Pritchard v. State

Decision Date05 March 1990
Docket NumberNo. CV-89-0227-PR,CV-89-0227-PR
PartiesJames PRITCHARD and Antoinette Pritchard, husband and wife, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. STATE of Arizona, a body politic; Dennis Hunt, individually and as an employee of the Arizona Department of Corrections, and Louanne Hunt, his wife, Defendants/Appellees.
CourtArizona Supreme Court

Bosco & DiMatteo, P.C. by Carm R. Moehle and Nicholas E. Vakula, Phoenix, for plaintiffs/appellants.

Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by Judith Elaine Abramsohn, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for defendants/appellees.

Morrison and Morrison by Robert Morrison, Sierra Vista, for amici curiae Lloyd C. and L.A. Taffy Hill and United Services Auto. Ass'n.

MOELLER, Justice.

JURISDICTION

Plaintiff was shot and seriously wounded during an armed burglary at plaintiff's home. He filed an action against the state alleging that the state was liable to him by reason of negligent supervision of the burglar, who was on parole. The state moved to dismiss on various grounds. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and a divided court of appeals affirmed on the ground that plaintiff had failed to file a claim against the state within the twelve-month period prescribed by A.R.S. § 12-821. We granted review pursuant to Rule 23, Ariz.R.Civ.App.P., 17B A.R.S. and have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art 6, § 5(3).

ISSUES

We are presented with two issues:

1. Whether filing a claim with the state pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-821 is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a suit against the state.

2. Whether a factual determination of excusable neglect or incompetence under A.R.S. § 12-821 is a matter for the court or the jury.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the morning of January 11, 1985, Dennis Paul Eddy, also known as Bobby L. Beason, committed a burglary at the residence of the plaintiff, James Pritchard. In the course of that burglary, Eddy shot plaintiff in the stomach. At the time, Eddy was in parole custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections.

Following his gunshot wound, plaintiff underwent three surgeries and extensive hospital and home care. He is still undergoing medical treatment and incurring expenses from wound complications. His medical expenses are estimated at $50,000 and continue to rise. According to psychologist Dr. Terry Scritchlow, plaintiff also suffers from acute post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the shooting.

In May 1986, plaintiff participated in the prosecution of his assailant in Coconino County Superior Court. Eddy was sentenced to prison for armed burglary and aggravated assault. After sentencing, plaintiff discussed his medical bills and other problems with prosecuting attorney Fred Newton. Newton suggested that plaintiff might have a cause of action against the state for his injuries and damages. On December 12, 1986, plaintiff and his wife consulted an attorney regarding a civil claim against the state. Four days later, a claim was delivered to the attorney general. On January 9, 1987, the last day before the expiration of the statute of limitations, plaintiffs filed a complaint in superior court alleging that defendants failed to properly supervise parolee Eddy or to revoke his parole and incarcerate him. 1

The state filed a motion to dismiss based on both Rule 12(b)(1) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction) and Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim). The state argued that plaintiff's claim was not timely because it was not presented within the twelve months after the cause of action accrued as specified by A.R.S. § 12-821. The state also argued that plaintiff failed to state a sum certain in his complaint and that the complaint was premature because the state had not denied the claim prior to the filing of the suit.

In response to the timeliness aspect of the motion to dismiss, plaintiff contended that he was incompetent within the meaning of § 12-821(B) until sometime in 1986, thus making timely the filing of his claim In support of his position, plaintiff submitted four affidavits to the trial court. Prosecutor Newton's affidavit described the emotional and physical problems that plaintiff encountered at the trial of his assailant in 1986. In his affidavit, Dr. Scritchlow, plaintiff's psychologist in 1985, expressed dismay at plaintiff's emotional progress as of May 27, 1987. Dr. Scritchlow further stated that plaintiff was totally disabled from conducting his own affairs from the time he was shot in January 1985 until the early part of November 1985. In early November 1985, Dr. Scritchlow noted that plaintiff "began to regain his decision making abilities." Affidavits from Mr. and Mrs. Pritchard stated that plaintiff was still avoiding thinking about the shooting incident, and that they were still incurring medical expenses. The affidavits also noted that the Pritchards never considered compensation for their injuries until advised of the possibility by prosecuting attorney Newton.

[163 Ariz. 429] in December 1986. In the alternative, he argued that his failure to file was excusable neglect under the circumstances.

The trial court granted the state's motion to dismiss without an evidentiary hearing and without explanation. On review, the majority of the court of appeals held first that, under A.R.S. § 12-821(A), filing a timely claim with the state is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a complaint. Pritchard v. State of Arizona, 161 Ariz. 450, 452, 778 P.2d 1346, 1348 (App.1989). The majority then held that any factual dispute concerning the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction was a question to be resolved by the court alone, rather than the jury. Id. at 452, 778 P.2d at 1348. The court of appeals recognized that the facts were disputed and that no evidentiary hearing had been held. Id. Concluding that plaintiff had waived an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss by not requesting one, the court proceeded to an analysis of the affidavits plaintiff had submitted. Id. at 453, 778 P.2d at 1349. The court concluded that because the factual issue was one for resolution by the judge and not the jury, the issue on appeal was whether reasonable evidence supported the trial court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction because of a failure to comply with A.R.S. § 12-821. Id. at 451-52, 778 P.2d at 1347-48. The majority concluded that the evidence would support a finding that plaintiff's neglect to file a timely claim was not excusable and that plaintiff's disability ceased in the early part of November 1985, more than one year prior to the complaint's filing. Id. at 453, 778 P.2d at 1349. Consequently, the majority affirmed the trial court's dismissal based upon a presumed finding of untimeliness. Id. Therefore, it did not reach the issues of the lack of sum certain in the plaintiff's claim or the alleged lack of the state's disallowance of plaintiff's claim before filing.

In his dissent, Judge Fidel disagreed with the majority's conclusion that a timely claim filed against the state is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a complaint. Id. at 455, 778 P.2d at 1351 (Fidel, J., dissenting). Judge Fidel also asserted that the trial court could not properly have concluded that Pritchard's disability ceased by November 1985. Id. at 455-56, 778 P.2d at 1351-52. The dissent deemed "Pritchard's participation in the prosecution of Eddy an excuse for neglect of his own interests as a matter of law." Id. at 456, 778 P.2d at 1352. Because plaintiff's affidavit evidence was uncontroverted by the state, the dissent would have found that plaintiff's claim was timely as a matter of law. Id.

We hold that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the disputed facts presented a jurisdictional issue for resolution by the court alone.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff, relying on our decision in Bonner v. Minico, Inc., 159 Ariz. 246, 766 P.2d 598 (1988), first argues that whether his failure to file a timely claim is due to excusable neglect or incompetence should be a matter for a jury and not a judge. Although we agree the issue is one for a jury unless a jury is waived, plaintiff's reliance on Minico is misplaced. In Minico we held that when the determination of a trial court's jurisdiction necessarily in volves After examining the language of § 12-821, the legislative policy underlying the statute, and prior precedent on the matter, we conclude that filing a claim with the state pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-821 goes to the plaintiff's right to recover rather than to the power of the court to grant relief. We hold that filing a timely claim is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing suit, but is a requirement more analogous to a statute of limitations. Because compliance with § 12-821 is not jurisdictional, issues of excusable neglect or incompetence under the statute are to be resolved like any other disputed issue of fact in the case.

                the determination of disputed facts, which facts are intertwined with the merits of the case, the resolution of the disputed fact issues is for the jury.  Id. at 256, 766 P.2d at 608.   However, we conclude that Minico is not relevant here because we hold that § 12-821 is not jurisdictional
                

Subject matter jurisdiction is the court's fundamental power to grant relief in a pending case. Collins v. Robbins, 147 Me. 163, 168, 84 A.2d 536, 538 (1951). Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 14, provides that "[t]he superior court shall have original jurisdiction of: 1. Cases and proceedings in which exclusive jurisdiction is not vested by law in another court." Because the superior court is a court of general jurisdiction, a presumption exists in favor of retention of jurisdiction, and a divestiture of jurisdiction cannot be inferred but must be clearly and unambiguously found. See Dockery v. Central Arizona Light & Power Co., 45 Ariz. 434, 443, 45 P.2d 656, 659 (1935); Varnes v. White, 40 Ariz. 427, 431, 12 P.2d 870, 871 (1932); State v. Villados, 55 Haw. 394, 520 P.2d 427, 430...

To continue reading

Request your trial
111 cases
  • Millman v. County of Butler
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • July 27, 1990
    ...[trial court] has jurisdiction of the subject matter. 121 Wis.2d at 51-52 n. 6, 357 N.W.2d at 552 n. 6. See, also, Pritchard v. State, 163 Ariz. 427, 788 P.2d 1178 (1990) (filing a claim is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for an action against government under tort claims act); Moran v. T......
  • Hayes v. Continental Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • April 21, 1994
    ...of retaining jurisdiction and will not find divestiture unless stated clearly, explicitly, and unambiguously. Pritchard v. State, 163 Ariz. 427, 430, 788 P.2d 1178, 1181 (1990); Daou v. Harris, 139 Ariz. 353, 356, 678 P.2d 934, 937 (1984). Thus, this court has generally declined to find pre......
  • McCarthy v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. No. 48, CV18-1351-PHX-DGC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Arizona
    • August 23, 2019
    ...estoppel and tolling. Jones v. Cochise County , 218 Ariz. 372, 187 P.3d 97, 104 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Pritchard v. State , 163 Ariz. 427, 788 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1990) ). Equitable estoppel applies if "(1) the party to be estopped intentionally or negligently induces another to believ......
  • Florez v. Sargeant
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • May 16, 1996
    ...the date of accrual of a cause of action are in dispute, the jury must determine whether the action is barred. Pritchard v. State, 163 Ariz. 427, 433, 788 P.2d 1178, 1184 (1990). The same rule applies, of course, to factual disputes over the application of a tolling statute. Vega v. Morris,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT