."), at 6.) But when the court then stated that Matusiak could have a trial, he promptly changed his mind again:
THE COURT: Okay. You'll go to trial, no problem. That's no problem.
(Whereupon, the defendant conferred with counsel.)
(Tr. 6-7).
When the court then sought to elicit from Matusiak a description of the events THE COURT: Now, Mr. Matusiak, what you're pleading guilty to is that on or about--between June 12 and June 13, you and Mr. Dyser killed somebody by the name of Edward Mascia. Is that true? Is that true?
leading to the murder charge, the following colloquy ensued:
(Whereupon, the defendant conferred with counsel.)
(Whereupon, the defendant conferred with counsel.)
(Whereupon, the defendant conferred with defendant [sic ].)
(Whereupon, the defendant conferred with counsel.)
(Whereupon, defendant conferred with counsel.)
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