79 Hawai'i 14, Sato v. Tawata

• Decision Date: 19 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 16388,16388
• Citation: 79 Hawaii 14,897 P.2d 941
• Parties: 79 Hawai'i 14 Russell SATO and Shelley I. Sato, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Stephanie TAWATA, John Does 1-10, Jane Does 1-10, Doe Partnerships 1-10, Doe Corporations 1-10, Roe "Non-Profit" Corporations 1-10, and Roe Governmental Entities 1-10, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 941

897 P.2d 941

79 Hawai'i 14

Russell SATO and Shelley I. Sato, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Stephanie TAWATA, John Does 1-10, Jane Does 1-10, Doe

Partnerships 1-10, Doe Corporations 1-10, Roe

"Non-Profit" Corporations 1-10, and Roe

Governmental Entities 1-10,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16388.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

May 19, 1995.

Raymond J. Tam, Henry N. Kitamura and Peter B. Carlisle of Shim, Tam, Kirimitsu & Chang, on the briefs, Honolulu, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Melvyn M. Miyagi and V. Nicole Bynum of Reid, Richards & Miyagi, on the briefs, Honolulu, for defendant-appellee Stephanie Tawata.

Before MOON, C.J., KLEIN, LEVINSON and RAMIL, JJ. and Circuit Judge SHIMABUKURO, in place of NAKAYAMA, J., recused.

MOON, Chief Justice.

Plaintiffs-appellants Russell Sato (Sato) and Shelley I. Sato [hereinafter collectively, appellants] appeal from the judgment entered pursuant to special verdict following a jury trial. Briefly, the facts indicate that Sato was injured in an automobile accident when a car, driven by defendant-appellee Stephanie Tawata, collided into a Love's Bakery truck driven by Sato. At trial, Tawata was allowed to introduce, over appellants' objection, evidence of workers' compensation benefits Sato had received. On appeal, appellants contend that, because Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 386-8 (1985) unambiguously prohibits the introduction of workers' compensation benefits in any action brought to recover damages, the court abused its discretion in allowing its admission.

For the reasons discussed below, we hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence regarding Sato's receipt of workers' compensation benefits. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in favor of appellants in the amount of $306,474.11 and the order awarding costs to Tawata. ¹

I. BACKGROUND

Sato was the driver of a Love's Bakery truck that was broadsided by a car driven by Tawata on February 5, 1988. At the time of the accident, Sato was employed by Love's Bakery as a pastry route salesman. Sato claimed he could not return to work because of the disability he suffered as a result of the accident. He maintained that he had sustained injuries to his back and suffered from panic disorder with mild agoraphobia, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and chronic pain syndrome. In their action for personal injury, Sato sought medical and rehabilitative expenses, past and future lost wages, and general damages for pain and suffering, and Shelley Sato claimed for loss of consortium.

Prior to trial, appellants filed a motion in limine to prohibit the introduction of the workers' compensation benefits Sato had received. Tawata opposed the motion and argued that Sato's workers' compensation benefits were admissible to show that Sato had no incentive to return to work because the benefits he was receiving approximated his pre-accident salary. The trial court granted the motion, subject to reconsideration upon the presentation of other evidence during trial.

At trial, appellants called as an expert witness Gregory Basting, M.D., a physician specializing in physical medicine and rehabilitation, who had treated Sato for his chronic pain syndrome. Dr. Basting testified, inter alia, that, although Sato complained of pain which prevented him from returning to work, there was no physiological basis for Sato's pain. To this extent, Dr. Basting confirmed the earlier testimony of Albert Chun-Hoon, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, who had testified that there was no physiological basis, such as soft tissue abnormality or muscle tightness, for explaining Sato's pain. Dr. Chun-Hoon also testified that Sato was physically capable of returning to work as a truck driver.

After Tawata completed her cross examination of Dr. Basting, she requested that the court reconsider its ruling with respect to Sato's receipt of workers' compensation benefits. During the court's reconsideration of Sato's motion in limine, which was conducted in the absence of the jury, Dr. Basting testified that Sato's receipt of workers' compensation benefits, which approximated his pre-accident salary, may have been a factor in causing Sato's pain syndrome and in his not returning to work. Following arguments from both sides, the court ruled that the evidence of Sato's workers' compensation benefits was a relevant subject of inquiry and, therefore, allowed Tawata to introduce evidence of Sato's receipt of workers' compensation benefits, but not as to the amount of such benefits.

Thereafter, in the presence of the jury, Dr. Basting testified that he agreed with Joseph Rogers, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist who was also treating Sato, that Sato's receipt of workers' compensation benefits, which approximated his pre-accident salary, was a "disincentive" to his returning to work. During Dr. Rogers' testimony, he explained his use of the term "disincentive" as "an explanation as to why people would not show an improvement in their pain, per se." Dr. Rogers opined that Sato was capable of returning to part-time sedentary work as early as August 1990. Moreover, testimony similar to that of Drs. Basting and Chun-Hoon was elicited from Rowlin Lichter, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, who testified that there was no organic or physiological basis for Sato's pain or other symptoms and that Sato was orthopedically and physically capable of returning to work as a driver for Love's Bakery.

Other evidence indicated that Sato: (1) has an IQ of 122; (2) was able to drive his wife to work; and (3) volunteered at the Mo'ili'ili Community Center in the elder home-care department, where his duties included cooking shopping for groceries, and taking his elderly "clients" on walks for exercise.

The jury, by special verdict, awarded Sato: (1) $65,175.11 in medical expenses; (2) $100,000.00 in past lost wages; (3) $11,300.00 in vocational rehabilitation expenses; (4) $55,000.00 in lost future earnings; ² and (5) $40,000.00 in general damages, for a total award of $271,474.11. Shelley was awarded $35,000.00 in general damages for her loss of consortium claim. As noted previously, Tawata was awarded costs in the amount of $16,602.16 pursuant to HRCP Rule 68, based upon appellants' rejection of her pretrial offer of judgment in the amount of $350,000.00. This timely appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether HRS § 386-8 prohibits the introduction of workers' compensation benefits in third party liability actions. HRS § 386-8 provides in pertinent part:

[w]hen a work injury for which compensation is payable under this chapter has been sustained under circumstances creating in some person other than the employer or another employee of the employer acting in the course of his employment a legal liability to pay damages on account thereof, the injured employee or his dependents (hereinafter referred to collectively as the employee) may claim compensation under this chapter and recover damages from such third person.

....

The amount of compensation paid by the employer or the amount of compensation to which the injured employee is entitled shall not be admissible in evidence in any action brought to recover damages.

(Emphasis added.)

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in allowing workers' compensation benefits received by Sato to be introduced at trial to show that such compensation, which approximated Sato's annual salary of $30,000.00, was a disincentive for him to return to work. Appellants also contend that the language of the statute not only prohibits the introduction of the actual amount of compensation but "indicates an intent to broadly restrict the introduction of [the fact that] ... compensation benefits [were] received by the injured employee[.]" Tawata, on the other hand, argues that the statute was not violated because (1) the actual amount of workers' compensation benefits received by Sato, (2) the period of time in which those benefits were received, and (3) the amount of Sato's medical expenses covered by workers' compensation were never specifically mentioned.

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewable de novo. Franks v. City and County of Honolulu, 74 Haw. 328, 334, 843 P.2d 668, 671 (1993). In so doing,

[o]ur primary duty in interpreting and applying statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intention to the fullest degree. Although the intention of the legislature is to be obtained primarily from the language of the statute itself, we have rejected an approach to statutory construction which limits us to the words of a statute[,] ... for when aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no rule of law which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on superficial examination. Thus, the plain language rule of statutory construction, does not preclude an examination of sources other than the language of the statute itself even when the language appears clear upon perfunctory review. Were this not the case, a court may be unable to adequately discern the underlying policy which the legislature seeks to promulgate and, thus, would be unable to determine if a literal construction would produce an absurd or unjust result, inconsistent with the policies of the statute.

Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 76 Hawai'i 46, 68-69, 868 P.2d 1193, 1215-16 (Klein, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), reconsideration denied, 76 Hawai'i 247, 871 P.2d 795 (1994). Unfortunately, the legislative history of HRS § 386-8 provides little guidance as to the statute's underlying policy. However, we agree with the South Carolina Supreme Court's interpretation of a workers' compensation statutory provision virtually identical to the provision at issue in this case ³ wherein the court held that "the primary purpose and intent [of the...