New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC
Decision Date | 22 May 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 14–4624.,14–4624. |
Parties | People of the State of NEW YORK, by and through Eric T. SCHNEIDERMAN, Attorney General of the State of New York, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. ACTAVIS PLC, Forest Laboratories, LLC, Defendants–Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Lisa S. Blatt, Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, D.C. (Sarah M. Harris, Robert A. DeRise, Arnold & Porter, LLP, Washington, D.C.; George T. Conway III, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York, N.Y.; J. Mark Gidley, Peter J. Carney, Claire A. DeLelle, White & Case LLP, Washington, D.C.; Jack E. Pace III, Martin M. Toto, White & Case LLP, New York, N.Y., on the brief), for Defendants–Appellants.
Anisha S. Dasgupta, (Barbara D. Underwood, Andrew Kent, Eric J. Stock, Elinor R. Hoffmann, on the brief), for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, N.Y., for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Before: WALKER, RAGGI, and DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
The State of New York brought this antitrust action against Defendant–Appellant Actavis PLC and its wholly-owned subsidiary Forest Laboratories, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”). New York alleges that as Namenda
IR, Defendants' twice-daily drug designed to treat moderate-to-severe Alzheimer's disease, neared the end of its patent exclusivity period in July 2015, Defendants introduced a new once-daily version called Namenda XR. The patents on XR ensure exclusivity, and thus prohibit generic versions of XR from entering the market, until 2029. Faced with the prospect of competition from generic IR, Defendants decided to withdraw virtually all Namenda IR from the market in order to force Alzheimer's patients who depend on Namenda IR to switch to XR before generic IR becomes available. Because generic competition depends heavily on state drug substitution laws that allow pharmacists to substitute generic IR for Namenda
IR—but not for XR, New York alleges that Defendants' forced-switch scheme would likely impede generic competition for IR. Moreover, the substantial transaction costs of switching from once-daily XR back to twice-daily IR therapy would likely further ensure that Defendants would maintain their effective monopoly in the relevant drug market beyond the time granted by their IR patents.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Robert W. Sweet, Judge ) issued a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from restricting access to Namenda IR prior to generic IR entry. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting New York's motion for a preliminary injunction because New York has demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its claim under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, and has made a strong showing of irreparable harm to competition and consumers in the absence of a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order issuing a preliminary injunction.
This case raises a novel question of antitrust law: under what circumstances does conduct by a monopolist to perpetuate patent exclusivity through successive products, commonly known as “product hopping,”2 violate the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2. This question is an issue of first impression in the circuit courts. Determining whether Defendants' actions are unlawfully anticompetitive requires some understanding of the idiosyncratic market characteristics of the complex and highly-regulated pharmaceutical industry, as well as some peculiar characteristics of treatment for Alzheimer's disease
. We begin by describing several key features of the pharmaceutical industry.
In compliance with the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 –399f, when a pharmaceutical manufacturer seeks to bring a new drug to market, it must submit a New Drug Application (“NDA”) for approval by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). 21 U.S.C. § 355. An NDA must contain scientific evidence that demonstrates the drug is safe and effective, which inevitably requires “a long, comprehensive, and costly testing process.” F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2223, 2228, 186 L.Ed.2d 343 (2013). NDA-approved drugs are generally referred to as brand-name or brand drugs. An approved brand drug enjoys a period of patent exclusivity in the market at the end of which one or more generic drugs,3 exhibiting the same characteristics as the brand drug, may enter the market at a lower price to compete with the brand drug.
Hatch–Waxman also promotes competition from generic substitute drugs. It permits a manufacturer that seeks to market a generic version of an NDA-approved drug to file what is known as an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”). See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) ; see also In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litig., 754 F.3d 128, 130 (2d Cir.2014). An ANDA allows a generic manufacturer to rely on the studies submitted in connection with the already-approved brand drug's NDA to show that the generic is safe and effective, provided that the ANDA certifies that the generic drug has the same active ingredients as and is “biologically equivalent” or “bioequivalent” to the already-approved drug.4 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) ; see also Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1670, 1676, 182 L.Ed.2d 678 (2012) (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv) ).
A generic drug is bioequivalent to a brand drug if “the rate and extent of absorption” of the active ingredient is the same as that of the brand drug. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B)(i). In other words, two drugs are bioequivalent if they deliver the same amount of the same active ingredient content into a patient's blood stream over the same amount of time. By enabling generic manufacturers to “piggy-back” on a brand drug's scientific studies, Hatch–Waxman “speeds the introduction of low-cost generic drugs to market, thereby furthering drug competition.” Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2228 (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted); see also H.R. Rep. No. 98–857, pt. 2, at 9 (1984) ( ).
By the time Congress enacted the Hatch–Waxman Act, many states had enacted drug substitution laws to further encourage generic competition.5 Today, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have drug substitution laws.6 Although the specific terms of these laws vary by state, drug substitution laws either permit or require pharmacists to dispense a therapeutically equivalent, lower-cost generic drug in place of a brand drug absent express direction from the prescribing physician that the prescription must be dispensed as written.7 For example, New York's drug substitution law requires a pharmacist to “substitute a less expensive drug product containing the same active ingredients, dosage form and strength as the drug product prescribed” provided certain conditions are met. N.Y. Educ. Law § 6816–a(1).
All state drug substitution laws prohibit pharmacists from substituting generic drugs that are not therapeutically equivalent to the brand drug, but state laws do not all define therapeutic equivalence in the same way.8 Thirty states, including New York and the District of Columbia, adopt the FDA's definition of therapeutically equivalent and only allow generic substitution if the FDA designates the generic as “AB-rated” in a publication commonly referred to as the “Orange Book.”9 N.Y. Education Law § 6816–a(1) ; N.Y. Public Health Law § 206(1)(o ). To receive an AB-rating, a generic must not only be bioequivalent but pharmaceutically equivalent to the brand drug, meaning it has the same active ingredient, dosage form, strength, and route of administration as the brand drug. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., FDA, Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations vii–x (35th ed.2015), available at http://1.usa.gov/1PzbMxF (the “Orange Book”). The AB-rating requirement is designed to provide guidance regarding which drugs are therapeutically equivalent, but, as has been observed, it also provides an opportunity for brand manufacturers to “game” the system.10 S.A. 28.
Hatch–Waxman and state substitution laws were enacted, in part, because the pharmaceutical market is not a well-functioning market. In a well-functioning market, a consumer selects and pays for a product after evaluating the price and quality of the product. In the prescription drug market, however, the party who selects the drug (the doctor) does not fully bear its costs, which creates a price disconnect. Moreover, a patient can only obtain a prescription drug if the doctor writes a prescription for that particular drug. The doctor selects the drug, but the patient, or in most cases a third-party payor such as a public or private...
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