Broward County v. GBV Intern., Ltd.

• Decision Date: 07 June 2001
• Docket Number: No. SC93115.,SC93115.
• Citation: 787 So.2d 838
• Parties: BROWARD COUNTY, Petitioner, v. G.B.V. INTERNATIONAL, LTD., etc., et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

787 So.2d 838

BROWARD COUNTY, Petitioner, v. G.B.V. INTERNATIONAL, LTD., etc., et al., Respondents.

No. SC93115.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 7, 2001.

Edward A. Dion, County Attorney, Andrew J. Meyers, Chief Appellate Counsel, and Tamara M. Scrudders, Assistant County Attorney, Fort Lauderdale, FL, and Anthony C. Musto, former Chief Appellate Counsel, as to the briefs filed, Hallandale, FL, for Petitioner.

James C. Brady of Brady & Coker, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Respondent.

SHAW, J.

We have for review G.B.V. International, Ltd. v. Broward County, 709 So.2d 155 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), based on conflict with City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624 (Fla.1982), and numerous other decisions of this Court. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We approve in part and quash in part G.B.V. as explained below.

I. FACTS

G.B.V. International ("G.B.V.") owns thirty acres of undeveloped land in the City of Coconut Creek ("City") within Broward County ("County") on which it seeks to build 300 garden-style apartments in an area termed Sawgrass Exchange. G.B.V. sought to amend the Broward County Land Use Plan ("BCLUP") to change the designation of this parcel from "Industrial" to "Residential," and to allow a density of ten dwelling units per acre. The Broward County Planning Council ("Planning Council") reviewed the proposed amendment and recommended approval of the change in designation but at a density of only five units per acre. The Broward County Commission ("Commission") at a meeting on December 12, 1995, voted to tentatively transmit the amendment as proposed, i.e., at ten units per acre, to the Florida Department of Community Affairs ("Department") to see if the amendment would pass state muster. After the Department indicated that the amendment would pass, the Planning Council reviewed the amendment anew and again recommended adoption at a density of five units per acre. The Commission at a meeting on May 1, 1996, discussed the matter at length with G.B.V. and ultimately adopted the amendment at a compromise density of six units per acre.

G.B.V. several months later sought approval of a perimeter plat for the Sawgrass Exchange development at a density of ten units per acre. At the Commission meeting on November 12, 1996, G.B.V. explained that it recently had obtained approval from the City to use "flex" units to make up the additional four units per acre that it had been denied earlier.¹ G.B.V. pointed out that due to its use of City flex units the following now obtained: (1) Its plat comported with the BCLUP; (2) no further amendment to the BCLUP was required; (3) the plat met all the objective requirements for approval; and (4) the County staff had recommended approval. The Commission by oral vote following general discussion approved the plat application but at a density of six units per acre rather than the requested ten.

G.B.V. sought certiorari in the circuit court, arguing that the Commission should have approved the plat at ten units per acre. The court denied the petition, ruling inter alia that G.B.V. was estopped from bringing its claim because G.B.V. had misrepresented its position on flex in the proceedings before the Commission.² G.B.V. then sought certiorari in the district court. The court granted certiorari, quashed the circuit court order, addressed the underlying plat controversy, and remanded for entry of an order approving the plat at ten units per acre.³

We granted review based on conflict with numerous decisions of this Court holding that a district court's role on "second-tier" certiorari review is limited to the two-step assessment set forth in City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624 (Fla.1982). Broward County contends that the district court exceeded the scope of its authority on certiorari review. G.B.V. concedes that conflict exists but contends that the district court ruled properly.

II. THE APPLICABLE LAW

A decision granting or denying a site plan or plat application is governed by local regulations, which must be uniformly administered. The allocation of burdens expressed in Irvine v. Duval County Planning Commission, 495 So.2d 167 (Fla. 1986), is applicable to such proceedings:

[O]nce the petitioner met the initial burden of showing that his application met the statutory criteria for granting such [applications], "the burden was upon the Planning Commission to demonstrate, by competent substantial evidence presented at the hearing and made a part of the record, that the [application] requested by petitioner did not meet such standards and was, in fact, adverse to the public interest."

Irvine, 495 So.2d at 167. To deny a plat application, a local government agency must show by competent substantial evidence that the application does not meet the published criteria. Once the agency has denied the application, the developer may seek judicial review via the writ of certiorari, as explained below.⁴

The common law writ of certiorari is a special mechanism whereby an upper court can direct a lower tribunal to send up the record of a pending case so that the upper court can "be informed of" events below and evaluate the proceedings for regularity.⁵ The writ functions as a safety net and gives the upper court the prerogative to reach down and halt a miscarriage of justice where no other remedy exists.⁶ The writ is discretionary⁷ and was intended to fill the interstices between direct appeal and the other prerogative writs.⁸ The writ never was intended to redress mere legal error, for common law certiorari—above all—is an extraordinary remedy, not a second appeal.⁹ Florida courts have adapted the common law writ of certiorari for use in various scenarios, including the following: (1) to review actions of local government agencies; (2) to review decisions of circuit courts acting in their appellate capacity; and (3) to review nonfinal, nonappealable orders of lower tribunals, e.g., discovery orders.¹⁰ The first category of adjudicatory action, i.e., actions of local government agencies, is in issue in the present case. This category comprises local agency action that is not otherwise subject to review under the Administrative Procedure Act¹¹ and is further divided into two subgroups: quasi-judicial actions and legislative actions.¹² As a rule, only quasi-judicial actions are reviewable via certiorari.¹³

The Court in City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1982), delineated the standards of review for local agency action at both the circuit and district court levels. The inquiry at both levels is deliberately circumscribed out of deference to the agency's technical mastery of its field of expertise,¹⁴ and the inquiry narrows as a case proceeds up the judicial ladder.¹⁵ "First-tier" certiorari review is three-pronged, and "second-tier" certiorari review is two-pronged:

Where a party is entitled as a matter of right to seek review in the circuit court from administrative action, the circuit court must determine [1] whether procedural due process is accorded, [2] whether the essential requirements of the law have been observed, and [3] whether the administrative findings and judgment are supported by competent substantial evidence. The district court, upon review of the circuit court's judgment, then determines [1] whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and [2] applied the correct law.

Vaillant, 419 So.2d at 626.¹⁶ In brief, first-tier certiorari review is not discretionary but rather is a matter of right and is akin in many respects to a plenary appeal, whereas second-tier certiorari review is more restricted and is similar in scope to true common law certiorari.¹⁷

Consistent with the limited purpose of this writ, the Court long ago delineated the narrow range of options that are available to a reviewing court on certiorari review. The role of the reviewing court in such a proceeding is to halt the miscarriage of justice, nothing more:

On certiorari the appellate court only determines whether or not the tribunal or administrative authority whose order or judgment is to be reviewed has in the rendition of such order or judgment departed from the essential requirements of the law and upon that determination either to quash the writ of certiorari or to quash the order reviewed.

When the order is quashed, as it was in this case, it leaves the subject matter, that is, the controversy pending before the tribunal, commission, or administrative authority, as if no order or judgment had been entered and the parties stand upon the pleadings and proof as it existed when the order was made with the rights of all parties to proceed further as they may be advised to protect or obtain the enjoyment of their rights under the law in the same manner and to the same extent which they might have proceeded had the order reviewed not been entered.

The appellate court has no power in exercising its jurisdiction in certiorari to enter a judgment on the merits of the controversy under consideration nor to direct the respondent to enter any particular order or judgment.

Tamiami Trail Tours v. Railroad Commission, 128 Fla. 25, 174 So. 451, 454 (1937) (on rehearing). This limited range has been addressed by the district courts,¹⁸ and the modern trend in this Court's decisions has been to further restrict—not expand —the scope of this writ.¹⁹

III. THE PRESENT CASE

As noted above, although the County staff recommended approval of G.B.V.'s plat application at ten units per acre, the Commission approved the application at only six units per acre. The circuit court denied G.B.V.'s petition for certiorari, ruling that the Commission's decision was legislative in nature and that G.B.V. was estopped from raising its claim because G.B.V. had misrepresented its position on flex in its application before the Commission.²⁰ This ruling was improper. First, the Commission decision was a quasi-judicial, not legislative, function and was...