Reckitt & Colman, Ltd. v. Administrator, Drug Enforcement Admin.

• Decision Date: 08 April 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1193,85-1193
• Parties: RECKITT & COLMAN, LTD., Petitioner, v. ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, Respondent. McNeil Pharmaceutical, Intervenor.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 22

788 F.2d 22

252 U.S.App.D.C. 120

RECKITT & COLMAN, LTD., Petitioner, v. ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, Respondent McNeil Pharmaceutical, Intervenor.

No. 85-1193.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Feb. 12, 1986.

Decided April 8, 1986.

As Amended April 8, 1986.

Petition for Review of an Order of Drug Enforcement administration.

Thomas O. Henteleff, Washington, D.C., with whom Peter R. Mathers, Washington, D.C., was on brief for petitioner.

Gary Schneider, Atty., Dept. of Justice, with whom Stephen E. Stone, Associate Chief Counsel, Dept. of Justice, and Charles E. Pazar, Sr. Atty., Drug Enforcement Administration, Washington, D.C., were on brief for respondent.

Robert A. Dormer, with whom Robert T. Angarola, Washington, D.C., was on brief for intervenor.

Before ROBINSON, Chief Judge, and MIKVA and SILBERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge:

This is a petition for review of an order of the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency maintaining the classification of the drug buprenorphine as a narcotic under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. Secs. 801-966 (1982). The petitioner, Reckitt & Colman, Ltd., complains that the DEA Administrator's designation of buprenorphine as a narcotic rests on an improper determination that buprenorphine is a derivative of the opiate drug thebaine. Because we conclude that the Administrator's definition of the statutory term "derivative" represents a permissible construction of the Act, and that substantial record evidence supports the Administrator's conclusion that buprenorphine falls within this definition, we affirm the Administrator's decision.

I.

The Controlled Substances Act is a comprehensive regulatory measure that divides the universe of hazardous drugs into different schedules subject to varying degrees of control. See 21 U.S.C. Sec. 812 (1982). The Act also designates certain substances as "narcotic drugs." See id. Sec. 802(16). In general, the severity of restrictions imposed on the marketing of controlled drugs depends more on what schedule a drug is placed in than on whether it is designated a narcotic. Classification as a narcotic, however, does circumscribe the manner and extent of a drug's importation and exportation, see id. Secs. 952-53, and its use in drug detoxification programs, see id. Sec. 823(g). Moreover, criminal penalties for violations of the Act are harsher if a narcotic substance is involved. See id. Sec. 841(b)(1). And, in practical terms, the DEA's classification of a drug as a narcotic may be expected to impair a drug manufacturer's marketing freedom.

Under the Act, any "derivative" of opium or an opiate is classified as a narcotic drug. ¹ Buprenorphine is a relatively new drug, produced from the opium constituent thebaine, that has been developed for medical use as a pain reliever. Although buprenorphine is marketed in many foreign countries, Reckitt & Colman has attempted to introduce it into the United States only recently. In May 1982, the Department of Health and Human Services notified the DEA Administrator that a new drug application for buprenorphine had been approved. HHS recommended that the DEA Administrator modify buprenorphine's status as a Schedule II controlled substance under the Act to the less restricted status of Schedule V. HHS also recommended, however, that buprenorphine continue to be classified as a narcotic drug on the ground that it is a thebaine derivative.

In September 1982, the Administrator issued a notice of proposed rulemaking indicating that buprenorphine would be transferred to Schedule V but would retain its classification as a narcotic. 47 Fed.Reg. 41,401 (1982). Reckitt & Colman objected, urging that buprenorphine should be entirely decontrolled and that it should not be designated a narcotic. The matter was set for an on-the-record hearing before an administrative law judge. In October 1984, the ALJ issued an opinion essentially agreeing with Reckitt & Colman's position. The DEA Administrator, however, rejected the ALJ's conclusions and issued a final order placing buprenorphine in Schedule V and retaining its designation as a narcotic. 50 Fed.Reg. 8104 (1985). Although Reckitt & Colman has abandoned its objection to the placement of buprenorphine in Schedule V, it challenges that part of the Administrator's order maintaining buprenorphine's narcotic classification. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Sec. 877 (1982). ²

II.

Reckitt & Colman contends that in maintaining buprenorphine's narcotic classification, the DEA Administrator adopted an unprecedented and improper definition of the statutory term "derivative." To be sure, this is a fairly unusual case. In the course of the administrative proceedings, it became apparent that the derivative status of a substance is a more complicated and uncertain matter than previously thought by the agency. Buprenorphine had heretofore been considered a derivative of thebaine simply because it is prepared from thebaine. Under modern technological methods, however, it is possible to prepare aspirin, acetaminophen (Tylenol), and, apparently, even water from thebaine. Thus, a more refined (and restrictive) definition of "derivative" was obviously needed. But neither the Act nor its legislative history purport to define what a derivative is. Under these circumstances, the Administrator indicated that the agency would regard as a derivative of a drug any substance (1) prepared from that drug, (2) which chemically resembles that drug, and (3) which has some of the adverse effects of that drug. See 50 Fed.Reg. 8104, 8107 (1985). The Administrator then concluded, "Buprenorphine possesses sufficient opiate-like actions and does so resemble the structure of its parent, thebaine, that it must be considered to be a derivative thereof...." Id.

Reckitt & Colman argues that the Administrator's construction of the Act is flawed because it defines the term "derivative" too broadly. In the petitioner's view, a substance may rightly be regarded as a derivative of another only if it can be produced from it in only one or two chemical operations. (Buprenorphine is produced from thebaine in six or seven steps). The Administrator rejected this narrow "two-step" definition. He felt that "[t]o attribute great significance to the actual number of chemical steps is misleading"--that what is important, rather, is the overall chemical similarity of the product to its parent. Id. We conclude that this aspect of the Administrator's definition is "sufficiently reasonable" to warrant judicial deference. Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39, 102 S.Ct. 38, 46, 70 L.Ed.2d 23 (1981). Although the Administrator was not necessarily required to follow a strictly scientific definition, cf. United States v. An Article of Drug ... Bacto-Unidisk...., 394 U.S. 784, 792, 798, 89 S.Ct. 1410, 1418, 22 L.Ed.2d 726 (1969), ³ the definition he adopted is nevertheless consistent with that employed by chemists. ⁴

Reckitt & Colman also argues that the Administrator erred in considering a substance's pharmacological effects as an aspect of the definition of "derivative." Reckitt & Colman maintains that whether one substance is a derivative of another is solely a question of the two substance's chemical relationship. Under the Act, substances with addictive potential comparable to morphine are classified as "opiates," 21 U.S.C. Sec. 802(17) (1982), and hence narcotics, id. Sec. 802(16)(A). Thus, the petitioner contends, the statute's reference to "opiates" exhausts the range of situations in which a substance's pharmacological attributes bear on whether it is a narcotic. We find this argument uncompelling. Nothing in the Act dictates that the Administrator must blind himself to the abusive consequences associated with a drug short of effects comparable to morphine. Given the Act's overarching purpose of controlling the distribution of harmful drugs, id. Sec. 801, we think it quite reasonable that the Administrator sought to confirm the theoretical chemical similarity of buprenorphine to thebaine by examining its real-world effects. As the Administrator noted, "It is quite clear that addicts recognize buprenorphine as a narcotic and utilize it as a heroin substitute. They clearly understand that buprenorphine is not aspirin or [Tylenol]." 50 Fed.Reg. 8104, 8107 (1985).

In short, the Administrator has drawn upon his expertise to fashion an interpretation of an undefined and potentially ambiguous statutory term. Because that interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the Act's purposes, we are obliged to defer to it. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); Federal Election Comm'n, 454 U.S. at 37; Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231, 94 S.Ct. 1055, 1072, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-82, 385-86, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1801-02, 1804, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969).

III.

Reckitt & Colman also argues that the Administrator's conclusion that buprenorphine falls within this definition is not supported by substantial evidence. Reckitt & Colman does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence introduced regarding buprenorphine's pharmacological attributes; ⁵ the Administrator had before him extensive evidence about abuse associated with buprenorphine in West Germany, Australia, New Zealand, and other countries. See 50 Fed.Reg. 8104, 8106 (1985). Instead, Reckitt & Colman focuses its attack on the Administrator's conclusion that buprenorphine is chemically similar to thebaine. According to the petitioner, the only evidence supporting this finding was the testimony of one witness, Dr. Zelesko, who is employed by intervenor McNeil Pharmaceutical. ⁶ The petitioner argues that the ALJ found this witness'...