Jackson v. Procunier

• Citation: 789 F.2d 307
• Decision Date: 09 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84-2239,84-2239
• Parties: Andrew Lee JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Raymond K. PROCUNIER, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Page 307

789 F.2d 307

Andrew Lee JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Raymond K. PROCUNIER, Director, Texas Department of

Corrections, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 84-2239.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 9, 1986.

Jim Mattox, Atty. Gen., David A. Harris, Gabriel G. Guintanilla, Asst. Attys. Gen., Austin, Tex., for defendants-appellees.

Andrew Lee Jackson, pro se.

Kevin B. Wiggins (court-appointed), Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before GEE, RUBIN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge:

A prisoner asserts that he was deprived of his constitutional right of access to the courts when his petition in forma pauperis was intentionally delayed by prison mailroom personnel. The delay resulted in the dismissal of his state appeal from an adverse judgment in a civil suit. The court below interpreted his claim as a negligent deprivation of property without due process. It dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on the ground that due process was satisfied by the existence of a post-deprivation state tort remedy. We find, however, that the district court misinterpreted the pro se complaint, which also states a cause of action for the intentional deprivation of a constitutional right implicit in the first amendment and in substantive due process. We, therefore, reverse the dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings, reserving ruling for issues that may possibly lurk in the case until the district court has either found the facts or the material facts have been made clear beyond genuine dispute.

I.

Andrew Lee Jackson, while incarcerated in a Texas prison, was a defendant in a civil suit in the Texas courts. He lost at trial, and on July 12, 1979, was notified by his counsel that his motion for a new trial had been denied, and that an appeal would require either posting an $8,000 bond before July 30 or filing an affidavit of his inability to do so by July 19. His allegations and deposition testimony are uncontradicted on the record therefore, we take the following facts as established. Jackson immediately prepared an affidavit of poverty and had it notarized the next day by Jack Garner, the Assistant Warden. Garder denied Jackson permission to enter the mailroom or to speak with a prison mail officer to determine the correct postage to send the affidavit by certified mail. He suggested that Jackson guess at the amount required.

Jackson deposited the affidavit in a prison mailbox that night. He attached two dollars in postage, printed "Attention, Urgent" in large red letters on the envelope, and attached a note instructing the mail officers to send the envelope by certified mail if there was enough postage, otherwise to send it first class. The envelope was addressed to his attorney, and the note stated that it contained legal documents that had to be in court by July 19.

The next morning, July 14, the envelope was collected by a prison mail officer. It was returned to Jackson four days later, on the evening of the 18th, with a note that 41 cents more was needed to pay for the postage for certified mail. Jackson mailed it a second time that evening. It reached his attorney on the 23rd, and the attorney filed the affidavit in court the same day. Despite Jackson's written explanation for the delay the Texas court dismissed his appeal for failure to timely file the affidavit.

Jackson brought suit pro se, under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleging that Garner and the mailroom personnel denied his right of access to the courts by deliberately delaying his mail, ignoring his instructions, and preventing him from ascertaining the correct postage. He named as defendants the four mailroom officers on duty during the five days that his mail was delayed; Assistant Warden Garner; C.D. Burson, the Building Major; E.H. Turner, the Warden; and W.J. Estelle, the Director of the Texas Department of Corrections.

Jackson was granted an evidentiary hearing, of which no transcript was made, and was deposed by the defendants' attorney. Jackson's efforts to conduct discovery, obtain mailroom records, and serve interrogatories were repeatedly rebuffed, even after his motion to compel discovery was granted. Jackson was unable, therefore, to fix responsibility on any particular defendant or to adduce support for his allegations that the delay was intentional.

The defendants filed a motion seeking summary judgment, suggesting, inconsistently, that the "complaint should properly be dismissed by this Court for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 56." They argued that the complaint stated nothing more than a tort, and that, under Parratt v. Taylor ¹ and Baker v. McCollan, ² the existence of a state law remedy provided adequate due process for any deprivation that Jackson might have sustained. Drawing support from Jackson's deposition, the motion argued that respondeat superior was the sole basis for including Burson, Turner, and Estelle as defendants, and that they should therefore be dismissed from the case because Sec. 1983 does not impose vicarious liability. ³ Deposition excerpts were submitted with the motion.

Jackson filed a pro se response, stating that he had not alleged a negligent deprivation of property without procedural due process, as in Parratt, but a deliberate violation of his constitutional right of access to the courts, guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. He also raised a disputed issue of material fact, claiming that the prison supervisory personnel knew of "a long history of deliberate and malicious" mishandling of the prisoners' legal correspondence, and that the supervisors were personally responsible for the deprivation he suffered because of their refusal to correct the longstanding abuses of their subordinates.

In ruling on the motion, the magistrate referred to Jackson's deposition, but also took the allegations of his complaint as true. He characterized Jackson's action as a tort for negligent handling of mail, stating "there is not even an allegation by plaintiff that any of the Defendants knew the contents of or the urgency of the package." He concluded that, under Parratt, the existence of a state tort post-deprivation remedy provided sufficient procedural due process, and Jackson had suffered no constitutional deprivation. Consequently, he dismissed the complaint "without prejudice." The district court adopted the magistrate's report, and Jackson appealed.

II.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is to be evaluated only on the pleadings. ⁴ It is not interchangeable with a motion for summary judgment, for the latter may impose a burden on the non-moving party to supplement its pleadings with affidavits, depositions, or other evidence to demonstrate that a genuine dispute exists over material facts. ⁵ A complaint sought to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) may generally be amended to cure its deficiencies. ⁶ Summary judgment, however, is a final adjudication on the merits.

When, as here, matters outside the pleadings are presented to, and considered by, the district court, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) provides that the motion "shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56," so long as the opposing party has been afforded the opportunity to respond in accordance with Rule 56. ⁷ In such cases, an appellate court may review the lower court's decision as one for summary judgment, even if the court mislabeled it as a 12(b)(6) dismissal. ⁸ We, therefore, review the district court's dismissal as a grant of summary judgment.

III.

In Augustine v. Doe, we held, "Parratt applies only when the plaintiff alleges a deprivation of procedural due process; it is irrelevant when the plaintiff has alleged a violation of some substantive constitutional proscription." ⁹ While Parratt has been partially overruled, ¹⁰ this limitation remains applicable to so much of the decision as has continuing force.

Had Jackson alleged only a deprivation of procedural due process, whether negligent or intentional, ¹¹ the magistrate's disposition of the complaint would have been correct. Had Jackson alleged only a negligent deprivation of substantive due process, his complaint would also have failed as a matter of law under the recent Supreme Court decisions of Davidson v. Cannon ¹² and Daniels v. Williams. ¹³ We find, however, that the magistrate mischaracterized Jackson's complaint, for Jackson expressly alleged the knowing and intentional deprivation of an enumerated constitutional right.

A substantive right of access to the courts has long been recognized. ¹⁴ In Ryland v. Shapiro, we characterized that right as "one of the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution." ¹⁵ In Wilson v. Thompson, we stated, "[i]t is by now well established that access to the courts is protected by the First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances." ¹⁶ That right has also been found in the fourteenth amendment guarantees of procedural and substantive due process. ¹⁷ Consequently, interference with access to the courts may constitute the deprivation of a substantive constitutional right as well as a potential deprivation of property without due process, and may give rise to a claim for relief under Sec. 1983. ¹⁸ Any deliberate impediment to access, even a delay of access, may constitute a constitutional deprivation. ¹⁹

The defendants argue that a prisoner's right of "adequate, effective, and meaningful" access to the courts, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Bounds v. Smith, ²⁰ is limited to the presentation of constitutional, civil rights, and habeas corpus claims. As we have recently said, obiter dicta, in Morrow v. Harwell, ²¹ the Bounds opinion was primarily concerned with constitutional and civil rights claims and with the minimum...