Walter v. Gunter, 41

Citation788 A.2d 609,367 Md. 386
Decision Date09 January 2002
Docket NumberNo. 41,41
PartiesNicholas Todd WALTER v. Michele GUNTER.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland

Julia Doyle Bernhardt, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Joseph B. Spillman, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of MD, on brief), Baltimore for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ.

BATTAGLIA, Judge.

The decisional issue in this case is whether the appellant, Nicholas Todd Walter, remains liable for child support arrearages when the paternity judgment, from which the child support order emanates, was vacated. We hold that the putative father cannot be legally obligated for child support arrearages that result from a now-vacated paternity judgment. The trial court is without discretion in this matter because, as a matter of law, the inherently dependent child support orders are invalid upon the vacatur of the paternity declaration.

I. Background

On August 13, 1993, the appellee, Michele Gunter, filed a Complaint to Establish Paternity in which she claimed that Nicholas Todd Walter was the father of her child. Walter consented to a judgment of paternity on September 30, 1993, based on Gunter's representations that she had not had sexual relations with any other man during the period of conception. Pursuant to the court's paternity judgment, Walter was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $43.00 per week.

During the following years, periodic civil contempt proceedings were brought against Walter to enforce the child support obligation. Walter's financial stresses stemmed, at least to some degree, from an injury sustained in a work related accident in 1996 that was exacerbated by a subsequent motor vehicle accident making him unable to work in his prior job.1 For these reasons, on March 30, 2000, Walter filed a petition to modify child support. Walter contemporaneously filed a motion for genetic testing. Walter asserted that Gunter's family members had told Walter repeatedly that he was not the child's father and that he wanted a paternity test to prove that the child was indeed his. The genetic testing, however, excluded Walter conclusively as the father of the child. As a result, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, on September 28, 2000, terminated Walter's prospective child support obligation, subject to further argument on retroactivity.

On October 19, 2000, a hearing before a Master was conducted to determine whether Walter would remain responsible for paying the arrearages and whether he could recoup the child support payments already made. The Master recommended that the circuit court set aside the paternity judgment, deny Walter's request for recoupment of child support previously paid, deny Walter's request that he not be responsible for arrearage, and order Walter accountable for the accrued arrearage as of March 30, 2000, the date on which he filed his motion for genetic testing.

Walter filed exceptions to the Master's recommendations based solely on the arrearage issue.2 A hearing on the exceptions was held on March 9, 2001 before the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, and the exceptions were overruled. The circuit court, accepting the Master's recommendations, set aside the paternity judgment and ordered that Walter was responsible for the arrearage in existence as of March 30, 2000, totaling $11,228 (of which $4,153.33 was owed to the State Department of Social Services).3

Mr. Walter appealed to the Court of Special Appeals and filed in this Court a petition for certiorari before judgment and a petition for expedited review. We granted certiorari to determine whether the appellant, Nicholas Todd Walter, remains liable for child support arrearages when the paternity judgment, from which the child support order emanates, was vacated, and whether, in the event that we hold Walter liable for the arrearages, he may be subject to contempt proceedings or imprisonment for failure to make payments on the arrearage. Walter v. Gunter, 364 Md. 534, 774 A.2d 408 (2001). Because we hold that Walter cannot be legally obligated for child support arrearages that result from a nowvacated paternity judgment, we do not reach the second issue.

II. Standard of Review

Review by this Court involves interpreting whether the circuit court's order was legally correct. While child support orders are generally within the sound discretion of the trial court, see Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 703, 655 A.2d 901, 908 (1995)

(discussing the circuit court's discretion in family matters, with specific reference to visitation orders); Giffin v. Crane, 351 Md. 133, 144, 716 A.2d 1029, 1035 (1998)(reviewing the lower court's determination of custody); Early v. Early, 338 Md. 639, 654, 659 A.2d 1334, 1341 (1995)(reviewing the circuit court's child support order), not to be disturbed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion, where the order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court must determine whether the lower court's conclusions are "legally correct" under a de novo standard of review. See In re Mark M., 362 Md. 623, ___, 766 A.2d 147, ___ (2001)(reviewing a trial court's visitation order de novo when the issue involved whether the order itself constituted an improper delegation of judicial authority).

III. Discussion

The issue we decide today—whether a child support order, terminated4 by the circuit court prospectively after the vacatur of the paternity declaration, may still oblige the father to satisfy arrearage is a novel question of law. As is often the case with novel legal questions, a comprehensive understanding of the issue necessitates consideration of several facets of the pertinent law. The matters we consider today are tailored by the arguments proffered by the parties and the law on which the Master and the circuit court relied in declaring Walter responsible for the arrearage. The parties argue that specific provisions of the Family Law Article, namely Section 12-1045 and Section 5-1038(b),6 either prohibit or require this Court to find in their favor. The parties, as well as the Master and the circuit court, also rely extensively on dicta in this Court's recent decision, Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 754 A.2d 389 (2000), to support their respective arguments. We will briefly address the proper application of each of these statutory sections in the Family Law Article and the application of our decision in Langston, supra, as such review will not only provide guidance for future proceedings of this nature, but will help to narrow the issue before us.

First, the facts of this case do not present a situation encompassed by Section 12-104 of the Family Law Article, which confines a court's ability to modify a child support order subsequent to the date of the filing of a motion for modification. In the case sub judice, this Court must consider the viability of a child support order after the very paternity declaration, from which the child support order originates, has been vacated, not the modification of a child support order requested as a result of some material change of circumstance of one of the parties before the court. Therefore, Section 12-104 does not limit our review of the issue presently before us.

Second, the facts of this case do not permit consideration of the discretionary authority afforded courts by Section 5-1038(b), which provides:

Except for a declaration of paternity, the court may modify or set aside any order or part of an order under this subtitle as the court considers just and proper in light of the circumstances and in the best interests of the child.

Md.Code, § 5-1038(b) of the Family Law Article. We have clearly stated, on several occasions, that Section 5-1038(b) operates to ensure continuing jurisdiction for paternity orders (with the exception of paternity declarations) for purposes of modifying or vacating those orders as may be "just and proper in light of the circumstances and in the best interests of the child." Id.; See also, Jessica G. v. Hector M., 337 Md. 388, 401, 653 A.2d 922, 928-29 (1995); Adams v. Mallory, 308 Md. 453, 463, 520 A.2d 371, 376 (1987). Yet, the orders subject to this provision are those articulated throughout the paternity proceeding subtitle, and therefore, necessarily stem from a paternity declaration.7See Md.Code, § 5-1038(b)(explicitly encompassing "any order or part of order under this subtitle""this subtitle" refers to subtitle 10 which consists of paternity proceedings provisions). In the absence of a paternity declaration, these orders have no foundation and the aforementioned "continuing jurisdiction" is meaningless.

This case presents a factually unique circumstance: the circuit court terminated ongoing child support, yet ruled that the arrearage, which resulted from the very same child support order, still obligated the now non-paternal "father." Ostensibly, the circuit court used its discretionary authority to "modify" a child support order as is "just and proper in light of the circumstances." Md.Code, § 5-1308(b). Contrary to the parties' assertions, this is not a situation that can be readily discharged under Section 5-1038(b). In fact, Section 5-1038(b) is inapplicable. Section 5-1038(b) deals strictly with paternity orders, i.e. orders relating to or arising from paternity declarations, or more specifically, orders relating to valid and enforceable paternity declarations. The absence of a paternity declaration, as becomes its status upon vacatur,8 demands the abrogation of a court's discretion to "modify or set aside" a child support order relating to that paternity declaration.

The utility of Section 5-1038(b) is that it grants courts discretionary authority to modify paternity orders when a valid paternity declaration is in place. A court has no discretion, however,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
243 cases
  • 100 Harborview Drive Condo. Council of Unit Owners v. Clark
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • July 30, 2015
    ...[we] must determine whether the lower court's conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392, 788 A.2d 609 (2002) (citing In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 704–05, 782 A.2d 332 (2001) ).a. The phrase “books and records” includes written a......
  • Southern Management v. Taha
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • November 25, 2003
    ...revise a judgment within thirty days after it is entered."), superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 400, 788 A.2d 609, 617 (2002); Platt v. Platt, 302 Md. 9, 13, 485 A.2d 250, 252 (1984) (describing the law governing the power of a court over an e......
  • Romero v. Perez
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • April 1, 2019
    ...if the circuit court order was legally correct). We do so de novo . Nesbit , 382 Md. at 72, 854 A.2d 879 (quoting Walter v. Gunter , 367 Md. 386, 392, 788 A.2d 609 (2002) ) ("When the trial court's order ‘involves interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court ......
  • Woznicki v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • May 27, 2015
    ...construction de novo. See Nesbit v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 382 Md. 65, 72, 854 A.2d 879, 883 (2004) (quoting Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392, 788 A.2d 609, 612 (2002) ) (“When the trial court's order ‘involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Genes, parents, and assisted reproductive technologies: arts, mistakes, sex, race, & law.
    • United States
    • Columbia Journal of Gender and Law Vol. 12 No. 1, January 2003
    • January 1, 2003
    ...ex. rel. J.A.U. v. R.L.C., 47 P.3d 327 (Colo. 2002); Kim C. v. Glenn W., 744 N.Y.S.2d 777 (App. Div. 2002). But see Walter v. Gunter, 788 A.2d 609 (Md. 2002), where putative father's child support obligation was vacated after genetic testing excluded him as the (138.) Linda Lacey objects to......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT