Spong v. Fid. Nat. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.

Citation787 F.3d 296
Decision Date22 May 2015
Docket NumberNo. 13–41317.,13–41317.
PartiesRobert SPONG ; Kerry Spong, Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. FIDELITY NATIONAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY; Fidelity National Insurance Services, L.L.C., Defendants–Appellants.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

787 F.3d 296

Robert SPONG ; Kerry Spong, Plaintiffs–Appellees
v.
FIDELITY NATIONAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY; Fidelity National Insurance Services, L.L.C., Defendants–Appellants.

No. 13–41317.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 22, 2015.


787 F.3d 298

Jeffrey Lynn Doggett (argued), Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs–Appellees.

Gerald Joseph Nielsen, Esq. (argued), Trial Attorney, Kim Tran Britt, Esq., John Dennis Carter, Esq., Nielsen, Carter & Treas, L.L.C., Metairie, LA, for Defendants–Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and BENAVIDES and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

PRISCILLA R. OWEN, Circuit Judge:

This interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) arises from the issuance and subsequent renewals of a flood insurance policy under the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) covering property owned by Robert and Kerry Spong. Hurricane Ike swept away all improvements on the Spongs' property and all personal belongings. The insurer, Fidelity National Property and Casualty Insurance Company, subsequently advised the Spongs that the policy was void from its inception because the property was ineligible for flood insurance under the NFIP. The Spongs sued Fidelity National Property and Casualty Insurance Co., its affiliate Fidelity National Insurance Services, L.L.C., and the United States, asserting a number of federal and state-law claims. The Fidelity entities (collectively “Fidelity” for purposes of this opinion) sought summary judgment, asserting, among other grounds, that the Spongs' claims were preempted by federal law. Fidelity seeks

787 F.3d 299

review of the denial of that motion. Based on precedent that binds this panel, we conclude that the Spongs' state-law causes of action are not preempted by federal law to the extent that they are insurance procurement claims, but claims that pertain to or arise out of “claims handling” after the policy issued are preempted. Additionally, even though not preempted, certain claims cannot succeed as a matter of law. We remand for further proceedings.

I

Fidelity National Property and Casualty Insurance Co. is a “Write–Your–Own” (WYO) Program insurance carrier that participates in the issuance of flood insurance under the National Flood Insurance Act (NFIA). Fidelity National Insurance Services, L.L.C. is a third-party vendor that services the federal flood insurance policies issued by Fidelity National Property and Casualty Insurance Co. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers the federal flood insurance program.

In at least two prior decisions, our court has explained the NIFP's workings in more detail,1 and we will not repeat those details today, other than to note that the exact terms and conditions of NFIP policies and eligibility for federal flood insurance are dictated by federal law. It is now beyond debate that the property at issue in the present case is and has been ineligible for federal flood insurance even before the Spongs purchased it. But two federal agencies, FEMA and the Fish and Wildlife Service, had erroneously concluded otherwise at the time the Spongs obtained a policy from Fidelity.

In recounting the pertinent facts, we consider the record in the light most favorable to the Spongs who were not the movants for summary judgment.2 The Spongs contracted to purchase an elevated home in the Caplen Shores subdivision located on the Bolivar Peninsula in Galveston County, Texas. The Spongs knew that this property was located within a flood zone and that to secure a mortgage loan, they were required to obtain flood insurance. Under federal law, however, if property is located in the John H. Chafee Coastal Barrier Resources System (CBRS), the NFIP is prohibited from issuing a flood insurance policy.3 The CBRS, created by Congress in the Coastal Barrier Resources Act,4 was designated to “minimize the loss of human life, wasteful expenditure of Federal revenues, and the damage to fish, wildlife, and other natural resources.”5 It was not determined with finality that the Spongs' property was within the CBRS until three years after they had purchased their property and after Hurricane Ike had destroyed all improvements on it. Because government entities vacillated over a period of years as to the property's eligibility for flood insurance,

787 F.3d 300

we recount the evidence in this regard in some detail.

The Spongs purchased the property from the Hogans. The Hogans owned two adjacent lots, 549 Caplen Shores Circle and 553 Caplen Shores Circle. The Spongs purchased the 553 Caplen Shores property. It was not until several years afterwards that Fidelity ascertained that many of the documents that relate to the present dispute, including the application for insurance and the flood insurance policy itself, referred to 549 Caplen Shores, rather than 553 Caplen Shores. However, none of the parties contends that this error or the resulting confusion is material to the issues presently before this court, and we will not differentiate between the two addresses in our references to “the property” unless otherwise indicated.

FEMA requires applicants for federal flood insurance to obtain elevation certificates, which provide a risk profile of the property to be insured, to assist in the administration of the NFIP. Eight years before the Spongs purchased their property, the Hogans had obtained an elevation certificate, dated October 22, 1998, from a private company, and that certificate said that 549 Caplen Shores was “within the Coastal Barriers Act.”

The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, however, subsequently concluded otherwise. The Fish and Wildlife Service is the agency tasked with overseeing NFIP and CBRS mapping. In 2004, two years before the Spongs purchased the property, the Fish and Wildlife Service wrote a letter, dated April 15, 2004, to the NFIP that said the “property located at 549 Caplen Shores ... is not located within the Coastal Barrier Resources System nor an Otherwise Protected Area.” The Spongs' predecessors, the Hogans, were accordingly issued a SFIP flood insurance policy on October 5, 2005, from Fidelity covering 549 Caplen Shores Circle, four months before the Spongs agreed to buy the adjoining property, in February 2006.

As part of the Spongs' purchase process, another private entity was engaged to prepare a Standard Flood Hazard Determination. That form, dated February 22, 2006, reflected that the home on the property “is in a Coastal Barrier Resources Area (CBRA) or Otherwise Protected Area (OPA)” and stated “[f]ederal flood insurance may not be available.” It also stated “CBRA/OPA designation date: 10/1/1983.” However, that same form contained a box entitled “Compliance Quick Check” and “YES” was typed onto a line next to the question, “Is NFIP Insurance Available?” The form further stated: “This determination is based on examining the NFIP map, any Federal Emergency Management Agency revisions to it, and any other information needed to locate the building/mobile home on the NFIP map.” This certificate was prepared for Fidelity's use in the flood insurance application process, but it is not clear whether the Spongs saw or were provided this form prior to closing.

However, a realtor involved in the Spongs' purchase transaction provided to Kerry Spong a copy of the 1998 elevation certificate, which stated that the 549 Caplen Shores Circle property was “within the Coastal Barriers Act.” The Spongs had sought the services of an insurance agency, Crystal Beach Insurance, in obtaining coverage for the property they were purchasing from the Hogans, and Kerry Spong sent the 1998 certificate in PDF format to Crystal Beach Insurance. That agency submitted an application for a federal Standard Flood Insurance Policy (SFIP) on 549 Caplen Shores Circle to Fidelity on March 15, 2006, which included the April 15, 2004, letter from the Fish and Wildlife Service stating that the property was not in the CBRA. Fidelity subsequently issued

787 F.3d 301

a SFIP, effective March 15, 2006, covering 549 Caplen Shores Circle. The following day, March 16, 2006, the Spongs consummated the purchase of 553 Caplen Shores Circle.

About five months after the Spongs closed the purchase of the property, FEMA sent a “critical error” notice to Fidelity, dated August 8, 2006, stating that as of June 30, 2006, the flood insurance policy was invalid because the property was located in the CBRA. The notice further stated the Spongs' policy “ha[s] no tolerance and must be cancelled[,] corrected[,] or appealed.” Within the next few weeks (on August 17 and August 23, 2006), Fidelity appealed this notice and, based on the April 15, 2004, Fish and Wildlife Service letter, twice requested FEMA to remove the invalid policy code on the Spongs' policy. A month after these requests, in a letter dated September 13, 2006, the Fish and Wildlife Service once again advised the NFIP that 549 Caplen Shores Circle “is not located within the Coastal Barrier Resources System nor an Otherwise Protected Area.” Based on this Fish and Wildlife...

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