State ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Ret. Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio
| Decision Date | 08 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2015–1074.,2015–1074. |
| Citation | 150 Ohio St.3d 102,2016 Ohio 8024,79 N.E.3d 522 |
| Parties | The STATE ex rel. OHIO PRESBYTERIAN RETIREMENT SERVICES, INC., Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Ohio et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Rosemary D. Welsh, Cincinnati, for appellant.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Andrew Alatis, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission.
Robert A. Muehleisen, for appellee Sherry L. Redwine.
Philip J. Fulton Law Office, Philip J. Fulton, and Chelsea J. Fulton, Columbus, for amici curiae Ohio Association of Claimants' Council and Ohio Association for Justice.
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Robert A. Minor, Columbus, for amicus curiae Ohio Self–Insurers Association.
Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin, and Michael J. Hickey, Columbus, for amicus curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce.
{¶ 1} Appellee Sherry L. Redwine was receiving permanent-total-disability benefits based solely on the psychological condition in her workers' compensation claim. She subsequently applied for permanent-partial-disability benefits based upon the physical conditions in the same claim.
{¶ 2} Appellee Industrial Commission determined that an injured worker is not barred from receiving compensation for permanent partial disability for a condition or conditions in a claim that formed no part of the basis for a prior finding of permanent total disability in the same claim. Redwine's employer, appellant, Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Services, Inc. ("OPRS"), filed a complaint in the Tenth District Court of Appeals seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the commission to vacate its order. The court of appeals denied the writ.
{¶ 3} We hold that the commission has no authority to award an injured worker permanent-partial-disability compensation under R.C. 4123.57(A) when the worker has been previously found to be permanently totally disabled under R.C. 4123.58 in the same claim, even when the new finding is based on a condition or conditions in the claim that formed no part of the basis for the prior finding of permanent total disability. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and grant OPRS's request for a writ of mandamus.
{¶ 4} On August 13, 2003, Sherry Redwine was injured at work. She filed a workers' compensation claim that was allowed for the following conditions: lumbosacral strain
, radiculopathy right lower extremity, aggravation of pre-existing degenerative disc disease, depression, and ruptured disc at L4–5 with free disc fragment.
{¶ 5} Redwine applied for permanent-total-disability compensation. The commission concluded that Redwine was unable to perform any sustained remunerative employment due solely to the medical impairment caused by the allowed psychological condition in her claim and awarded her benefits beginning July 12, 2010, to continue until her death. The commission relied on the medical reports of Roberto Madrigal, Ph.D., Thomas W. Heitkemper, Ph.D., and Michael E. Miller, M.D. Because the decision was based exclusively on a medical condition, the commission was not required to consider any nonmedical disability factors.
{¶ 6} In August 2013, Redwine applied for permanent-partial-disability compensation. She conceded that she was not entitled to permanent-partial-disability benefits for her psychological condition (for which she had been granted permanent-total-disability compensation), but she maintained that she was entitled to this award based on the physical conditions allowed in her claim.
{¶ 7} A district hearing officer denied her application based on a lack of statutory authority for concurrent awards under R.C. 4123.57(A) and 4123.58. In addition, the hearing officer noted that the physical and psychological conditions were the result of the same workplace injury and under State ex rel. Murray v. Indus. Comm., 63 Ohio St.3d 473, 588 N.E.2d 855 (1992), a claimant is precluded from receiving simultaneous benefits for permanent partial disability and permanent total disability for the same injury.
{¶ 8} On reconsideration, a staff hearing officer concluded that a claimant is not barred from concurrent compensation for permanent partial disability if it is based on conditions that were not the basis for the prior finding of permanent total disability in the same claim. The hearing officer relied in part on the commission's analysis of the same issue in claim No. 02–354357 involving a different injured worker. In that case, the commission determined that the analysis of concurrent awards focuses on an injured worker's allowed medical conditions, not the injury or claim, citing State ex rel. Missik v. Youngstown, 65 Ohio St.3d 189, 602 N.E.2d 633 (1992), and State ex rel. Hoskins v. Indus. Comm., 87 Ohio St.3d 560, 722 N.E.2d 66 (2000).
{¶ 9} OPRS filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, alleging that there was no statutory authority for the commission's order and therefore it was not supported by some evidence. A magistrate determined that the writ should be denied. The magistrate relied on State ex rel. Mosley v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP–127, 2014-Ohio-1710, 2014 WL 1612681, and concluded that because the psychological condition formed the basis for the permanent-total-disability award, Redwine's physical conditions could be the basis of permanent-partial-disability compensation. The court of appeals adopted the magistrate's decision and denied the writ.
{¶ 10} This matter is before the court on the direct appeal of OPRS.
{¶ 11} OPRS seeks an extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the commission to vacate its decision of July 24, 2014, in which the commission concluded that an injured worker is not barred from receiving compensation for permanent partial disability for a condition or conditions in a claim that were not a basis for a prior finding of permanent total disability in the same claim. According to OPRS, the commission's decision was an abuse of discretion because there is no statutory authority for concurrent payment of permanent-partial-disability and permanent-total-disability compensation in the same claim.
{¶ 12} A mandatory writ may issue against the commission if it has incorrectly interpreted Ohio law. State ex rel. Gassmann v. Indus. Comm., 41 Ohio St.2d 64, 65, 322 N.E.2d 660 (1975). The issue before us is whether the commission's decision to consider Redwine's application for permanent-partial-disability benefits, after she was previously awarded compensation for permanent total disability in the same claim, was supported by the law. We find that it was not.
{¶ 13} Compensation rights for injured workers are limited to those conferred by statute. Westenberger v. Indus. Comm., 135 Ohio St. 211, 213, 20 N.E.2d 252 (1939). R.C. 4123.54 provides that with certain exceptions, every employee who is injured in the course of employment is entitled to receive compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury and such medical services as are provided by the Workers' Compensation Act.
{¶ 14} There are two types of compensation at issue in this case. Compensation for permanent partial disability is authorized by R.C. 4123.57(A) for "the percentage of the employee's permanent disability * * * based upon that condition of the employee resulting from the injury or occupational disease and causing permanent impairment." It is intended to compensate injured claimants who can still work. State ex rel. Kaska v. Indus. Comm., 63 Ohio St.3d 743, 746, 591 N.E.2d 235 (1992).
{¶ 15} Compensation for vocational permanent total disability is authorized by R.C. 4123.58(A) when "the allowed conditions either alone or with nonmedical disability factors render the claimant unable to do sustained remunerative work." State ex rel. Miller v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 418, 2002-Ohio-6664, 780 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 8. The purpose of permanent-total-disability benefits is "to compensate an injured worker for impairment of earning capacity." Ohio Adm.Code 4121–3–34(B)(1).
{¶ 16} In certain limited instances, the General Assembly has provided for payment of concurrent awards. For instance, R.C. 4123.57(C) authorizes compensation for partial impairment in addition to temporary-total-disability compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.56, and R.C. 4123.58(E) authorizes compensation for permanent total disability in addition to scheduled loss benefits under R.C. 4123.57(B). However, neither R.C. 4123.57 nor 4123.58 expressly authorizes concurrent payment of permanent-partial-disability and permanent-total-disability compensation. The conspicuous absence of any reference to concurrent payment of benefits in the statute "evinces a legislative intent to prohibit simultaneous receipt of these benefits." Murray, 63 Ohio St.3d at 475, 588 N.E.2d 855.1
{¶ 17} The court of appeals in this case justified its decision based on R.C. 4123.95, which mandates a liberal construction of the pertinent statutes in favor of injured workers. OPRS, citing Armstrong v. John R. Jurgensen Co.,
136 Ohio St.3d 58, 2013-Ohio-2237, 990 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 13, and State ex rel. Williams v. Colasurd, 71 Ohio St.3d 642, 644, 646 N.E.2d 830 (1995), argues that R.C. 4123.95 does not allow a court to read into a statute something that cannot reasonably be implied from the statute's language. We agree. R.C. 4123.95 does not authorize courts to alter the meaning of unambiguous statutory language. Armstrong, ¶ 13. Thus, the court of appeals could not read into either R.C. 4123.57 or 4123.58 authority to award concurrent permanent-partial-disability and permanent-total-disability compensation.
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State ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Ret. Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio
...Columbus, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce. Kennedy, J.{¶ 1} In State ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 150 Ohio St.3d 102, 2016-Ohio-8024, 79 N.E.3d 522 (" Ohio Presbyterian I"), we held that the Industrial Commission does not have......