U.S. v. Shegog, 85-1930

• Citation: 787 F.2d 420
• Decision Date: 27 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1930,85-1930
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gregory SHEGOG, Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 420

787 F.2d 420

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gregory SHEGOG, Appellant.

No. 85-1930.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted March 14, 1986.

Decided March 27, 1986.

Walter L. Brady, Jr., St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.

J. Bennett Clark, Asst. U.S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.

Before McMILLIAN and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges, and HANSON, ^* Senior District Judge.

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Gregory Shegog appeals from a final judgment entered in the District Court ¹ for the Eastern District of Missouri upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of possession with intent to distribute phencyclidine (PCP) in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1) (count I) and unlawful possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. app. Sec. 1202(a)(1) (count II). The district court sentenced appellant to a term of twenty years imprisonment and a special parole term of six-years for count I and to a term of thirty years imprisonment for count II, to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed for count I. For reversal appellant argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress physical evidence because there was unreasonable delay in the execution of the search warrant. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

During the week of February 24, 1985, local police detectives received information from a reliable confidential informant that appellant, whom the informant identified by name and physical description, and another man, identified by his age, race and first name only, were selling large quantities of PCP from a particular house. Police surveillance of the house on several occasions during the weeks of February 24, 1985, and March 3, 1985, corroborated the informant's tip about a man matching the description given by the informant engaged in apparent illegal drug activity. The informant also told the detectives that he or she had been inside the house in question within the last twenty hours and had seen a large quantity of what the informant believed to be PCP. On the basis of this information, the detectives applied for and obtained a state search warrant on March 4, 1985. However, later that day, after the search warrant had been issued, the same informant advised the detectives that appellant was out of PCP but was expecting more to come in. The informant stated that he or she would contact the detectives when the PCP arrived. On the basis of this new information, the detectives decided not to execute the search warrant immediately but to wait until the PCP had been delivered. During the morning of March 12, 1985, eight days after the search warrant had been issued, the informant told the detectives there was PCP at appellant's house. The detectives immediately executed the search warrant and seized a large quantity of PCP, packaging materials and two firearms from appellant's room. At the time of the search the detectives knew that appellant had prior felony convictions.

Appellant argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Appellant argues that the eight-day delay between the issuance and execution of the search warrant was unreasonable and invalidated the search and that the detectives could not have objectively believed in good faith that the delay in execution was reasonable. The government argues that the search warrant was supported by probable cause and the delay in execution was not unreasonable under the circumstances. The government further argues that the search warrant was executed and the return filed within ten days of issuance as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(c)(1) and state law. Alternatively, the government argues that if the delay in execution was unreasonable and as a result the search was invalid, the detectives executed the search warrant in good faith on the basis of a reasonable belief that it was still valid and therefore the evidence should not be suppressed.

The evidence was seized by state authorities pursuant to a state search warrant. However, the evidence seized was used in a federal prosecution and is admissible only if the search complied with the requirements of the fourth amendment. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960).

Search warrants are to be executed "promptly." "If the police were allowed to execute the warrant at leisure, the safeguard of judicial control over the search which the fourth amendment...