788 F.2d 954 (3rd Cir. 1986), 85-3073, Ali v. Sims

Docket Nº:Ishmael Muslim ALI, Appellee in 85-3073, Cross-Appellant in 85-3143,
Citation:788 F.2d 954
Case Date:April 21, 1986
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Page 954

788 F.2d 954 (3rd Cir. 1986)

Ishmael Muslim ALI, Appellee in 85-3073, Cross-Appellant in 85-3143,


Rudolph SIMS, Edwin Potter, Richard Schraeder, James Daniel

and Brenda Blyden.

Appeal of Rudolph SIMS, Director, Bureau of Corrections,

Edwin Potter, Warden, Richard Schraeder, Committer Chairman,

James Daniel, Committee Member and Brenda Blyden, Committee

Member, Appellants in 85-3073, Cross-Appellees in 85- 3143.

Nos. 85-3073, 85-3143.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

April 21, 1986

Argued Dec. 3, 1985.

Benjamin A. Currence (argued), Pallme & Mitchell, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, for appellee/cross-appellant.

Cornelius Evans (argued), Dept. of Law, Christiansted, St. Croix, Virgin Islands, for appellants/cross-appellees.

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Before HUNTER, GARTH and BECKER, Circuit Judges.


BECKER, Circuit Judge.

These are cross-appeals from the judgment of the district court of the Virgin Islands awarding damages to the plaintiff, a prison inmate, for the violation of his due process rights; the defendants appeal the finding of liability, while plaintiff's appeal concerns the amount of the damages. Defendants' appeal presents the question of the propriety of the district court's imposition of sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 that led to a grant of partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on liability; the partial summary judgment was an important basis for the jury's award of damages.

We hold that the district court's sanctions order was an abuse of discretion. Because the sanctions order led to a finding of liability, we vacate the judgment against defendants. In the ordinary course we would remand the case to the district court for a new trial. However, this case presents a special problem in that regard because plaintiff, Ishmael Muslim Ali, is a fugitive from justice. 1 We therefore must decide whether Ali is entitled to proceed with a new trial in view of his fugitive status. For the reasons that follow we conclude that he is not.


On November 2, 1979, Ali, then a prisoner in the custody of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections, was placed in solitary confinement ("lockdown") on the grounds that he had disrupted institutional security. He was not given a hearing prior to his confinement, and remained in solitary confinement for nineteen days before he received a hearing. On November 20, a disciplinary hearing was held, at which Ali was found guilty of disrupting the institution and was sentenced to ninety more days in solitary confinement.

On October 29, 1980, acting pro se, Ali filed a complaint in the District Court of the Virgin Islands alleging that five prison officials had infringed his due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The complaint alleged due process violations both in the initial lockdown without a hearing and in the sentence of ninety days' lockdown following the hearing. Ali sought monetary damages against three of the defendants, a declaratory judgment that all five defendants had violated his constitutional rights, and an injunction prohibiting future discrimination against him. Some defendants answered on December 16, the others on December 24.

The docket sheet suggests that there was no activity in this case from January, 1981 to June, 1983, and the record offers no explanation for this long period of inactivity. In June, 1983, trial was scheduled for February, 1984. The trial date was continued, however, and on January 26, 1984, Ali, still acting pro se, filed and served upon defendants a demand for production of documents, and on February 21, filed and served several interrogatories. Defendants did not respond to these discovery requests. On May 31, 1984, a United States Magistrate, to whom the matter had apparently been referred, ordered a response to plaintiff's discovery requests within 15 days; however, the order was not complied with.

While the record is unclear as to the precise events during this time period, it appears that defendants, all public officials, who for some reason had been represented

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by private counsel, were in the process of shifting to representation by the attorney general's office. On January 30, 1984, Albert Sheen, who then represented the three appellants, moved for a continuance (the trial was then scheduled for February 6) stating that at the time he undertook representation of defendants, "it was anticipated that the Office of the Attorney General would have been substituted in [my] stead, prior to trial.... [W]ithin 15 days of today's date, counsel will either secure substitution through the office of the Attorney General, or file whatever motions may be appropriate." On August 7, the district court approved the replacement of Sheen by the attorney general's office.

On October 9, 1984, the district court, sua sponte, and pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b), entered an order that "the factual allegations of plaintiff's complaint shall be deemed admitted." The entire articulated grounds of the sanctions order was defendants having "brazenly ignored" the magistrate's May 31 order to respond promptly to plaintiff's discovery requests. Based on the fact that the material allegations of plaintiff's complaint were deemed admitted, the district court granted summary judgment in Ali's favor with respect to the charge that the initial lockdown violated Ali's due process rights. The court did not grant summary judgment with respect to the...

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