Hawkins v. N.H. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.

• Decision Date: 31 December 2001
• Docket Number: No. 2000–012.,2000–012.
• Citation: 147 N.H. 376,788 A.2d 255
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
• Parties: Cassandra HAWKINS, v. NEW HAMPSHIRE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES.

147 N.H. 376

788 A.2d 255

Cassandra HAWKINS,

v.NEW HAMPSHIRE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES.

No. 2000–012.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Dec. 31, 2001.

New Hampshire Legal Assistance, of Portsmouth and Manchester (Kay E. Drought and Kenneth J. Barnes on the brief, and Ms. Drought orally), for the plaintiff.

Philip T. McLaughlin, attorney general (Mary E. Schwarzer, assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the defendant.

Malloy & Sullivan, P.C., of Manchester (Gregory V. Sullivan on the brief), for Union Leader Corporation, as amicus curiae.

Orr & Reno, P.A., of Concord (James P. Bassett on the brief), for Keene Publishing Corporation, as amicus curiae.

BROCK, C.J.

The plaintiff, Cassandra Hawkins, appeals a Superior Court (Coffey , J.) order dismissing her petition for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Right–to–Know Law, RSA ch. 91–A (2001 & Supp.2001), seeking access to certain records kept by the defendant, New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). We vacate and remand.

In 1998, the plaintiff's counsel, on behalf of the plaintiff and other families, requested HHS to make available records of dental services provided to New Hampshire Medicaid recipients under the age of twenty-one and of Medicaid reimbursement payments made to their dental healthcare providers from 1993 to 1998. The plaintiff asserted that the purpose for obtaining this information was to evaluate HHS' compliance with federal Medicaid law regarding dental services for recipients under twenty-one. In response to the plaintiff's request, HHS provided "pre-formatted" tabular summary reports. The plaintiff claims these reports were unresponsive to her request because most of the data provided did not distinguish between recipients by age and the few records specific to individuals under twenty-one offered no information regarding the dental services provided to them.

In 1999, the plaintiff filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief requesting access to the aforementioned records pursuant to RSA chapter 91–A. In her petition, the plaintiff requested the court to find that under RSA chapter 91–A: (1) the data sought were public records subject to disclosure; (2) HHS could be required to copy onto tapes the requested computer data; and (3) the plaintiff was required to pay only for the actual cost of the tape itself. HHS argued that the information was stored in the Medicaid claims processing system as "input data," which are discrete bits of information, and therefore did not constitute existing documents subject to disclosure under RSA 91–A:4. HHS asserted before the trial court that none of its programs was capable of generating the information in the format requested. In addition, the agency contended that the plaintiff was required to pre-pay for the cost to create the documents.

The plaintiff moved to compel production of the data. HHS then moved to dismiss the plaintiff's petition. The superior court granted HHS' motion, concluding:

The plaintiff here does not simply seek a copy of a particular government document, but rather asks the Court to order the defendant to create a new document to meet her request. The cost of creating an entirely new data manipulation program, assembling the diverse pieces of data, and encrypting or removing any confidential information would exceed $10,000, by the defendant's estimate. As a matter of law, RSA Chapter 91–A does not intend such a result.

This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff argues the trial court erred in granting HHS' motion to dismiss because: (1) HHS admitted that it possessed the "input data" requested; (2) the data constituted public records under RSA 91–A:4 ; and (3) the court considered the alleged cost of compliance in determining whether the data constituted public records under RSA 91–A:4.

"[I]n ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the trial court must determine whether the allegations contained in the plaintiff's pleadings sufficiently establish a basis upon which relief may be granted." Provencher v. Buzzell-Plourde Assoc. , 142 N.H. 848, 852–53, 711 A.2d 251 (1998). In making this determination, the court should assume the truth of the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact and construe all reasonable inferences from them most favorably to the plaintiff. Hacking v. Town of Belmont , 143 N.H. 546, 549, 736 A.2d 1229 (1999).

The trial court's interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo . Fichtner v. Pittsley , 146 N.H. 512, ––––, 774 A.2d 1239, 1241 (2001). The starting point in any statutory interpretation case is the language of the statute itself. Kaplan v. Booth Creek Ski Group , 146 N.H. 202, ––––, 785 A.2d 412 (2001). Where the language of a particular statutory provision is at issue, "we will focus on the statute as a whole, not on isolated words or phrases." Snow v. American Morgan Horse Assoc., 141 N.H. 467, 471, 686 A.2d 1168 (1996).

The information the plaintiff is requesting is derived from Medicaid claims received by HHS, either in hard copy or electronic form. HHS argues that the information does not...